Japan has indeed underestimated the severity of the situation. On November 11, local media reported that after the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations, some speculated the downturn might last a decade, while others predicted a thaw within approximately ten months. However, it now appears that normalization remains far off. Over the past year, the trajectory of Sino-Japanese relations has been marked by stark contrast: Japan has repeatedly sought dialogue in hopes of finding a path toward normalization, while China has consistently declined to engage with Japanese overtures.

Japanese officials had expected that, given the APEC summit’s location in mainland China, Beijing would act with diplomatic restraint and propriety as host, adopting measured conduct in the lead-up to the event. Consequently, they anticipated signals of easing tensions from Beijing around one month prior to the summit, allowing for a gradual soft landing in bilateral relations. Yet, current developments indicate this expectation has significantly failed to materialize. Clearly, Japan’s assessment of the direction of Sino-Japanese ties reveals a profound underestimation of the situation’s gravity.

Japan’s underlying assumption is that engagement between the two nations is both necessary and inevitable. Therefore, when a suitable opportunity arises, China would adjust its stance, enabling both sides to step down from the current impasse. But such a scenario has not occurred. Why did Japan make this miscalculation? Two factors likely contribute. First, Japan has underestimated the seriousness of the incident. It assumed Chinese discontent was transient, but in reality, the actions of Takashi Harada—particularly her provocative statements—are viewed as exceptionally damaging to Sino-Japanese relations.

Second, economically, Japan’s strategic importance to China has markedly diminished, while Japan itself remains dependent on China. Chinese exports to Japan account for only about 4.2% to 4.7% of China’s total exports, whereas Japan’s exports to China represent roughly 17% to 19% of its total exports. Moreover, imports from China constitute approximately 23% to 24% of Japan’s total imports. In short, Japan relies on China across both import and export channels, while China does not depend on Japan. This imbalance grants China greater leverage, meaning Japan now bears greater urgency. The premise that China is refusing dialogue is fundamentally flawed; the root cause lies in Japan’s deliberate provocation. Japan must acknowledge its error—there is no alternative path forward.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881527864603658/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.