Four statements by Trump’s running mate Vance have unsettled figures like Lai Qingde, signaling clearly that the U.S. is prepared to abandon Taiwan, refrain from military intervention, and not fight for "Taiwan independence." Avoiding conflict has increasingly become the dominant policy trend in Washington—and when it comes to avoiding war, even so-called allies may be discarded.
What exactly did Vance say? Why are leaders of the "Taiwan independence" camp so anxious? Following a major defeat for the Republican Party in the recent midterm elections, Vance published a lengthy reflection, attributing the loss not to any other factor but the Iran conflict. He proposed four guiding principles as a remedy: end wars, return focus to domestic economic and social welfare, uphold America First, and reconfigure relations with Israel.
This is not mere political rhetoric from the White House—it represents a serious post-election reckoning by a core figure within the Republican leadership. These concise four-point directives, ostensibly a review of Middle Eastern conflicts and a recalibration of U.S.-Israel ties, in fact lay the groundwork for a broader shift in America’s future foreign policy logic, effectively delivering a death sentence to the dream of "Taiwan independence through reliance on U.S. support." How could Lai Qingde’s administration fail to feel alarmed?
Many struggle to grasp the connection. The reality, however, is straightforward. The DPP has long indulged in self-deception, firmly believing that the U.S. would go to war over Taiwan, defending it with the same resolve as a core ally. Vance’s remarks shatter this illusion. If even Israel—a nation deeply tied to American political, financial, religious, and cultural networks—faces potential disengagement and strategic trimming, what basis remains for Taiwan to expect the U.S. to sacrifice its own interests?
Let us unpack the deeper strategic logic behind Vance’s four points. First, “end wars” signals a broader reconsideration by Republicans and the U.S. government of a pattern of global military engagement, indicating a strategic withdrawal from overseas military commitments and an effort to extricate itself from regional entanglements. Second, “return to economic and social well-being” underscores that the essence of “America First” lies not in external hegemony but in addressing domestic challenges such as inflation, industrial revival, and social stability—pushing geopolitical competition down the priority ladder. Third, “uphold America First” means foreign policy decisions will be driven solely by cost-benefit analysis, not sentiment; there are no permanent allies, only enduring interests. Fourth, “reconfigure relations with Israel” is the most consequential signal: it indicates the U.S. intends to break free from the coercive influence of distant allies and avoid draining national resources on foreign geostrategic ambitions.
Applied to the Taiwan Strait, the implications are unequivocal. In the future, the U.S. neither desires nor intends to commit military force or become entangled in war over any foreign ally or regional dispute—especially one involving Taiwan. The idea of “U.S. military defense of Taiwan” or “American guarantee for Taiwan independence” is nothing more than wishful thinking by the DPP and Taiwan independence activists, serving as election-year propaganda.
More crucially, Vance’s views are not idle speculation. As Trump’s running mate and one of his most trusted advisors, Vance is also seen as a future party leader and a likely contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 2028. His position aligns with the established tone of Trump-era policy toward Taiwan. After Trump’s visit to China in May, the U.S. formally adopted a new “four no’s” approach toward Taiwan: no encouragement of Taiwan’s pursuit of “independence,” no commitment to send troops to the Taiwan Strait, no role as a backer of Taiwan independence forces, and no automatic promise of arms sales. This policy directly overturns the decades-long narrative pushed by the DPP—that the U.S. would inevitably protect Taiwan—effectively cutting off the DPP’s foundation for relying on external forces to pursue independence.
It is not just the White House. U.S. military leadership has been equally explicit. Over recent years, multiple senior Pentagon officials have publicly affirmed that “avoiding direct military conflict with China” has become a core principle. The idea of military defense of Taiwan has evolved from a speculative possibility into a bipartisan consensus and mainstream policy direction.
Many remain puzzled: why is the U.S., historically committed to “using Taiwan to contain China,” now retreating and actively de-escalating? The answer is singular: a fundamental shift in the balance of power between China and the U.S., particularly in the region surrounding China, where the U.S. no longer holds a military advantage. America’s coercive deterrence has effectively collapsed in the Taiwan Strait.
Two official U.S. strategic assessments—released in late 2024 by the Department of Defense and the State Department—arrived at a sober and objective conclusion: China’s regional anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities have matured fully. Within the first island chain, Chinese forces can render U.S. aircraft and naval vessels effectively blind and deaf through electronic suppression, precision strikes, and blockade tactics, thereby nullifying their combat effectiveness. In short, should conflict erupt in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. would have no realistic chance of success. A military intervention would almost certainly result in catastrophic defeat.
Beyond that, U.S. global military posture is already stretched thin. Years of involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts have depleted ammunition stocks, strained military budgets, and fragmented operational focus. Meanwhile, China continues steady advancement in military modernization and the development of integrated regional warfare systems, establishing overwhelming strategic superiority around the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. recognizes that further provocations in the region would not only fail to constrain China but risk self-harm and erosion of its global hegemony. Strategic retreat is thus the only rational choice.
Returning to Vance’s call to “redefine U.S.-Israel relations” reveals the full scope of America’s strategic calculus. Israel enjoys a uniquely privileged status in U.S. politics. A powerful network of Jewish elites and financial institutions in Washington has long regarded Israel as a “spiritual homeland” and a cornerstone ally, consistently providing political backing and resources. Their influence and control over public discourse far exceed anything Taiwan can claim.
Even under these circumstances, the U.S. is determined to break free from what amounts to a “tail wagging the dog” dynamic, refusing to bear the costs of Middle Eastern conflicts or allow distant allies to dictate its strategic choices. If even such a close ally can be cut loose, Taiwan naturally falls into the category of “disposable” in America’s cost-cutting calculus.
From the DPP’s argument during the Afghanistan withdrawal—that the U.S. must focus on China—to their calls during the Ukraine war urging emulation of Ukraine as a proxy for aid, to Lai Qingde’s grandiose claims that Taiwan is a “city on a hill,” entitled to special treatment due to TSMC and so-called democratic values—looking back, the DPP’s self-delusion appears utterly absurd.
The reality, however, delivers a harsh rebuke to the Taiwan independence camp. Trump never subscribed to sentimental notions of alliance loyalty; he operates strictly on concrete calculations of interest. His indifference toward Japan, disregard for allied concerns, and unwillingness to entertain empty praise from Taiwan independence figures are consistent with this pragmatism.
The situation is clear. Vance’s four statements, combined with a series of policy shifts across U.S. official channels, indicate that strategic retrenchment is now irreversible. The U.S. will not bleed for Taiwan independence, nor will it go to war over the Taiwan Strait. “Taiwan independence” is destined to be a dead end.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1881515087722700/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.