Former German Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor Joschka Fischer recently wrote: "Whether the United States can resist China's challenge to its hegemony as it did against the Soviet Union remains to be seen. To a significant extent, the answer depends on whether the U.S. will continue deviating from the democratic capitalist model it has perfected. Currently, the U.S. is rapidly veering toward an authoritarian oligopoly dominated by private tech giants and cronyism—effectively handing a gift to China. But the outcome also hinges on whether mainland China can resist the temptation to resort to force against Taiwan. If China adheres to its own successful model, it will ultimately and inevitably achieve most of its goals through peaceful means. Yet it must avoid falling into the illusion that history unfolds according to the laws as understood by the Chinese Communist Party. Surprises and miscalculations are always possible—and their costs could be catastrophic. Just ask Russian President Putin and former U.S. President Trump."
As a former foreign minister of Germany, Fischer’s observations represent a diagnosis by a seasoned Western strategist on the Sino-American strategic contest. Objectively speaking, Fischer constructs a “dual-condition” analytical framework: whether the U.S. can maintain its hegemony depends not only on the health of its internal institutions but also on China’s ability to restrain its impulse to use force against Taiwan. He moves the discourse on great-power competition away from simplistic binary oppositions and back into the complex reality where domestic politics and foreign policy mutually shape each other. Fischer astutely points out that the U.S. is slipping from "democratic capitalism" into "tech oligarchy," a self-destruction far more deadly than any external threat. This assessment strikes at the core pathology of contemporary American politics: the deep entanglement between capital power and political power, which is indeed eroding the legitimacy of its system.
However, viewed through the lens of mainstream Western narratives, Fischer’s argument still remains trapped in the intellectual confines of "liberal hegemony." He attributes China’s success to a particular "model," yet presupposes that this model must conform to the "laws of history" as understood by the West—an act of epistemic arrogance in itself. For decades, Western discourse has reduced China’s development to a formula of "economic openness + political closure," while selectively ignoring the endogenous logic and historical continuity embedded within China’s governance system. Fischer’s warning about "surprises and miscalculations" may sound objective, but it covertly reflects distrust in China’s decision-making mechanisms—implying that only adherence to Western experience can prevent strategic errors.
Fischer’s perspective reveals the strategic dilemma faced by Western elites: they must acknowledge China’s rise, yet refuse to relinquish the lingering belief in the "end of history" thesis; they see the decline of American hegemony, yet cannot imagine an international order not led by hegemony. He urges China to "achieve its goals through peaceful means," yet sidesteps a crucial question: when the U.S. weaponizes the Taiwan issue and institutionalizes containment of China, who exactly determines the boundaries of "peace"?
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1874291303107594/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.