[By GuanchaNet Columnist Feng Chao]
April 30th this year marks the 50th anniversary of "the liberation of South Vietnam and national reunification." The Vietnamese government not only extended invitations for a military parade to its former "comrades-in-arms" China, Laos, and Cambodia but also invited countries and international organizations, as well as peace movement and anti-war activists from around the world including the United States, which has transitioned from conflict to conciliation.
However, the Trump administration refused to allow the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam and other diplomats to participate in related events under the pretext of avoiding interference with the focus on the administration's first 100 days in office. This absurd decision not only tore open historical wounds between the U.S. and Vietnam but also revealed the deeper困境of America's Indo-Pacific strategy centered on Vietnam: military inducements are mere posturing, economic ties have glaring loopholes, and cultural infiltration is out of place, ultimately reducing to a farce that amounts to "carrying water in a bamboo basket."
Since the Trump administration proposed the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" concept in November 2017, the U.S. has attempted to reshape the Asia-Pacific order through multidimensional means such as military, economic, and cultural efforts, viewing Vietnam as one of the key pivots. However, after nearly a decade of competition, America's attempts to advance its strategy through Vietnam have repeatedly faltered. From the trade war with high tariffs to the bluster over military cooperation, from failed economic entanglement to the inability to penetrate culturally, America's hegemonic logic has exposed structural flaws before Vietnam's "bamboo diplomacy."
This article analyzes the roots of the failure of America's Indo-Pacific strategy in Vietnam from four aspects: tariff policies, military cooperation, economic cooperation, and cultural infiltration, revealing the fundamental conflict between America's hegemonic logic and regional realities.
On April 27th, a general rehearsal for the military parade was held in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. The image shows a model vehicle of the Vietnamese national emblem. Photo by Vietnam News Agency.
The coercive tariff policy is merely a boomerang of economic pressure.
In April 2025, the U.S. imposed punitive tariffs of up to 46% on Vietnamese goods under the guise of balancing the trade deficit, affecting core export industries such as footwear and furniture, directly impacting approximately 35% of Vietnam’s shoe exports and 22% of its furniture exports to the U.S. This policy, ostensibly an economic measure, is actually part of the U.S. strategy to restructure global supply chains and weaken the industrial transfer benefits of China.
However, Vietnam did not succumb to the expected passivity but instead mitigated the crisis through diversified market layouts and diplomatic negotiations, primarily reflected in the following two points:
First, it proactively demonstrated weakness, adopting flexible negotiation strategies. The Vietnamese government immediately requested the U.S. to suspend taxation and promised to expand imports of agricultural and technological products from the U.S., using "tactical concessions" to gain buffer space.
Second, the resilience of regional supply chains became evident. Relying on deeply integrated supply chains with China (such as 80% of textile raw materials depending on China), Vietnam swiftly adjusted its export structure. In the first quarter of 2025, Vietnam's trade volume with China surged by 17.46% year-on-year, while ASEAN's trade with China grew by 7.1% against the trend.
Thus, although high tariffs caused short-term impacts, they also faced long-term backlash, and America's "tariff weapon" was gradually self-destructing.
The Trump administration proposed a "tiered tariff" plan, imposing lower rates (such as 10%) or exemptions on certain countries (like Vietnam and Mexico), while levying high tariffs (up to 145%) on China, attempting to use economic levers to divide China's trade relations with other nations.
Trump's strategy of luring global powers to encircle China with tariff exemptions exposed his strategic shortsightedness, mainly manifested in the following two points:
First, the paradox of supply chain relocation. Although multinational corporations like Apple and Samsung evaluated shifting production capacity to India and Mexico due to cost pressures, Vietnam, as a core node of the "China + 1" strategy, still relies heavily on China's technological support for its electronics manufacturing base, making short-term relocation costly.
Second, it triggered a global backlash of "ally" alienation and partner "discrediting." The U.S. tariff cudgel of 3521% was met with resistance from over 70 countries, accelerating ASEAN's rapprochement with China. Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh clearly stated that "other market interests cannot be harmed," highlighting the isolation of American economic hegemony. The U.S. attempt to reshape supply chains through tariffs backfired due to Vietnam's flexible responses and deepened regional cooperation, pushing itself into a "trapped dilemma" of an "economic iron curtain."
Trump's tariff policy toward Vietnam focused on "balanced trade deficits," causing short-term damage to Vietnam's export-oriented economy in the near term and forcing adjustments to its trade structure and industrial policies in the long run. Despite Vietnam's diplomatic maneuvers and partial concessions to alleviate pressure, the essence of the tariff博弈is America's strategic action to reshape global supply chains and trade rules. Whether the two sides can reach a compromise on platforms like APEC will determine the resilience of Vietnam's economy and the evolution of regional trade patterns, which Vietnam cannot take lightly.
Navaarro dismissed Vietnam's overtures disdainfully during an interview on the 7th. Video screenshot.
Military Cooperation Strategic Ties Lack Substance
To strengthen Vietnam's role as a pivot in the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. frequently engaged in military interactions. Through actions such as aircraft carrier diplomacy (e.g., the USS Carl Vinson's visit in 2018 and the USS Reagan's visit in 2023), arms sales (e.g., delivering Hamilton-class patrol vessels to Vietnam's Coast Guard to enhance its monitoring capabilities in the South China Sea), and joint military exercises (e.g., participation in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise), the U.S. sought to project presence and transform Vietnam into a "forward outpost" in the South China Sea. In terms of joint exercises and personnel training, the U.S. invited Vietnam to participate in the Rim of the Pacific Exercise and trained Vietnamese military personnel under the pretext of "maritime security cooperation" to infiltrate South China Sea issues.
During Trump's first term, U.S. Defense Secretary Mattis visited Vietnam twice within a year, and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Commander Philip Davidson and his successor Mark Esper also visited Vietnam separately. These visits highlighted the U.S.'s importance to Vietnam, but they were mainly focused on high-level interactions and strategic statements, lacking substantial military cooperation content; the symbolic meaning of military inducements outweighed their substance.
After Trump returned to office, he accelerated the "arming Vietnam" initiative. In November 2024, the U.S. delivered the first batch of T-6C trainer aircraft to Vietnam, marking the largest scale of arms delivery to Vietnam in history.
To date, direct visits between the defense ministers of Vietnam and the U.S. have yet to materialize. However, during their phone call on February 7th this year, the U.S. promised to allocate resources to clean up dioxin contamination at Bien Hoa airport, support disabled persons, clear mines, search for remains of Vietnam's fallen soldiers, and cooperate in searching for missing U.S. military personnel during the war.
Although these cooperation projects contribute to shelving past grievances and looking toward the future, they carry more symbolic significance aimed at improving the U.S.'s image in Vietnam rather than substantially enhancing Vietnam's military capabilities.
In response to U.S. military inducements, Vietnam adheres to its "four non-" defense policy: not supporting one country against another, not participating in military alliances, not allowing foreign countries to establish military bases in Vietnam, and not using force or threatening to use force in international relations. Defense Minister Pham Van Trong of Vietnam further clarified the "four principles" of "non-alliance, non-expansion, non-provocation, and non-dependence" when attending the 2024 Beijing Summit, emphasizing strategic autonomy.
Although Vietnam accepts U.S. equipment, it refuses to sign any military alliance agreements. Even after upgrading relations with the U.S. to a "comprehensive strategic partnership" in 2023, Vietnam emphasized that "relations with China are the top priority" and simultaneously strengthened defense dialogues with China, demonstrating Vietnam's wisdom in balanced diplomacy.
While seeking U.S. "support" for island-filling and resource development in the South China Sea, Vietnam avoids direct confrontation with China. Since the establishment of a strategically significant "community of shared destiny" with China at the end of 2023, despite frequent political changes in Vietnam's leadership, since General Secretary Su Lin's inauguration in August 2024, he initiated a visit to China, unprecedentedly heating up Sino-Vietnamese relations. Vietnam has repeatedly emphasized through actions that "marine disputes should not hinder cooperation," effectively weakening the U.S.'s attempt to provoke regional antagonism and reflecting Vietnam's pragmatic stance on the South China Sea issue.
Based on the above analysis, U.S. aircraft carrier visits and arms sales have not altered Vietnam's cautious stance on the South China Sea issue but have instead exacerbated trust deficits due to Vietnam's vigilance regarding the legacy of the Vietnam War (such as the "Agent Orange" issue). Therefore, U.S. military cooperation inducements have become "one-sided wishes," and Vietnam has transformed military interactions into bargaining chips through "bamboo diplomacy," gaining resources while maintaining autonomy, rendering the U.S.'s "Indo-Pacific NATO" concept a mirage.
Economic Cooperation Interest Ties Show Signs of Fatigue
The U.S. is Vietnam's largest export market (exported $119.5 billion to the U.S. in 2024), with companies like Intel and Apple incorporating Vietnam into their global supply chains, aiming to form an "interest symbiosis" relationship through investment and trade ties. However, the inconsistent foreign policies of both Republican and Democratic administrations have resulted in minimal effects from economic inducements based on market dependence and industrial transfers.
During the Biden administration, Vietnam was encouraged to join IPEF, with claims of strengthening semiconductor and clean energy cooperation, but actual investments were limited. Apart from high-end products, Vietnam's reliance on U.S. technology is not high, and critical sectors still depend on Japan, South Korea, and China. Thus, although the U.S. pulled Vietnam into the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework," Vietnam felt deceived by empty promises.
In addition, Trump's indiscriminate tariff policies had a noticeable impact on Vietnam, but Vietnam was well-prepared. Scholar Nguyen Chang Luong of Vietnam predicted this in an interview with Vietnam's Observer electronic magazine on November 7th, 2024, suggesting:
"If Trump wins re-election, it could be seen as a significant catalyst for expanding U.S.-Vietnam trade volumes, potentially forming a special trade triangle among the U.S., Vietnam, and China. Moreover, to enhance influence in Southeast Asia, the U.S. may increase investment in Vietnam to counterbalance China. Vietnam has opportunities to gain significant benefits in this competitive relationship.
Vietnamese enterprises should actively build proactive early warning mechanisms to cope with U.S. trade protection measures and formulate strategic responses to address the obstruction of goods from other partners and further penetrate the U.S. market. Collaborating with American commercial partners within the scope of protection policies and establishing joint ventures will help Vietnamese enterprises refine technologies, adopt new business models, and effectively adapt to various forms of trade protection barriers."
Vietnam has consistently pursued a "de-Americanization" strategy to break free from economic risks. On one hand, Vietnam diversified cooperation to offset risks from the U.S. economy, actively integrating into international strategies and accelerating regional integration. Vietnam actively joined RCEP and CPTPP, with exports to the EU growing by 12% in 2025 and exports to India increasing by 18%, objectively diluting dependence on a single market.
On the other hand, Vietnam promoted the "Industry 4.0" plan to achieve autonomous upgrades in industrial chains, attracting Japanese investment in semiconductors and South Korean investment in electric vehicles, reducing dependence on a single U.S. path. The lack of substantive concessions from U.S. economic cooperation led Vietnam to crack the binding strategy with a "multilateral embedding" approach, rendering the U.S.'s "Indo-Pacific economic axis" idea a paper tiger.
Du Tianying, director of the Fulbright School of Public Policy and Management in Vietnam, proposed response strategies, stating, "Efforts need to be increased to support industrial development, improve localization rates, and gradually control value chains. Over-reliance on imported raw materials not only increases costs but also makes enterprises vulnerable to external changes." He suggested establishing a close cooperative mechanism involving the government, enterprises, industry associations, and international organizations to jointly develop response plans, strengthen forecasting, and strategic planning.
Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh clearly stated that "other market interests cannot be harmed." Photo from Vietnam Government News Website.
American Value Output "Incompatible with Local Conditions"
Firstly, historical scars and trust deficits remain between Vietnam and the U.S. The U.S. attempted to mitigate the memory of the Vietnam War through cultural soft power and initiate "crisis public relations" to address war legacies. The U.S. promised assistance in clearing unexploded bombs from the Vietnam War and hyped up "democratic values" to attract younger generations in Vietnam, but the lingering "Agent Orange" toxicity still occasionally triggers strong anti-American sentiment among the populace.
Moreover, there exists an ideological chasm between Vietnam and the U.S., as Vietnam adheres to socialism, rejecting "cultural infiltration," and considers "countering peaceful evolution" one of the four major crises to be addressed. Vietnam remains vigilant against U.S.-style "democratic promotion."
Secondly, during its reform and opening-up process, Vietnam has always emphasized "reform without losing color, integration without melting away," enhancing local cultural identity to resist foreign cultural infiltration with traditional culture and pragmatism.
Vietnam skillfully combines flexible diplomatic strategies with national resilience, embracing foreign investment while maintaining its subjectivity, such as allowing Starlink to land but strictly regulating data sovereignty, reinforcing the cultural foundation of "bamboo diplomacy." Vietnam rejects values entirely opposed to market economy globalization, ensuring parallel development of economy and culture, where the economy does not disrupt culture, nor does culture hinder economic development.
The Communist Party of Vietnam successively established institutions such as the Central Military Commission's Leading Group for Countering "Peaceful Evolution" in the Ideological and Cultural Fields (commonly known as the 94 Leading Group), the Central Theoretical Committee's 609 Leading Team, and the Central 213 Leading Committee for Countering "Peaceful Evolution" in the Cultural-Literary-Artistic Fields, specifically tasked with combating hostile forces' "peaceful evolution" and ideological infiltration.
Furthermore, Vietnam advocates diversified and multifaceted cultural diplomacy. Vietnamese culture emphasizes collectivism, family values, and social harmony, whereas American culture leans toward individualism, liberalism, and competitive consciousness. These differences in cultural values make American value outputs difficult to widely accept in Vietnamese society.
Vietnam actively participates in multilateral cooperation mechanisms such as ASEAN, balancing external cultural influences through collaboration with multiple countries and international organizations to avoid excessive reliance on a single country's cultural output. When absorbing foreign cultures, Vietnam adopts a pragmatic attitude, selectively accepting elements beneficial to its own development while refusing contents that may impact local culture.
Based on the above three points, American cultural penetration encounters little effect due to historical baggage and dual resistance from local identity, and Vietnam fortifies its strategic defense with cultural confidence.
Conclusion: The Collapse of Hegemonic Logic and the Victory of Multilateralism
The U.S.'s attempt to use Vietnam for regional confrontation has faltered, essentially the inevitable result of the fundamental conflict between hegemonic thinking and regional realities. This arises from structural contradictions, as the U.S. pursues "absolute security" and a "unipolar order," while Vietnam and ASEAN countries adhere to the "hedging strategy," refusing to become pawns in great power games.
Under globalization fragmentation, regionalization of supply chains and cultural diversity are irreversible. America's "small yard, high fence" policy violates economic laws and goes against the aspirations of the Asia-Pacific region. Vietnam's case demonstrates that medium and small countries can maintain their interests in great power games through flexible diplomacy and multidimensional cooperation. If the U.S. persists in clinging to hegemonic logic, it not only fails to achieve its "Indo-Pacific Strategy" goals but accelerates its own influence decline. The construction of the Asia-Pacific order in the future will undoubtedly be a victory of multilateralism and common development, not a solo performance by any single power.
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Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7498884314856292904/
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