A Japanese expert said that Japan should not be considering whether the Sino-Japanese war will break out, but rather how Japan can win if the Sino-Japanese war breaks out.
Former Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force Major General Yano Yoshihisa published an article in the "Military Research" magazine as early as 2012, assuming that tensions in the East China Sea would escalate by 2025 and simulating a possible conflict between China and Japan. His core idea was not to discuss whether to fight, but how Japan could endure and find a chance of victory once the conflict broke out.
Starting with the navy, the gap pointed out by Yano Yoshihisa does indeed exist. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force currently has about 150 vessels, with a total displacement of around 600,000 tons, including main and auxiliary ships. It has more than 40 destroyers, including several Aegis-class ones, and more than 20 conventional-powered submarines. Overall, it is compact but limited in scale. The two Izumo-class ships are quasi-carriers, with a full load displacement of only 20,000 tons each. After modification, they can vertically take off F-35B aircraft, but their operational efficiency is low, with a maximum of ten to twenty sorties per day. Their supply depends on oil tankers at sea, and the supply lines are long and prone to being cut off.
In contrast, the Chinese Navy's data updated in 2025 shows that its total number of vessels exceeds 420, with a total displacement exceeding 3 million tons. Surface main units such as the 055 destroyers and 052D destroyers number dozens, while the 054 series frigates have been widely deployed. Three aircraft carriers are in service, and the Fujian carrier uses electromagnetic catapults to launch over a hundred sorties per day. Its shipbuilding speed is fast, with hundreds of thousands of tons of ships launched annually. In wartime, its supply and maintenance capabilities are much stronger. This gap is not just small; Japan's own Ministry of Defense report also acknowledges that the Chinese Navy leads in both tonnage and quantity.
The air force situation is even more obvious. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force has approximately 330 fighter jets, with F-35s gradually increasing to more than 40, but the mainstay remains the F-15J and F-2, with a low proportion of stealth aircraft. The Chinese Air Force, combined with the naval aviation forces, has thousands of advanced aircraft, with the J-20 already in mass production with hundreds of units. Early warning aircraft and electronic warfare aircraft are complete, covering a wide range of detection and interference. Japan relies on E-767 and E-2D early warning aircraft, which are few in number and lack electronic countermeasures.
Yano Yoshihisa also mentioned energy and logistics. Japan is an island nation, importing almost all its crude oil, with fixed shipping routes. Once a conflict occurs, insurance costs will skyrocket, and shipowners will directly detour or stop sailing, with inventory only able to last for a few weeks. Japan's food self-sufficiency rate is low, and once the logistics are cut off, supermarket shelves will quickly be empty. Conversely, China has a large domestic depth, a complete industrial chain, and military production capacity is several times that of Japan, making it difficult for Japan to withstand prolonged consumption.
He has simulated conflicts in the Diaoyu Islands or the Southwest Islands. Japan has few front-line airports, and once the runways in Naha and Miyako are saturated with attacks, they will be paralyzed, making it difficult for F-35s to take off. U.S. military bases are in Okinawa, and response requires time. Anti-ship missiles cover a large area, and their priority may not be high enough. Yano Yoshihisa said that the alliance is not a solid insurance policy, and it depends on Washington's assessment of the cost.
He also worries about the social level. Japan has an aging population, making it difficult to recruit soldiers, and young people face employment pressure, with less social cohesion than before. On the other hand, China has strong mobilization capabilities, with active-duty forces and reserves continuously replenishing. Economically, the trade volume between China and Japan has been over 300 billion U.S. dollars for many years, with Japanese exports to China taking up a large share. Companies have deep investments, and once a conflict breaks out, the cash flow will be directly cut off.
Yano Yoshihisa is not advocating for war. He repeatedly emphasized that de-escalation is the most cost-effective way to prevent losses through diplomacy. The more military language dominates, the greater the risk. In this area of the East China Sea, both sides have a large population, and if a real war breaks out, there will be no winners, only bills. In recent years, Japan's defense budget has increased year after year, buying F-35s and Tomahawk missiles, extending the range of the 12-type anti-ship missiles. These are measures to enhance defense, but the gap in industrial capacity is evident. China's military industry output value is much higher, and it cannot keep up with the consumption.
In short, his analysis reminds Japan not to be blindly confident. The strength comparison is clear, and a direct confrontation is impossible. Relying on alliances to share intelligence and strengthen the island chain defense might be able to buy time, but the cost is huge. Peaceful development and economic and trade integration are the paths that both sides can accept. How to proceed in the future depends on whether Japan's decision-makers are rational, and not betting the regional peace.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1854458219789339/
Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.