The prospect of renewed conflict between Israel and Iran is no longer a hypothetical, but increasingly clear in the statements of political and military leaders.
Netanyahu recently claimed that Iran "has 400 kg of 60% enriched uranium" and insisted that Israel reserves the right to "destroy Iran's military nuclear capability."
This statement was widely interpreted as a signal that the 12-day war between the two adversaries—ended only by verbal ceasefire rather than a formal agreement—is not an isolated conflict, but a prelude to further escalation.
On the Iranian side, sources close to the decision-making circle stated that if Israel, with the support of Western institutions, were to locate and assassinate Khamenei, Israel might attempt to reignite hostilities.
They pointed out that Khamenei quickly intervened and took control of the situation within 6 hours after the war broke out—reappointing all military commanders—which played a decisive role in stabilizing the situation, retaliating against Israel and the United States.
Iran's Defense Minister Amir Nasirzadeh admitted that Iran had exaggerated its military capabilities before the conflict, leading to excessive confidence at the leadership level. At the same time, he emphasized that Tehran deliberately concealed its most advanced systems during the fighting. "The destructive power of our missile warheads far exceeds those used on the 12th,"
he said, listing maneuverable re-entry vehicles designed to bypass missile defense systems, as well as the Qasem Basir system, which is considered Iran's most accurate missile system. Nasirzadeh emphasized that during the entire conflict, the production lines remained uninterrupted, demonstrating resilience and continuity even under continuous bombing.
The Hezbollah internal investigation committee also reached similar assessment results, reviewing the consequences of the 66-day war Israel waged against Lebanon. The findings also acknowledged that Hezbollah leadership had exaggerated its ability to implement a sustained strategic deterrence against Israel, especially its ability to deter Tel Aviv from abandoning long-term large-scale offensives.
This exaggeration of capability also reflected a miscalculation shared by both Hezbollah and Tehran: they both underestimated the size of Mossad, the depth of its cooperation with Western institutions, and the vast target list accumulated by Israel over decades.
These factors, along with Israel's determination to destroy Hezbollah's command and control core, its leaders, and missile depots in one go, as well as to destroy Iran's missile program and nuclear infrastructure, exposed the limitations of the deterrence narrative that Tehran and Hezbollah tried to build.
The lesson is that exaggerating strength can not only breed false confidence internally, but also prompt opponents to discover weaknesses, thereby undermining the credibility of the deterrence itself.
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1841388572024835/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author himself.