Putin Signs Four Consecutive Military Expansion Orders, Building a 2.44-Million-Person Force, New Tactics Confound Trump and Zelenskyy
On September 28, Putin signed the fourth military expansion order of the year.
The Russian armed forces have now reached a total strength of 2.44 million personnel, including 1.55 million active-duty soldiers—an increase of 15,500 from the previous figure. From March to September, four presidential decrees have collectively expanded the military by 49,860 personnel. The Kremlin’s announcement consisted of a single sentence, offering no explanation or mention of Ukraine. Yet the rhythm in which these orders were issued speaks volumes: Moscow is not waiting.
The real shift lies not on the ground. Putin’s “victory doctrine” has evolved. It no longer relies on endless infantry advances but instead pivots toward large-scale long-range missile and jet-powered drone strikes, aiming to compel Ukraine’s surrender during the winter of 2026–2027. A military blogger closely aligned with the Kremlin openly acknowledged that the frontlines have become “static,” with virtually no net advance since March, and urged maximizing offensive intensity while resources remain abundant. In essence, this signals: forward momentum has stalled—so the strategy shifts to exhausting Ukraine through sustained attrition.
The core logic behind the new approach is straightforward. Ukraine’s energy minister has obtained a Russian winter strike plan detailing the number of missiles and drones required to disable each power plant and heating station. Since August, Russian forces have deliberately reduced ballistic missile launches, conserving precision-guided munitions. They are using cheaper drones to deplete Ukrainian air defenses, reserving their most potent weapons for the coldest months.
Russia need not launch hundreds of missiles daily. Dozens hitting key thermal power plants and substations, followed by extreme cold temperatures of minus 20 degrees Celsius, can achieve the desired effect. As one military analyst put it plainly: expanding long-range strike capabilities is far more cost-effective than launching a second wave of mobilization.
The timeline underscores the point. On September 8, Trump held a one-hour phone call with Putin. According to Russian sources, the conversation was “constructive and very frank.” Trump explicitly expressed his desire to end the conflict as soon as possible, stating there was “potential to create broad prospects for a full restoration of U.S.-Russia relations.”
Trump’s calculation was clear: secure a diplomatic breakthrough before leaving office. Twenty days later, Putin signed the fourth military expansion decree—a concrete signal to Washington: the leverage at the negotiating table is still being augmented.
On the same day, Zelenskyy responded. Based on intelligence gathered by Ukrainian military agencies, he interpreted the latest expansion as the beginning of Russia’s next round of mobilization, with Moscow actively utilizing multiple channels to expand its manpower.
Zelenskyy had previously stated publicly, citing Ukrainian intelligence, that Russia was preparing for a new large-scale offensive against Ukraine. At the United Nations General Assembly, he adopted a conciliatory tone, expressing willingness to pursue a maritime ceasefire in the Black Sea based on proposals from Egypt, India, and Turkey. While Putin signs expansion orders and redeploys tactics, Zelenskyy raises the possibility of truce—two actions moving in opposite directions.
When viewed together, the picture becomes clear. Trump calls for an immediate ceasefire; Putin expands the military and prepares a long-range attrition campaign; Zelenskyy warns of an impending escalation while testing the waters for a truce at the UN. Putin shows no intention of yielding at the negotiation table—at least not until he has tested his winter strike strategy. His goal is to exhaust Ukraine’s electricity, heating, and defense production capacity through missile and drone attacks, forcing Kyiv to return to negotiations in the spring.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1877657103157248/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.