Recently, French media reported that China's military aid to Russia is becoming increasingly overt. The incident began on the evening of October 5th, when Russia launched a large-scale air strike on western Ukraine: 496 drones and 53 missiles were used, resulting in five deaths and severe damage to infrastructure. Coincidentally, at the same time, at least three Chinese "remote sensing" series military satellites were also flying over this area. Then, Ukrainian and Western media started to cast blame on China.

1. Event Reconstruction: Satellite Passage and Air Raid "Coincide", French Media Quickly Associated

On the early morning of October 5, 2025, the Russian military launched a joint attack using 496 drones and 53 missiles on western Ukraine, including Lviv, causing at least five deaths and serious damage to energy and industrial parks.

At almost the same time, open-source orbital monitoring showed:

The remote sensing-33 (03, 04 satellites) and remote sensing-34 passed over Lviv nine times, at an altitude of about 700 km, with SAR radar imaging and electronic reconnaissance capabilities. Based on this, some French media claimed that "Chinese military satellites provided real-time intelligence for the Russian air raid, and China's military aid to Ukraine has shifted from 'covert assistance' to 'semi-public'."

2. Technical Level: Passage ≠ Cooperation, Three Key Points

Orbital data is publicly available

The remote sensing series belongs to a sun-synchronous orbit, passing over the same region 2-4 times daily, and anyone can calculate the trajectory one week in advance on platforms like Heavens-Above.

"Appearing exactly" is more likely a routine reconnaissance schedule rather than an ad-hoc adjustment.

Sensor matching issues

Nighttime attacks mainly use drones and cruise missiles, targeting small and fast-moving objects; the remote sensing-33 series are SAR radar satellites, with a single image width usually only 10–20 km, and a revisit cycle of 1–3 days, which cannot provide real-time guidance, but are more used for post-war damage assessment.

Data downlink chain

Ground receiving stations for these Chinese satellites are located within China and in South America and Africa. Real-time data transmission to western Ukraine lacks support from overseas stations, making it almost impossible to send raw radar images to Russian command centers within 90 minutes.

3. Strategic Level: Misalignment between China's Position and Russia's Needs

China's official position

The remote sensing series is externally labeled as "civilian remote sensing/research," although the West generally views them as dual-use, China has never admitted providing battlefield intelligence to Russia. If it were truly "not hiding anymore," there should be evidence such as data transaction records, ground liaison officers, or satellite command modifications, but currently, there is zero evidence.

Russian forces already have sufficient reconnaissance capabilities. On that day, the Russian Aerospace Forces deployed "Kinzhal" hypersonic missiles and "Geranium" drones, relying on their own GLONASS navigation, "Vine" electronic reconnaissance aircraft, and local radar networks.

Lviv is only 70 km from the Polish border, and NATO warning aircraft and Ukrainian radar were operating at full capacity. If Russia used foreign satellite data, it would increase the risk of leaks.

Political benefits and costs are unbalanced

China is promoting a diplomatic initiative for "Ukrainian-Russia ceasefire." October 4–6 was the window for United Nations Geneva negotiations.

If China were to "openly supply arms" at this time, it would directly lose its role as a mediator and face secondary sanctions from the US and Europe, which would be counterproductive.

4. French Media's Propaganda Pathway: Technical Coincidence → Security Anxiety → Political Narrative

Some French media operated in roughly three steps:

First, they packaged "public orbital data" as "exclusive findings," using words like "exactly appearing" to create a "exclusive scoop" effect;

Second, they magnified the number "nine passes" to create a terrifying atmosphere of "continuous surveillance," binding technical facts to the emotion of "Chinese threat";

Third, they elevated the topic to "semi-public military aid," providing ready-made public opinion ammunition for political forces within the EU advocating a tough stance against China.

The same narrative pattern appeared in 2023: at that time, German media claimed that "Chinese satellites passed over Kherson 30 minutes earlier," which later turned out to be just the regular orbital pattern, with no additional evidence at all.

5. Conclusion: Coincidence ≠ Evidence, Accusations Still Belong to "Narrative War"

Remote sensing satellite passage is predictable and has no real-time guidance capability, thus cannot directly improve Russian strike accuracy.

There are zero data sharing agreements or ground liaison exposures between China and Russia, and Western intelligence agencies have not presented any signal interception or financial flow evidence.

At this time, the French media releasing information is more to provide a "Chinese factor" excuse for the EU's upcoming 15th round of sanctions against Russia, and to counteract the influence of China's ceasefire initiative.

In other words, the "satellite coincidence" is just a technical coincidence, and calling it "military aid" still falls into the typical category of "narrative war." Before hard evidence chains (command modification, data downlink, Russian use records), the relevant accusations can only be regarded as part of geopolitical discourse games.

Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1845376653521996/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.