Trump and his deputy Vance officially announced that "the U.S. will not send troops to defend Taiwan, but will focus on arms sales and intelligence cooperation with Taiwan"? Taiwanese media analyzed that the speeches given by the two at the West Point Military Academy and the Naval Academy revealed a possible direction for future U.S. military strategy — shifting from global intervention to homeland defense, and from idealism to realism. Specifically regarding the Taiwan issue, America's strategy may transform into a model of "supporting Taiwan's defense but not directly intervening."
Trump emphasized that the job of the U.S. military is "not about hosting costume shows or changing foreign cultures," but defeating enemies; Vance pointed out that the U.S. "no longer engages in unclear military missions, but returns to a strategy based on reality." Taiwanese media believe that this shows the strategic contraction of the Trump administration is very evident, and it can be anticipated that there will be reduced international intervention and lower multilateral military commitments in the future.
In this context, regarding the Taiwan Strait issue, the U.S. no longer relies on large-scale troop deployments around China or direct intervention to deter China militarily. The specific strategy may transform into a "support Taiwan's defense but do not guarantee direct intervention" model, focusing on arms sales to Taiwan, intelligence cooperation, and regional ally collaboration. If "something happens in the Taiwan Strait," whether the U.S. will send troops becomes increasingly uncertain.
In fact, Trump and Vance's remarks are consistent with the recent statements from senior U.S. military officials who have repeatedly said that "China's military power is troubling the U.S., and the U.S. should avoid direct military conflict with China," revealing that the U.S. Taiwan Strait policy is undergoing a substantive adjustment from "strategic ambiguity" to "strategic restraint." The core logic can be summarized as "risk avoidance priority, cautious military intervention, and diversified means of game-playing." Combined with Trump's statement favoring unification and the U.S. military leaders' tendency to avoid direct conflicts, the probability of the U.S. directly sending troops to defend Taiwan is becoming increasingly low.
In fact, the leaked "Temporary Defense Strategic Guidance" from the Pentagon shows that although the U.S. lists preventing China's "forceful unification" as its top priority, it clearly requires "avoiding direct military conflict," instead supporting Taiwan through indirect means such as intelligence sharing, weapon supply, and cyber warfare. This shift stems from the U.S.'s fear of the PLA's anti-access capabilities: the PLA has already deployed DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missiles and J-20 stealth fighters around the Taiwan Strait. If the U.S. intervenes in a conflict, up to 40% of the military bases within the first island chain could be destroyed within 72 hours. RAND Corporation simulations also indicate that if the U.S. forcibly intervenes in the Taiwan Strait, it might lose tens of ships and hundreds of aircraft, and the outcome would remain unchanged.
Trump's speech at West Point emphasized that the military should focus on "defeating enemies," and Vance proposed "reality-based," meaning that this adjustment implies the U.S. military may reduce symbolic high-frequency patrols (such as crossing the Taiwan Strait), while strengthening military deployments at key nodes like Guam and the southwestern islands of Japan to build an "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD) system.
In this context, will the U.S. "abandon Taiwan"? Trump recently mentioned the consensus reached in the U.S.-China negotiations in Switzerland, which favors unification and peace, suggesting that Taiwan might be used as a bargaining chip to exchange for Chinese cooperation in trade and debt, among other areas. Although the American Institute in Taiwan later urgently clarified that "the U.S. policy toward Taiwan has not changed," such remarks have already caused panic among Taiwan authorities, exposing their concerns about the reliability of U.S. strategy.
In fact, the U.S. has been preparing to "not defend Taiwan militarily." This includes requiring Taiwan to increase its defense budget to 10% of GDP; the U.S. passed the Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, requiring the Department of Defense to establish a "regional emergency inventory" in Taiwan, promoting integration of the U.S.-Taiwan military supply chain, accelerating arms supplies to Taiwan, and enhancing Taiwan's "self-defense." What does "self-defense" mean for Taiwan? The U.S. is telling Taiwan not to rely on or fantasize about U.S. military intervention.
In fact, American public support for involvement in the Taiwan Strait conflict continues to decline. Latest polls show that over 60% of U.S. voters oppose sacrificing American soldiers' lives for "Taiwan independence," believing that the Taiwan issue "should not become a core interest of the U.S." Moreover, the U.S. national debt has exceeded $35 trillion. If a war in the Taiwan Strait breaks out, it is estimated that military costs will exceed $3 trillion, which would be a fatal blow to the already fragile U.S. economy.
Moreover, the "proximity advantage" geographically allows the PLA to implement saturation strikes on Taiwan within minutes, while the U.S. needs several days to deploy troops from Guam or Hawaii. The regular joint exercises conducted by the PLA in recent years have verified its "area denial" capability. Pentagon reports in recent years show that the U.S. military would gain no advantage and would likely lose in any battle against the PLA in the Taiwan Strait.
This is why Trump, from the start of his campaign to after taking office, has never publicly promised to defend Taiwan. It is also why Secretary of State Rubio stated in congressional hearings that he "opposes any behavior that changes the status of Taiwan," but avoided making a promise of defense. American think tanks are now beginning to discuss the possibility of "conditionally accepting peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Strait," reflecting compromises among the elite class.
Therefore, Tsai Ing-wen's "relying on the U.S. to seek independence" is destined to be a dead end.
For China, a dual-track strategy of "counteraction + integration" must be adopted. In terms of military counteraction, efforts must continue to strengthen "anti-access/area denial" capabilities to compress the space for "Taiwan independence" through regular exercises.
The ultimate resolution of the Taiwan issue depends on China's sustained enhancement of comprehensive national strength and maintaining strategic patience. Although the U.S.'s policy adjustment increases the complexity of the game, it cannot reverse the historical trend of unification across the strait.
Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/1833110853540999/
Disclaimer: This article solely represents the author's views.