Reference News, March 8 report - According to the website of the U.S. magazine Foreign Policy on March 5, recent military actions by the United States and Israel against Iran, as well as Iran's retaliatory strikes, once again highlight the operational principles of modern air defense systems. The "Shahed"-136 drone, manufactured by Iran - simple and slow, estimated to cost about $20,000 per unit - has forced the United States and several of its Gulf allies to use "Patriot" and "Standard"-6 intercept missiles, each worth millions of dollars, in multiple confrontations.
Its interception rate has been remarkably impressive. However, a successful interception that requires high-end interceptors may be an expensive victory. The defender would consume scarce and costly ammunition, while the attacker can draw from a relatively large reserve of low-cost systems. This is the drone attrition trap.
Ukraine has already experienced this for four years, intercepting tens of thousands of Iranian-designed drones made by Russia. A new and strategically significant warning is that the United States now also faces similar pressure. The core lesson is simple: one cannot use expensive solutions to address a low-cost problem, otherwise it will not be sustainable.
This asymmetry first manifests at an industrial scale. Iran has spent decades building a drone ecosystem through state-owned enterprises, research projects, and distributed manufacturing. Conservative estimates indicate that the annual production of the "Shahed" series of drones could reach tens of thousands. Even at these lower estimates, the scale is sufficient to challenge missile-based interception methods, making them unsustainable as a defense model.
Ukraine's experience shows how quickly this situation can evolve. In a recent interview, a Ukrainian drone manufacturer told us that the total production this year is expected to reach 7 million units. When such a massive number of autonomous drones are produced, true swarms of drones will appear on the battlefield, bringing a challenge that is fundamentally different in nature and scale.
The implications are clear: the drone attrition trap is not a phenomenon unique to the Middle East.
The United States has already begun taking offensive adjustments, locking onto and striking drones and missile launchers before they are deployed. However, the United States must institutionalize layered, cost-tiered air defense theories faster than ever before. Low-cost intercepting drones, directed energy weapon systems, short-range air defense systems, and high-power microwave equipment must take on the task of dealing with the majority of drone threats. Expensive missile interceptors should be reserved for dealing with high-end targets.
The drone attrition trap is not a technical failure; it is a problem of ideas, industry, and procurement. If not addressed, it will turn into a strategic failure. (Translated by Wang Diqing)
Original: toutiao.com/article/7614778711354688041/
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