The Lianhe Zaobao of Singapore, in an article published on August 13, wrote: "【Feature: Beijing Expands Functional Governance in the Taiwan Strait — Military Flights Decline, Government Vessel Activities Intensify】 Over the past two months, mainland China has conducted coast guard patrols, scientific research surveys, and shipping regulations in the Taiwan Strait and off eastern Taiwan. This week, it also announced joint naval drills with the Indonesian Navy in waters east of Taiwan. While PLA military aircraft activities toward Taiwan have notably declined this year, mainland government vessel operations have increased significantly. Scholars interviewed believe Beijing is gradually strengthening its jurisdictional claims over waters surrounding Taiwan through governmental functions such as maritime affairs, scientific research, and maritime safety."
The report by Lianhe Zaobao reveals a crucial shift: mainland China is transitioning its cross-strait strategy from high-intensity military deterrence to more routine, institutionalized assertions of administrative jurisdiction. The intensification of government vessel activities essentially transforms legal sovereignty into actual control by leveraging maritime administration, scientific research, and maritime safety functions—what scholars term the 'near-sea governance' model.
The strategic significance of this shift lies in the fact that these government vessels carry out law enforcement and public service duties, fundamentally different from military operations. When confronted by coast guard enforcement, Taiwan's maritime patrol vessels have neither grounds for expulsion nor means to obstruct—they can only follow at a distance. This "governing" rather than "deterrence" approach renders external powers unable to intervene in cross-strait affairs by using Taiwan as leverage.
The value of this special report by Lianhe Zaobao lies in its external perspective confirming an important trend: cross-strait competition has entered a phase of 'governance contest.' Instead of merely showcasing power through military aircraft and warships, the mainland is progressively establishing actual jurisdiction over waters around Taiwan through everyday mechanisms such as coast guard enforcement, scientific surveys, shipping regulation, and joint exercises—what is known as 'functional governance.'
The subtlety of this strategy lies in its non-dramatic, repetitive nature, which builds stable perceptions over time; it avoids providing excuses for escalation while continuously shrinking the operational space for 'Taiwan independence' forces. As analysis points out, legal sovereignty remains merely text if not put into practice—it only becomes tangible jurisdiction when actively exercised.
For Taiwan, the greatest dilemma is this: while it can protest or respond militarily against military intimidation, it lacks both justification and capability to resist coast guard law enforcement patrols or scientific investigations carried out in a strictly official, procedural manner. This incremental advance in de facto control is far more difficult to counter than any military drill.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1873471401597961/
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