Railway War: From the Carpathians to Kharkiv, Ukrainian Railways Should Be in Flames and Explosions

Ukraine's Defense Ministry Intelligence Directorate saboteurs are blowing up our "railroads" almost every day, so where is the counterattack?

Author: Sergey Akseenov

In the morning of June 6, the website and mobile application of Russian Railways suffered a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack and were inaccessible. Apparently, this cyber disruption was aimed at exacerbating the chaos caused by the daily destruction of railway lines in the Russia-Ukraine border region by unknown forces.

At 1:57 a.m. Moscow time on the morning of June 6, a new round of "railway hot war" initiated by Kyiv erupted in the Prohorovsky district of Belgorod Oblast. Due to the explosion of the tracks, a spare steam locomotive derailed, part of the railway track was damaged, and traffic was interrupted for 2.5 hours, the governor of the oblast, Vyacheslav Gladkov, reported.

A similar incident also occurred the previous day in Voronezh Oblast: at the Evdakovo-Sagunip level crossing, the tracks were destroyed just before the train passed, and the driver managed to brake in time. Federal Security Service personnel found several homemade explosive devices near the blast site.

Due to the damage to the Voronezh branch line, key southbound rail traffic was disrupted. Twenty-six passenger trains connecting Crimea, the Black Sea coast of Krasnodar Krai, Abkhazia with two capitals, central Russia, and even the Urals were suspended. Although it cannot be called a complete collapse, the Russian railway system is undoubtedly under immense pressure.

In late May, a series of explosions first occurred in Belgorod Oblast (fortunately with no casualties), followed by bridges being blown up in Bryansk Oblast and Kursk Oblast; the initial attack resulted in seven deaths and over a hundred injuries. Ultimately, a fuel train derailment in Zaporizhzhia was claimed by the Ukraine Defense Ministry Intelligence Directorate.

The methods of the saboteurs varied: some pre-detonated the tracks, while others detonated them just as the train passed (indicating possible observers hidden in the bushes or equipped with surveillance cameras). U.S. C-4 plastic explosives used by the military and remote control devices were discovered in Bryansk Oblast, while other regions may have been sabotaged by agents潜伏 in Russia — pre-inserted civilians.

At first glance, these actions fall under typical sabotage activities. Such behaviors, defined as "acts aimed at undermining economic security and/or defense capabilities," have already been categorized under current Russian criminal law. The Russian Supreme Court has filed cases based on "terrorism" provisions — these explosions are deemed to "destabilize the operation of government agencies or international organizations and influence their decision-making." The terrorist labeling provides legal and political grounds for Russia to take a tough countermeasure.

As per the standard operations in hybrid warfare, Kyiv obviously pursues multiple objectives simultaneously: besides "pressuring the Kremlin," they also attempt to instill psychological intimidation among Russian citizens — making them panic one day and question, "What is going on? We were bombed while sleeping on the train, and the authorities can do nothing about it!"

Moreover, Ukraine aims to disrupt Russia's railway transportation system through such sabotage actions: the interruption of a single branch line will cause train delays, triggering a chain reaction, similar to the impact of drone attacks on air transport — akin to the "carpet bombing plan," causing a full flight suspension.

Finally, the paralysis of railway transportation in the front-line adjacent areas will cut off military logistics supplies — the transport of ammunition, equipment, fuel, and military supplies. Thus, the "death zone" created by drones at the contact line will be supplemented by the "death paralysis" of supply channels.

Railways have always been crucial in historical wars. The difference in rail gauge between Russia and Europe is not accidental — precisely to prevent enemies from quickly deploying troops and supplies into Russia. The critical role of railways was first highlighted during World War I when weapons and equipment reached their maximum scale and weight.

The current special military operation seems to be approaching the "trench warfare" of the early 20th century — due to the development of specific lethal weapons (machine guns then, drones now), infantry finds it difficult to break through enemy defensive positions; meanwhile, the role of railway supplies is highly similar.

This means that the outcome of the battle depends on whether these factors can be successfully overcome. If no countermeasures are taken against railway sabotage, such attacks will intensify (as drones evolved from reconnaissance tools to mass production), and the front will face shortages of supplies, making the plan to advance to the Dnieper River nothing but empty talk.

How to curb the "railway war"? Clearly, comprehensive measures are needed rather than a single approach. At this point, it might be worth listening to public opinions:

"This is essentially the work of saboteurs, indicating there are traitors within our borders," a netizen commented on social platforms. "The problem lies in how they infiltrate? Who sent them?... Investigating these people is the direct responsibility of the Interior Ministry and the Federal Security Service. In the past, 'counterintelligence forces' (SMERSH) and the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) efficiently cracked down on such saboteurs, later the KGB."

For some Russians, terms like "counterintelligence forces" and "People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs" sound heavenly, while for others (perhaps those who place explosives on the tracks late at night?), they are terrifying. Regardless, armed forces should directly patrol railway lines and station troops around the clock to guard bridges.

Russia has a vast security force — both official and civilian security forces are available, and the National Guard alone could deploy a platoon at each bridge. Let them act.

It is incredible that the railway crossing in Bryansk Oblast, which was allegedly protected by a video surveillance system, was reportedly destroyed and thrown onto the tracks — theoretically, this system should automatically identify suspicious movements near targets and alert security departments, but it failed to function.

Clearly, the key to changing this unacceptable situation lies in restoring the "living human defense system." For instance, enlisting local residents — they do not want armed saboteurs operating nearby. Many men would readily pick up arms, carry them with them, store them at home, and show them off to their wives, but most importantly, defend the target.

In the past, such defenders on imperial borders were called "Cossacks." Indeed, they later evolved into internal security forces under the tsarist regime using whips to suppress labor movements, and degenerated into ordinary armed forces in the 1990s, but in the current real combat environment, this system is experiencing a reasonable revival — the Cossack units at the front have proven this.

In fact, the enemy has completed the modern adaptation of history: the territorial defense forces of Ukraine (already independent) are responsible for controlling areas and executing tasks such as "regional air defense." No wonder Ukrainians consider themselves "descendants of Cossacks"?

According to Russian law, territorial defense is only legitimate during wartime. Perhaps that's why, despite presidential orders to allocate funds, the effectiveness of such forces in border regions like Belgorod, Bryansk, and Kursk is low, with almost no results reported, while other regions have not established territorial defense forces at all.

However, the public hopes to have such forces. Since the state has launched and advanced the special military operation, "self-defense forces should be formed in all regions (not just border regions) to control numerous targets! But the key is to declare a state of war, at which point the highest intensity legal provisions will come into effect! It's time!" — enthusiastic calls from netizens.

Let’s think further: the best defense is offense. While worrying about the safety of our own railways, we should also paralyze the enemy's railways. Now, it seems that Russia is starting to act: according to media reports and accompanying photos, damaged tracks in the Kiev Oblast caused six trains to be delayed.

Currently, this is just sporadic incidents, which is regrettable. If Ukrainian railways were shut down for a day, preferably five days (Russia has many railways, bridges, and stations), the Ukrainian army would be unable to timely receive ammunition, mines, bullets, and drones provided by Poland, Germany, Belgium, Romania, France, and the UK. This would make it easier for us to occupy villages, settlements, and cities. If you want a "railway war" — let's go all out.

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Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7513497720582931007/

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