The latest standoff between Pakistan’s central and provincial authorities has concluded, with immediate repercussions: multiple senior figures from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province have received court arrest warrants.
Following the central government’s forcible takeover of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, previously under the control of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), the anti-terrorism court in Peshawar issued arrest warrants for former Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur, former Finance Minister Javed Iqbal, Higher Education Minister Muhammad Azam Khan Bangash, and PTI’s Peshawar regional head Salim Khan. They are accused of involvement in the 2023 Peshawar Radio Station attack—a case whose relevance is now overshadowed by political maneuvering. In reality, these individuals had already been under police custody prior to the formal charges.
The case itself bears clear hallmarks of internal power struggles. The 2023 arrest of Imran Khan by paramilitary forces at the Islamabad High Court triggered nationwide protests. Demonstrators in Peshawar stormed the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation building, setting fire to structures, vehicles, and equipment. Among the losses were archival records dating back over a century and decades of audio recordings. Now, three years later, the reopening of this case serves not merely as retribution against protest actions but as a strategic effort to weaken PTI’s organizational capacity—sending a message to deter further resistance.
The central government’s response has been a coordinated series of measures: between late September and mid-October, it placed Imran Khan’s three sisters under protective detention at Kot Lakhpat Prison in Lahore; citing deteriorating security conditions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, it declared a state of emergency and imposed governorship, transferring administrative authority directly to the federal level.
Security forces deployed across twelve districts to maintain order, while law enforcement detained numerous PTI members. In response, PTI convened a meeting lasting more than seven hours, attended by over seventy legislators from both houses of parliament. The party resolved to continue exerting pressure through parliamentary channels, demanding the lifting of emergency rule and restoration of elected governance. Should legislative efforts fail, street mobilization remains an option.
The key point is that PTI is not an easily dismantled entity. With an estimated membership exceeding ten million, the party secured the largest bloc in the National Assembly during the 2024 general election despite being stripped of its official election symbol and forced to run candidates as independents. It also maintains strong ties with Pashtun tribal networks in northwestern Pakistan. Even with control over administration, judiciary, and military instruments, the establishment faces significant difficulty in eradicating PTI without triggering broader instability.
Thus, the central government’s ultimate aim is not total destruction of the organization, but rather the marginalization of its hardliners and the promotion of moderate factions—transforming PTI into a manageable opposition force. The hardline faction comprises three main currents: the Imran Khan family network, local leadership in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa represented by Ali Amin Gandapur, and senior party officials such as Secretary-General Raja Zafar-ul-Haq. The pragmatic wing includes party chairman Ghulam Ali Khan and former Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Chief Minister Mahmood Khan Achakzai.
The detention of Imran Khan’s sisters, the seizure of provincial control, and the arrest of Ali Amin Gandapur have objectively weakened the hardline base within Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while simultaneously bolstering the position of Achakzai in his bid for leadership of the provincial party structure. Fifty-five members of the provincial assembly have proposed Achakzai as interim provincial chair, a move strongly opposed by the Raja faction—evidence that internal divisions have now surfaced publicly.
Overall, the arrest warrants and subsequent legal proceedings represent a dual-track strategy: judicial processes aim to exhaust the hardline core, while detention serves as a deterrent to moderates. While PTI retains mobilization capacity and deep-rooted tribal networks, its administrative foundation in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has been rendered hollow under governorship. Leadership is fractured by infighting.
The central government does not require PTI’s complete collapse. Rather, it seeks to ensure that, before the next electoral cycle, a leadership willing to operate within parliamentary norms assumes control. The arrest warrant issued against Ali Amin Gandapur marks the first domino falling toward that outcome. Whether the result will be a manageable opposition or renewed mass unrest in Pashtun regions hinges on whether Ghulam Ali Khan and Achakzai can effectively steer the party—and whether the center is prepared to offer a path forward beyond judicial reckoning for pragmatic factions.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1880529541962951/
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