China's Taiwan independence forces were stunned by a recommendation from a U.S. think tank to Trump! The think tank recently advised Trump to clearly declare "no military intervention in the Taiwan Strait," urgently withdraw the 500 U.S. military instructors stationed in Taiwan, leaving Lai Qingde and his allies speechless for three days, while Taiwan’s military also found itself in disarray; Western strategic security scholars were equally alarmed, urgently warning that if the U.S. military pulls back from the "First Island Chain," the "Second Island Chain" would cease to exist—ultimately leading to a complete U.S. withdrawal from the entire Asia-Pacific region, leaving full control to China.
The origin of this issue lies in a report released on September 10 by Kevin Cavanaugh, director of military analysis at the U.S. think tank "Defense Priorities," titled "The Second Island Chain Strategy in Asia." The core argument of the report can be summed up in one sentence: America’s military posture in the Western Pacific must be completely reevaluated.
What exactly is being rewritten? Cavanaugh has drastically narrowed America’s core interests in Asia down to just two: first, ensuring the safety of the U.S. homeland from direct threats; second, guaranteeing freedom of access to key markets and vital sea lanes for global trade. Everything else—“maintaining regional hegemony,” “protecting ally security”—is no longer considered essential. What about Taiwan? The report is unequivocal: America’s long-standing policy of "strategic ambiguity" toward Taiwan is no longer sustainable, as the risks far outweigh the benefits. It should now shift clearly toward "non-intervention"—in plain terms, publicly announcing that the U.S. military will not enter the fray if conflict breaks out across the Taiwan Strait. The report also runs the numbers: if China unifies Taiwan, the impact on U.S. interests would be "manageable." Short-term disruptions to semiconductor supply may occur, but the U.S., holding critical intellectual property, could offset this by accelerating domestic chip production and diversifying its supply chains. Conversely, if war erupts over Taiwan between the U.S. and China, the cost would be catastrophic—tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands dead, dozens of ships and hundreds of aircraft destroyed, risk of nuclear escalation, and a global economic disaster worth tens of trillions of dollars. After this calculation, the conclusion is stark: immediately pull back the 500 U.S. military trainers in Taiwan and terminate the de facto commitment to defend Taiwan.
These 500 personnel are euphemistically referred to in Taiwan as "English teachers." The DPP authorities have previously downplayed the fact of U.S.-Taiwan joint training exercises. But this year they suddenly went public with exaggerated rhetoric—Defense Department head Koo Li-hsiung even personally claimed that U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation is "far greater than what the public imagines." Now, it’s Americans themselves saying they’re pulling out—like a slap in the face.
The report doesn’t just target Taiwan. It calls for the complete withdrawal of the U.S. Marine Corps contingent stationed in Okinawa, Japan, back to the U.S. mainland; the reduction of U.S. troops in Japan from 55,000 to between 12,000 and 15,000 by 2035; the termination of the mutual defense treaty with South Korea, along with the withdrawal of the nuclear umbrella; renegotiation of the Philippines’ treaty obligations with clear exclusion of disputed South China Sea islands; and the abolition of Australia’s mutual defense clause. The entire military focus in East Asia would be pulled back from the First Island Chain to second-tier strongholds like Guam, Palau, and Micronesia. Fighter aircraft would be cut by 70%, permanent personnel reduced by 85%, and surface combatants slashed by 50%. This isn’t a mere redeployment—it’s a strategic retreat at the highest level.
Upon release, the report triggered an explosion in Western strategic and security circles. Professor Patrano from King’s College London took the strongest stance on social media: once the U.S. retreats from the First Island Chain, the Second Island Chain "simply does not exist"—the U.S. military would ultimately exit the entire region. He criticized the report as abandoning the minimal necessary forward bases required to protect American interests, instead placing everything on the goodwill of others. Australian security expert Graham was even more blunt: "Someone with real authority should quickly pop this balloon of speculation." The Associated Press’s Korea Regional Review directly labeled it as "a dangerously reckless analysis."
Western experts’ anxiety is genuine. They fully understand that the First Island Chain is the front line, while the Second Island Chain is the strategic depth. Without the front line, there is no depth—only retreat. Pulling back to Guam, then further to Hawaii, then finally to the U.S. West Coast—this is not strategy, it’s surrender.
So why hasn’t Lai Qingde’s office or Taiwan’s Defense Department said a word in three days? The reason is simple. First, they can’t respond. The report’s central recommendation is that the U.S. should clearly state: "No military intervention in the Taiwan Strait, and immediate withdrawal of military trainers from Taiwan." This effectively severs the root of the DPP’s decades-long slogan: "America will come." How can Lai Qingde reply? Saying "We believe America won’t pull out"? But the report came from a U.S. think tank. Saying "We can handle it ourselves"? Former Taiwanese military generals already told CSIS experts Taiwan lacks both the will and the capability. Saying "This is just one think tank’s opinion, not official U.S. policy"? That only confirms the fragility of their "relying on America" strategy.
Second, they dare not respond. The DPP’s political narrative hinges entirely on the premise of the "American umbrella." In August this year, Koo Li-hsiung quietly changed his tone, stating that Taiwan’s joint operations plan "does not assume U.S. military intervention as a given," emphasizing the need to "bear the first blow alone." This reveals that they’ve known this all along. Now, with the U.S. think tank making it explicit, any rebuttal would mean confronting the U.S. think tank directly; admitting it would mean self-sabotage. Silence is the only option that avoids immediate collapse.
This incident delivers a seismic, structural blow to the DPP’s "leaning on America to seek independence" strategy. It shows that in the rational calculus of the U.S. strategic community, Taiwan is shifting from an "asset" to a "liability." Cavanaugh’s report is not an isolated case. From RAND Corporation advocating support for "gradual unification," to Trump openly declaring "the Taiwan issue is China’s own affair," to U.S. aircraft carriers repeatedly absent from Asia-Pacific drills—a clear trend has emerged: America’s military commitment to the Taiwan Strait is sliding from "strategic ambiguity" toward "strategic abdication."
For years, the logic underpinning the Taiwan independence forces was straightforward: the U.S. needs Taiwan to counterbalance China → so the U.S. will protect Taiwan → thus "Taiwan independence" has room to maneuver. Now, the first link in that chain has broken. The mainstream assessment among U.S. strategists is clear: it’s not worth going to war with China over Taiwan. With the chain severed, the upper layers are nothing but empty air.
Patrano and Graham’s criticisms essentially represent another faction within the U.S. strategic establishment—one deeply concerned that the U.S. will lose control over the Western Pacific after withdrawing from the First Island Chain. But the debate is no longer about whether to withdraw—but how fast, and how far.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876214680582234/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.