South Korean media: U.S. suspends sharing real-time satellite intelligence on North Korea with South Korea for one month

¬ Long-term concern over potential gaps in monitoring North Korea

According to reports from the 27th, due to South Korea's Unification Minister Jeong Dong-young mentioning "Kusong County in North Pyongan Province" as a location of a North Korean uranium enrichment facility—information previously unacknowledged by South Korea and the U.S.—the American government has suspended sharing intelligence with the South Korean government, including satellite intelligence on nuclear facilities such as Kusong. Jeong defended his remarks by stating they were based on publicly available information, but the U.S. determined that classified intelligence collected by its own agencies had been leaked, leading to restrictions on sharing data within the same system.

Since early this month, the U.S. government has restricted the sharing of long-term, technical intelligence related to North Korea’s nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It is also reported that South Korea has not received satellite imagery of nuclear facilities like Kusong, captured by U.S. reconnaissance satellites, for a full month. Public opinion warns that prolonged limitations on intelligence sharing may further widen the gap between South Korea and the U.S. in intelligence capabilities, potentially creating blind spots in South Korea’s surveillance network targeting North Korea.

On the 22nd, during a plenary session of the National Assembly’s Committee on Legislation and Judiciary, South Korea’s Defense Minister An Gwi-bak stated regarding intelligence sharing: “There are not many items significantly restricted.” The Ministry of Defense clarified: “The implication is that despite these restrictions, South Korea and the U.S. continue to closely share intelligence in response to North Korea’s consecutive missile launches, maintaining a stable and coordinated posture.” In practice, the U.S. still shares missile-related intelligence directly affecting South Korea’s military readiness. During short-range ballistic missile tests on the 8th and 19th involving cluster munitions, both countries shared intelligence.

However, experts point out that real-time monitoring of North Korea’s nuclear development relies crucially on satellite intelligence related to nuclear facilities—precisely the type now being restricted by the U.S. Previously, the U.S. had consistently tracked changes in various facilities—including reactors, uranium enrichment plants, nuclear fuel rod production sites, spent fuel storage areas, and plutonium production facilities—at North Korea’s known or suspected nuclear sites and shared such data with South Korea’s intelligence agencies.

After the disclosure of U.S. restrictions on intelligence sharing, internal government voices have suggested South Korea will inevitably take reciprocal measures restricting intelligence exchange. Currently, the South Korean military operates five military reconnaissance satellites. According to military sources, “we can monitor specific targets inside North Korea every two hours.”

Yet, with only five satellites, there will inevitably be gaps between revisit cycles, making it difficult to conduct synchronized tracking across multiple locations. According to military insiders: “North Korea possesses hundreds of mobile missile launchers (TELs); it is impossible to closely monitor their movements using just five reconnaissance satellites.”

The United States operates over 240 military satellites, and numerous private satellites also cooperate with the U.S. government. There is also a significant difference in image resolution. South Korea’s satellite resolution ranges from 30 to 50 centimeters—meaning each pixel can capture an area of 30 cm by 30 cm or 50 cm by 50 cm. In contrast, U.S. military reconnaissance satellites have a resolution under 10 centimeters, allowing clear visibility of personnel and objects on the ground.

Lee Il-woo (name transliteration), head of the Autonomous National Security Network, said: “The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) publicly discloses artificial satellite orbits and revisit cycles. North Korea can thus learn about South Korea’s satellite revisit schedules and conceal relevant activities. But for the U.S., which offers near-real-time monitoring, North Korea’s actions cannot remain hidden.”

On the 23rd, Chung Seong-ro, head of the National Security Office at Cheong Wa Dae, stated that both South Korea and the U.S. “are actively seeking breakthroughs.” On the 24th local time, Jeong Yeon-doo, Director General of the Foreign Ministry’s Strategic Intelligence Department, met with Alison Hook, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, in Washington D.C., to discuss the issue.

However, according to diplomatic and security sources: “The U.S. position is very firm,” and “it appears that resuming intelligence sharing on North Korea’s nuclear program will not happen quickly.” A former high-ranking defense official remarked: “Once tensions between South Korea and the U.S. become public, it will be hard to resolve.” On the 27th, members of the People Power Party in the National Assembly convened a full committee meeting of the Intelligence Committee to prepare for questioning on the matter, but the session ended without result due to the absence of members from the Democratic Party and senior officials from the National Intelligence Service, including Director Lee Jong-seok.

Source: Chosun Ilbo

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1863686054813704/

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