
The third-ranking figure in Russia is now beginning to consider where the country should go after Putin.
Volgin, chairman of the State Duma of Russia, mentioned a meaningful statement when he spoke to TASS. He said that the Russian people should "cherish" the political system under Putin's leadership.

This top Russian political figure believes that against the backdrop of frequent global crises and an unstable international situation, it is precisely the system led by Putin that has ensured Russia's national stability.
Objectively speaking, this statement is not entirely baseless. Over the past two decades, Russia has indeed experienced many storms: international sanctions, financial crises, oil price collapses, and continuous geopolitical conflicts.
For a vast country with a heavy historical burden, if the power structure frequently fluctuates, it would be difficult for many policies to be implemented over the long term.
Puvin's long-term leadership at least ensures continuity in state power, allowing Russia to maintain a unified decision-making direction in the face of external pressure.

Especially in times of crisis, a stable power center can indeed avoid intense internal struggles among different political forces. Iran is a typical example of the opposite; the conflict between religious and secular factions has left the country in chaos.
However, the problem is that attributing Russia's stability entirely to Putin himself would easily overlook a more realistic issue—this stability is largely based on his personal authority.
Once this core figure no longer resides at the center of power, whether the entire system can continue to operate smoothly becomes an unavoidable question.

Put more directly, the most critical variable in today's Russian political structure is not the system itself, but Putin himself.
Since coming to power in 2000, Putin has been deeply involved in Russian governance for over twenty years. Many key decision-making mechanisms, methods of power balance, and even relationships between different political factions have gradually formed around this central figure.
As long as Putin remains in this position, the system can continue to function because everyone knows who the final arbiter is.
But once this premise changes, many underlying issues will surface.
First, there is the issue of succession. Russia has experienced similar situations multiple times in its history: a strong leader has held power for a long time, maintaining relative stability during their tenure, but when power transfers occur, various contradictions erupt. The period before the collapse of the Soviet Union is a typical example.
Strongman politics can indeed concentrate resources to accomplish major tasks in the short term, but in the long run, without a clear and widely accepted mechanism for power transition, the future will face great uncertainty.

Over the years, the outside world has always discussed who will succeed Putin. But the reality is that since the end of the "Putin-Medvedev rotation," this issue still lacks a clear answer.
Currently, there are indeed many influential figures within the Russian political system who are seen as potential successors to Putin, such as Prime Minister Mishustin, Secretary of the Security Council Shoigu, Presidential Assistant Yurkin, and Chairman of United Russia Party Medvedev. However, they mostly rely on the existing power structure in the Kremlin and few have the status to independently integrate all sides.
In other words, the current political landscape in Russia resembles a balance network maintained by Putin himself.
Different factions maintain some level of cooperation and restraint not because they have no conflicts, but because there is a "final arbiter" in the form of Putin.
If this "arbiter" no longer plays a role, whether this fragile balance can be maintained is hard to say.

Another practical issue is that the political line and consensus formed during Putin's era may not automatically continue into the next era.
Over the past two decades, Russia's national development model has basically been based on resource economy, prioritizing security and geopolitics, while maintaining a relatively centralized power structure.
This model could function in a specific historical stage, but the competitive environment in the future is changing. Global supply chains are being restructured, new technological revolutions like AI are constantly emerging, and many countries are vying for dominance in future industries. However, Russia has fallen behind.
Taking AI as an example, in the 2025 Global Artificial Intelligence Index ranking, the United States and China firmly occupy the top two positions, while Russia ranks 35th, even falling behind some small European countries.
It can be said that in the new round of industrial upgrading brought by AI, Russia is almost being eliminated, seeing no future.
From a macro perspective, issues such as technology, industrial upgrading, and population structure are putting forward new demands for Russia's national governance.

If the future Russian leadership cannot form a new development path on these issues, then even if the political structure maintains formal stability, it will be difficult to truly address the deep challenges of national development.
Not to mention the ongoing Ukraine conflict, which is essentially draining Russia's future. If Russia cannot face this future with a new posture, the outbreak of internal crises is just a matter of time.
Therefore, when Volgin emphasized that the Russian people should "cherish the current system," he inadvertently revealed a kind of anxiety: many Russian political elites realize that the stability of the current system is largely tied to Putin personally.
For Russia, the real difficult problem is not today, but the future.
By Li Jin, media professional
Original article: toutiao.com/article/7616644785487348233/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author alone.