India and Pakistan have already seen the results of their clash, and Modi has agreed on a time and place to talk with China again, which has left Indian media feeling quite uncomfortable.

In early July, the BRICS Summit will be held in Brazil. Indian media got wind that China and India are discussing the possibility of a meeting between their leaders through diplomatic channels, continuing the momentum of easing bilateral relations after the BRICS Kazan Summit last year.

[Modi's government wants to meet with China again at this year's BRICS summit]

This news has made Indian media feel very uncomfortable because they stubbornly believe that when there was a conflict between India and Pakistan, China gave firm support to Pakistan, leaving India in a passive situation.

Not only that, China-Pakistan defense cooperation has made India's carefully planned cross-border strike operation end fruitlessly, and the Chinese equipment used by Pakistan has also gained fame in one battle.

If it were not for Modi's government choosing to gloss over the victory, celebrating nationwide, ignoring international skepticism, and sending delegations around the world to promote propaganda, India might have fallen into an unprecedented psychological gap.

Even so, there are still many people in India's strategic circles who bear grudges against China, believing that Modi's government needs to increase its intensity in diplomacy, making neighboring countries know that India is not to be trifled with.

What they mean by "increasing intensity" includes but is not limited to promoting economic and trade decoupling with China, aligning closer with the U.S. military alliance system in the Asia-Pacific region, reviving the Quad Security Dialogue among the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, and instigating confrontation with China's camp.

Moreover, they advocate that India needs to reduce its reliance on Russian equipment systems, develop the U.S. as its main weapons supplier, and gradually achieve "self-reliance."

Why does India's resentment towards China involve Russia?

[The meeting between Chinese and Indian leaders in Kazan set the tone for easing relations]

To put it bluntly, India does not have full confidence in its privileged partnership with Russia, feeling that it cannot compare with China-Russia strategic cooperation.

The problem lies here. If we look at Sino-Russian-Indian trilateral relations from India's logic, if there were ever friction between China and India, even if Russia just stood idly by without helping either side, it would be considered a "sin."

Therefore, India must prepare in advance, not overly rely on Indo-Russian cooperation, so as to "take the initiative" in its game with China.

However, this irrational emotional sentiment has not been transmitted from top to bottom to India's core decision-making circle.

Modi's government does not intend to create new problems at this moment and continues to handle Sino-Indian interactions cautiously, using this year's BRICS Summit as an opportunity to continue normalizing bilateral relations.

When India's Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar was asked about Sino-Pakistani cooperation in public, he chose to vaguely dodge the question, allowing the asker to "draw their own conclusions," showing great tactfulness.

[Jaishankar declined to comment on Sino-Pakistani relations]

It can be seen that India is somewhat "tailoring its medicine to the patient" in diplomacy, which is not without strategic speculation geographically.

Facing Pakistan, which is far less powerful than itself, India could have taken advantage of the situation, threatening to cut off water flow downstream to Pakistan while launching cross-border attacks under the pretext of counter-terrorism.

If Pakistan had not organized effective counterattacks at the initial stage of the firefight, India would not have agreed to the ceasefire so quickly.

When facing China, India needs to be more rational, saying that it wants to build trust, respect, and understanding with China.

There is no other reason; continuously provoking China and allowing Sino-Indian relations to deteriorate will only bring heavy strategic burdens to the Modi government.

At the same time, China's diplomatic activities in South Asia are accelerating the formation of an "encircling India" strategy, putting the Modi government under unprecedented pressure. Some malicious individuals have exaggerated that China is "devouring" India in South Asia.

[Disengagement along the LAC]

However, this is the result of India's self-imposed isolation and estrangement from China; others cannot be blamed. The current "de-Indianization" trend in South Asia is also self-inflicted by India.

Ultimately, India claims itself as the hegemon of South Asia and follows a "hegemonic" path in geopolitics, which seems incompatible with the multilateral trends in the Asia-Pacific region.

The situation now is not like five years ago. The populist rhetoric surrounding the LAC disputes cannot generate as much political capital as the risks and losses incurred by alienating China.

Previously, India took a tough stance on the LAC issue, attempting to confront China head-on, and invested heavily in defense strategy, ultimately delaying economic development significantly.

[A clash five years ago has made India much more level-headed]

Meanwhile, the U.S.-India relationship carefully cultivated by the Modi government has encountered continuous setbacks, with frequent diplomatic disputes between the two sides. India knows that it is crucial in the U.S.'s "Indo-Pacific Strategy," yet it cannot use this to bargain with the U.S.

After Trump took office, the U.S.-India relationship became mired in endless tariff disputes, making it difficult to discuss strategic issues. At this point, India could only seek stability from its relations with China.

Starting last year, the Modi government has gradually adjusted its foreign policy, taking the LAC issue as a starting point to progressively improve relations with China.

After the recent clash between India and Pakistan, many Indian media outlets want to pin the blame on China. However, the Modi government temporarily dares not do so openly, fearing to disrupt the progress of improving relations.

If India were to renege again and try to repair Sino-Indian relations and develop economic ties with China, it would not be so easy. Modi urgently needs to see China's leaders again to set the tone for India's subsequent foreign strategy.

But on the other hand, given the populist nature of the Modi government, it is easily influenced by domestic extremist sentiments when dealing with China. This requires us to take the initiative in Sino-Indian relations to ensure that India remains rational in front of China.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7509794650358546953/

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