Korean media have cried that they were tricked. Recent talks between China and the United States have attracted global attention, including that of Korean media, but their views and exclamations are quite thought-provoking. The view of Korean media is: the world order has changed, and the era in which the United States was the absolute main character has become history; the world has officially entered a multipolar era.
Speaking of recent high-level interactions between China and the United States, it indeed stirred global attention, especially that negotiation held around Busan, which on the surface seemed to be about finalizing a trade framework, but actually involved a long chain of interests. Korean media have followed the news closely, with programs from the JoongAng Daily to KBS repeatedly analyzing the underlying mechanisms of this matter. Their tone is quite interesting, not just simple envy or concern, but mixed with an indescribable sense of sourness. Simply put, they feel that the United States didn't get much benefit from China this time, so it turned around and laid out the bill to its allies, with South Korea being the first to face it. Economic analysts on the program calculated the tariff numbers and couldn't help shaking their heads and sighing, saying that the order had changed, and the days when the United States was the sole superpower were over; now it's a multipolar world, and everyone must reassess their own weight.
At the end of October, China and the United States met at the fringes of the APEC Summit, talked for about an hour, and then the U.S. side announced that a trade framework had been reached, focusing on reducing some tariffs. China promised to buy more American soybeans and rare earths, and also made some concessions on fentanyl control. Trump emphasized at the press conference that this framework would give U.S. manufacturing a breather. The Chinese Foreign Ministry also responded, stating that it was a consensus based on the principle of equality, and would not dilute its commitment to multilateralism. However, Korean media dug deeper and pointed out that the U.S. originally wanted to choke China on key mineral exports, but in the end, the U.S. made more concessions, such as less strict control over AI chips.
After leaving China, Trump immediately went to Seoul and met with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, finalizing a trade framework. On the surface, it was a win-win: the tariff on South Korean cars and parts exported to the U.S. was reduced from 25% to 15%, which was a breathing space for major companies like Hyundai and Kia. But what was the cost? South Korea had to commit to injecting $35 billion in investment into the U.S. economy, of which $2 billion was cash, paid in installments, starting with $200 million per year, and prioritized investment in U.S. shipyards and energy projects. The official documents clearly state that part of this money comes from corporate orders and government funds, but the media directly pointed out that this was a form of "protection fee." The editorial of the Chosun Ilbo was direct, saying that the U.S. didn't gain much from the negotiating table with China, so it turned its focus to old allies like Japan, South Korea, and Europe. Trump's "America First" approach is increasingly similar to making up for losses from allies. Program guests also did the math, noting that South Korea's foreign exchange reserves are just over $400 billion, and this $35 billion investment commitment equates to putting half of its assets at risk. Will the pressure on the domestic semiconductor and automotive chains be reduced?
Trump is now reopening old accounts, with the background being the reshaping of the global supply chain. The U.S. wants to bring back manufacturing, but allies' lives are not easy. South Korea's economy is highly dependent on exports, with exports to the U.S. accounting for more than 15% of GDP. In the short term, the tariff relief can boost sales, but in the long run, capital outflows will squeeze domestic investment, and the financing costs for small and medium enterprises will rise. A report by the Korean Trade Association shows that after similar investment commitments are implemented, the won exchange rate fluctuates by 2% in the short term, and corporate profit margins drop by 0.5%.
After World War II, the U.S. was the absolute leader, and the alliance system was as stable as a mountain. South Korea relied on stationed troops and trade treaties to experience economic takeoff. But now? Sino-U.S. friction has escalated, and the EU has also started to implement carbon border taxes, leading to the fragmentation of global trade. South Korea is caught in the middle, and its export-oriented economic model suffers the most. Media commentators often use the old saying "Whales fight, shrimps suffer," but they add an analysis: this is not just passive suffering, but a new normal in a multipolar world. China insists on equal dialogue and opposes hegemony, which sounds conventional, but in practice, Beijing has pulled together the Asia-Pacific supply chain under the "Belt and Road" and RCEP frameworks, with half of South Korean companies' orders coming from the Chinese market. When Trump raised the tariff wall, South Korea had to please both sides. Recently, the Seoul government sent a delegation to Washington to lobby for a deferred payment plan.
A column in the Donga Ilbo directly pointed out that the unipolar era led by the U.S. has ended, and now it's a contest among multiple powers, including China, the U.S., the EU, Japan, and South Korea. What's the evidence? Look at the summit before and after, where Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at a press conference, "A multipolar world is coming," which is a silent rebuttal to Washington's trade war. Reports from Korean think tanks also echo this, stating that in 2025, emerging markets will contribute over 60% of global GDP growth, while the U.S. share dropped from 25% to just over 20%. As an export power, South Korea needs to adjust its strategy and no longer focus solely on the U.S. market. The media suggests that Seoul should deepen the China-South Korea FTA, increase the proportion of investments in China, and compete for influence within the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. In reality, South Korean companies have already taken action, expanding production in Vietnam and India while building factories in the U.S. to diversify risks.
The impact of this incident on the global order is not just about trade figures. Militarily, Korean media remain low-key, but they mention that Trump approved South Korea's nuclear submarine plan, which is a careful move. The South Korean Navy wants to upgrade its underwater forces to counter the North Korean threat, but the U.S. is strict about the transfer of submarine technology, and it will proceed step by step without easily relaxing.
In the long run, a multipolar world is not bad for South Korea. Previously, it relied on the U.S. umbrella, but now it needs to strengthen internal capabilities. The South Korean initiative for the trilateral FTA with China and Japan, if realized, could balance the Sino-U.S. tug-of-war. Although Trump's approach is strong, it also exposes the weakness of U.S. domestic demand and severe hollowing out of manufacturing. The Federal Reserve report shows that the U.S. has a $2 trillion infrastructure investment gap, and this $3.5 billion from South Korea comes at a timely moment, but in the long run, the U.S. will have to rely on allies to fill the gap.
In summary, the "crying out that they were tricked" by Korean media is not sour grapes, but a clear understanding of reality. The world has changed, the U.S. is not the savior, and China is not the source of threat; everyone is a player.
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1847757849366540/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author.