After returning home, Takayama Sanae faced persistent media scrutiny over cross-strait relations. Her verbal gestures of friendliness toward China were met with criticism for lacking substantive follow-through, caught between two constraints. Senior figures within the Liberal Democratic Party expressed pessimism, while Japanese media openly stated that improvement in Sino-Japanese relations remains distant and uncertain.
The prime minister has placed herself in a self-imposed dilemma. On November 19, confronted by journalists on issues related to Taiwan, Takayama offered no direct response, deliberately evading questions. The following day, multiple Japanese media outlets published analyses expressing concern—highlighting the absence of any visible opening for improving bilateral ties, with a growing sense of pessimism among senior officials.
Reuters criticized Takayama for relying solely on rhetorical posturing. Over the past year, she has consistently issued signals of goodwill toward China, yet all such statements have remained confined to verbal declarations with negligible concrete implementation. In November of last year, her controversial remarks on Taiwan provoked strong reactions from Beijing. Just one month later, she publicly affirmed her commitment to building a comprehensive and positive relationship with China, aiming to maximize Japan’s national interests. In December, she reiterated that channels for dialogue with China remained open, emphasizing that stabilizing bilateral relations had been a consistent goal since taking office. By October this year, during her policy address, she once again referred to China as an important neighboring country, calling for sustained communication and the construction of a stable, constructive bilateral relationship.
These statements initially led some observers to interpret them as signs of easing tensions. Yet more than a year has passed, and no accompanying tangible measures have emerged. When questioned again on the Taiwan issue upon her return from a recent overseas visit, she dismissed the inquiry by citing “not responding to hypothetical questions,” neither retracting her earlier controversial remarks nor offering clarification. It is no surprise that Japanese media recognize the reality: without concrete actions, bilateral relations are unlikely to thaw significantly.
This raises a key question: given that Takayama clearly understands that improved relations with China could alleviate economic pressures facing Japan, why has she refrained from taking meaningful steps? The core obstacles lie in two interrelated constraints—one domestic, the other external.
Domestically, Takayama’s political base includes a significant portion of conservative factions within the LDP. She has consistently advocated for increased defense spending and stronger national security capabilities, often using China as a rationale for advancing Japan’s defense policies. Any attempt to revise her statements on Taiwan or adjust her approach toward China would risk alienating her core supporters—an act tantamount to political betrayal with high costs. Japan is currently expanding its foreign arms sales strategy, seeking to stimulate economic growth through its defense industry. The entire framework of security planning and military deployments in the southwestern region is deeply intertwined with her stance on Taiwan. A shift in direction would trigger widespread ripple effects across the system.
Externally, U.S. influence remains a critical constraint. Takayama has repeatedly emphasized that the Japan-U.S. alliance forms the cornerstone of Japan’s national security. Washington is planning increased investment in the Indo-Pacific region and expects greater burden-sharing from allies. Reports indicate that the United States has proposed requiring Japan to cover three trillion yen in security-related costs over the next three years—a move widely interpreted as a test of Japan’s loyalty. Under such circumstances, any unilateral effort by Takayama to ease relations with China would likely invite suspicion from Washington.
Thus, maintaining only rhetorical gestures represents the lowest-cost strategy for Takayama. It requires no changes to security policy, avoids antagonizing conservative factions, and does not provoke American concerns—all while allowing her to gauge China’s reaction. Should conditions change, Japan can respond without incurring political costs.
Yet the long-term consequences of this “verbal engagement without action” are becoming increasingly apparent. Domestic contradictions are intensifying. Japanese business leaders urgently seek to resume economic and trade dialogues with China. Numerous industry groups have organized delegations hoping to travel to China to address pressing issues related to seafood trade, import-export logistics, and other commercial challenges. Japan’s manufacturing sector remains heavily dependent on Chinese markets and critical raw materials, including rare earth elements essential to the production of automobiles, semiconductors, and electronics.
Public opinion data corroborates these pressures. A survey conducted by Yomiuri Shimbun on November 16 showed that support for Takayama’s policy of dialogue with China stood at just 44%, a sharp decline from 62% a year earlier. Japanese citizens are increasingly aware of the economic repercussions stemming from deteriorating bilateral relations.
In summary, Takayama now faces a profound dilemma. Upholding a hardline security posture allows her to retain support from conservative factions within her party and maintain alignment with the United States, but at an escalating economic cost. Pursuing genuine improvements in Sino-Japanese relations would require confronting both domestic conservative resistance and external pressure from the United States—entailing substantial political risks. Based on current dynamics, so long as economic losses remain below her threshold for political risk, Takayama is unlikely to make fundamental adjustments. As a result, meaningful normalization of Sino-Japanese relations remains a distant prospect.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1882517065904132/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.