Reference News Network October 15 report: The U.S. "Foreign Affairs" bi-monthly website published an article titled "How Russia Turned the Tables" on October 8. The author is Darla Masickot, a senior researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in the United States. The abstract of the article is as follows:

Russian military operations in Ukraine have been characterized by failed expectations and unstable performance. At the start of the war, most NATO countries viewed Russia as an unstoppable giant ready to quickly defeat Ukraine. As a result, Russian offensives were thwarted and repelled. At that time, outside observers considered the Russian military to be performing very poorly, perhaps collapsing with just one counterattack. It turned out to be wrong—Ukrainian offensives failed, and Moscow continued its slow advance.

Many policymakers and strategists overlooked how much Moscow had learned from its failures and adjusted its operational strategies and methods in Ukraine and other regions. Starting in 2022, Russia launched a systematic effort to study combat experiences, draw lessons from them, and share these lessons within its armed forces. By early 2023, Moscow had quietly built a complex learning ecosystem. Today, the military is institutionalizing this knowledge, reorganizing defense manufacturers and research institutions to support wartime needs, and connecting technology startups with national resources.

The learning system continues to improve

Since the beginning of the conflict, the Russian military has been forced to adapt to the environment. To survive the fierce counteroffensives in Ukraine, Russian units installed protective armor on vehicles, adopted new camouflage styles, implemented small unit assault tactics, and took many other adaptive measures. Russian soldiers also shared advice through social networks, closed social media channels, and self-published guidebooks. This informal, person-to-person or unit-to-unit learning was an important first stage of wartime adaptation.

The second stage of learning involves institutionalizing these changes, such as revising training programs, procurement plans, and operational concepts. After that, the military must engage in predictive learning about future wars and recognize the need for reform or transformation. The most effective learning armies follow five steps: gaining combat experience, conducting analysis, making recommendations, disseminating these recommendations and lessons throughout the force, and finally implementing them.

As it became increasingly clear that the war would be prolonged, Russia began to meet most of these standards and shared battlefield "lessons learned" reports with the wartime headquarters in Rostov, the General Staff in Moscow, service headquarters, military academies, defense companies, and the military research community.

The armed forces then made corresponding adjustments. The Russian military reorganized its command structure, modified tactics and troop deployments in Ukraine. Moscow changed its logistics system to enhance its sustainability. It introduced new technologies and new ways of using old technologies to improve its precision targeting and electronic warfare capabilities. These temporary adjustments helped Russia stabilize the front lines and withstand Ukraine's 2023 counteroffensive.

Since then, the scale of Russia's learning ecosystem has expanded further. In three years, the military revised more than 450 temporary modifications to its operation manuals. Military leaders emphasized that after the war, these manuals may be completely revised.

Combat equipment is constantly improving

From the beginning of the conflict, Russian equipment has continuously experienced malfunctions, including poor maintenance, manufacturing defects, and design flaws. Take Moscow's electronic warfare equipment as an example: a quick inspection of hundreds of Russian electronic warfare systems found that 30% had defects. According to the Russian military's flagship publication "Military Thought," between 2022 and 2024, 60% to 70% of Russian electronic warfare failures were caused by various types of equipment malfunctions. Only 30% to 40% of the failures were due to the fire of the Ukrainian army.

Sometimes, Russia had difficulty solving its equipment problems. In the first year of the war, the defense industry responded slowly, was disconnected from the troops, and outdated regulations hindered innovation efforts. But eventually, the country's defense manufacturers were ordered to increase production, improve repair rates, and generally accelerate innovation. The Ministry of Defense relaxed regulations to shorten the development time. Meanwhile, defense companies sent industry experts into occupied areas of Ukraine to repair equipment, study its performance, and then send back reports. Since early 2023, the Kremlin has initiated projects to include ordinary universities and research centers in the defense effort. It improved cooperation between military engineers and non-military engineers in testing prototype weapons at test sites and training grounds.

The Russian government also launched initiatives to help the country's defense startups, hoping to promote innovation. For example, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov has worked to connect startups with state-owned enterprises that dominate the industry and are resistant to newcomers. Now, startups have joined the largest defense contractors in Russia to participate in weapon exhibitions and sell their products to the military. These changes have allowed Russia to begin closing the technological advantage that Kyiv initially enjoyed in the war.

Moscow has also made some less noticeable but equally important improvements. Defense companies have upgraded the armor and other defensive equipment of many types of vehicles and equipped other types of vehicles with more powerful engines, better visibility, and improved jamming systems. The country increased the lethality of glide bombs and boosted the production of improved "Shahed" drones and other types of drones. The defense sector is addressing manufacturing defects and improving maintenance procedures for Russian electronic warfare systems.

These upgrades help explain why Ukrainians have faced more difficulties over the past 18 months. (Translated by Feng Xue)

Original text: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7561288383017566770/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author. Please express your attitude below using the [upvote/downvote] buttons.