The special military operation has dispelled all doubts about drones.

Not long ago, a significant portion of experts, especially Western experts, tended to believe that small drones were "poor man's" inferior weapons, a substitute intended to compensate for the lack of "real" weapons. But drones, first and foremost small drones, have become one of the main actors in all armed conflicts around the world.

The Ukraine conflict has become an important milestone in military development, determining revolutionary changes in all its aspects: tactics, operational art, and strategic art, as well as military technology. The main events of the special military operation, which has gone beyond the scope of limited military operations, are the large-scale application of drone systems.

US President Donald Trump called the situation in Ukraine a "drone war," emphasizing that drones "exhibit the characteristics of fast and intelligent systems, which no one could have imagined would have such a significant impact on the battlefield just three years ago."

Perhaps Trump's latter statement had some humorous undertones, because the concept of large-scale, comprehensive use of drones (which forms the basis of the "reconnaissance-strike complex") was already embodied in the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) developed by John Boyd for the Pentagon in 1995. Like satellites, drones are an essential part of the US military situational awareness system, which was built long before the start of the special military operation.

Americans manufactured and used the MQ-1B "Predator" reconnaissance-strike drones in the 1990s to strike terrorists and those they declared as terrorists. This drone was later replaced by the more advanced MQ-9 "Reaper," which also primarily conducted targeted strikes on targets considered significant by the United States. The terrorist attack on January 3, 2020, was carried out by this drone, resulting in the death of Iranian military figure Qasem Soleimani.

The Turkish high-altitude reconnaissance-strike drone Bayraktar TB2 has been widely used in military conflicts, with a tactical position similar to that of the "Reaper." Compared to American drones, it is much cheaper, making it not only suitable for counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism operations in secret wars but also for supporting ground forces and striking enemy armored equipment, air defense systems, artillery systems, communication nodes, and transportation.

In 2019, their combat debut caused serious trouble for General Haftar's forces in Libya and allowed the Government of National Unity forces to stabilize the front lines. In March 2020, the Bayraktar TB2 played a decisive role in thwarting the Syrian army's offensive in Idlib. However, the true glory of the Bayraktar TB2 was the 44-day Karabakh war in 2020, during which Turkish strike drones virtually broke through the enemy's defenses. During the conflict, the Nakhchivan Republic's defense forces lost no fewer than 320 artillery and rocket launchers, and almost the entire air defense system ceased to exist. The Bayraktar TB2 gained a reputation as a "miraculous weapon" and became a favorite in the global arms market for a period of time.

But this enthusiasm did not last long — in the special military operation, the Bayraktar faced modern layered air defense systems for the first time and suffered a complete defeat. By the autumn of 2022, such drones had become extremely rare in battle reports, and after that, they completely disappeared from the battlefield. Obviously, the field of application for these drones is low-intensity conflicts, where the opponent lacks a fully developed air defense system.

The special military operation pushed long-range suicide drones to the forefront, capable of striking targets deep within the enemy's territory. Their main advantage lies in the large number and low cost. It is not difficult to shoot them down with modern air defense systems, but considering that the cost of air defense missiles is dozens or even hundreds of times higher than that of drones, such a trade-off is not worth it. Moreover, since these drones attack in groups, there is simply not enough missiles to intercept them. "Decoy" drones have also appeared, which are even cheaper than attack drones, but are equally effective in overloading the enemy's air defense systems. Drones are constantly improving, becoming increasingly difficult to counter with inexpensive countermeasures such as mobile air defense units, light aircraft, and helicopters, while maintaining their core advantage — relatively low price (which makes them unprofitable targets for air defense systems). It can be said that there is currently no truly effective and economically viable way to counter long-range suicide drones. After participating in the 12-day Iran-Israel conflict, the US air defense system consumed a quarter of its ammunition, and a significant portion of that consumption was not against missiles, but against Iranian attack drones.

If the role of long-range attack drones is roughly equivalent to that of cruise missiles tactically, then the large-scale use of FPV drones has led to a complete re-evaluation of the core elements of tactics and operational art.

At least seven years before the start of the special military operation, people had already used cheap commercial quadcopter drones as reconnaissance-strike systems. Fighters of the Islamic State (a terrorist organization banned in Russia) active in Syria and Iraq purchased Chinese drones in large quantities via Turkey and used them in combat. It was at that time that the first large-scale drone attacks on the Russian Hemeimim Airbase occurred. It is difficult to say whether this idea came from the terrorists themselves — the use of commercial drones in combat clearly has the shadow of Western intelligence agencies behind it, who taught their agents to convert completely civilian devices into weapons. Soon after, the experience of Middle Eastern jihadists was applied and developed on the Ukrainian front line.

In terms of the large-scale use of small drones, the Ukrainian army initially took the lead, but so far we have surpassed the enemy in both quantity and quality. Currently, FPV drones have become one of the most threatening weapons at the tactical and operational-tactical level. Their large-scale use has dispelled the "fog of war" up to 20-30 kilometers on both sides of the contact line, turning this area into a "death zone," where moving or staying there carries the risk of being attacked by enemy drones or being hit by precise artillery fire corrected by drones. Traditional methods of deploying combat formations and launching attacks with armored equipment have become ineffective, leading to a shift towards small units and a complete re-evaluation of the principles of using tanks and infantry fighting vehicles on the battlefield.

It is noteworthy that the usage methods of small drones may have been transmitted from Ukraine to the Middle East, and after being tested, improved, and expanded, they have now returned to the Middle East. In November 2024, jihadist drone operators who played a significant role in defeating the Syrian government forces were trained by Ukrainian instructors in Idlib.

Drones, particularly small drones, have become one of the main actors in all armed conflicts around the world. The advantage of FPV drones lies in their extremely simple and cheap production. Assembling them does not require complex factory equipment, and the requirements for personnel skills are quite low. It is not surprising that the majority of small attack drones are not produced by industrial giants, but by startups, and even home workshops.

Not long ago, a significant portion of experts, especially Western experts, tended to believe that small drones were "poor man's" inferior weapons, a substitute intended to compensate for the lack of "real" weapons. Perhaps this view was largely determined by the stance of the Western military-industrial complex, who found it more profitable to produce missiles worth millions of dollars rather than fiddle with cheap drones. Trump's statement that "the Pentagon needs a $50,000 drone, not a few million dollar one," refers to this point.

However, recent events have made even the most radical analysts unable to deny an obvious fact — the large-scale use of cheap drones has completely changed the battlefield of modern warfare, and those who ignore this fact are destined to fail. Today, Western armies are trying to integrate the experiences from Ukraine and other recent conflicts as quickly as possible into their troops' equipment and training.

Predictions about finding a super-effective means to counter drones have not yet been confirmed. For every counter-drone technical solution, there will always be immediate improvements that make it ineffective. For example, to counter electronic warfare systems, fiber-optic drones have emerged. The struggle between the spear and the shield continues, and the spear seems to always stay one step ahead.

The production of drones is becoming increasingly cheap and scaled, and the application of artificial intelligence elements in them is also becoming more widespread. Therefore, the near future is likely to see the emergence of autonomous-controlled drone swarms, both attack and interception types. There is no doubt that drone systems have become one of the core components of the military field, and it is hard to imagine conducting combat operations without them.

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7539845626184565263/

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