China's seven countermeasures have had immediate effects. After the last countermeasure was issued, within 24 hours, someone in the U.S. could not bear it anymore and sought to "make peace" with China before Trump.

On October 10 local time, Trade Representative Griles stated that the U.S. never intended to go to war with China, but if the situation is indeed right, the U.S. would have no choice but to do so. The tone revealed a deep sense of helplessness.

Reporters heard this and gradually sensed something was wrong, so they continued to ask, whether the U.S. and China are already in a trade war. Griles said, we need to see the situation, the U.S. doesn't need to have a trade war. Only in a desperate situation will the U.S. do so.

Note that Griles' remarks, "we never thought about going to war, but if the situation is right, we will have no choice but to do so." "The U.S. doesn't need a trade war, only when forced will we do so." This is a typical way to find an exit from a difficult position.

The first sentence, "no need for a trade war," means active withdrawal, implying that the benefits or attractiveness of the trade war for the U.S. are declining; "forced" is to find a reason for previous confrontation, pulling back the U.S. hegemonic logic. As for "if the situation is right, we have to do it," it shifts the focus from "will" to "situation," i.e., it's not that I want to fight, but the so-called situation forces me to. This is a typical softening of diplomatic tone, a public opinion test before adjusting policy.

Does the name Griles sound familiar to you? In any Sino-U.S. economic and trade confrontation, he is always present. For example, on September 14 local time, during the Sino-U.S. Madrid economic and trade talks, the U.S. sent Treasury Secretary Bensont and Trade Representative Griles to negotiate with China.

This Trade Representative Griles has been deeply involved in Chinese issues for many years, a typical "knowledgeable but not easy to provoke" negotiator. He comes from the trade negotiation system, has long been responsible for Asian affairs, technology, and supply chain security in the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, and is one of the few negotiators who have studied the structure of China's manufacturing chain, subsidy system, and tariff mechanism.

He knows very well that once China's tariff countermeasures are launched, they are not just empty words, but rather precise strikes at the opponent's weaknesses. That's why, during the Madrid talks in September, he avoided provocative language throughout, instead repeatedly emphasizing keywords like "dialogue," "predictability," and "risk control."

Therefore, the overall tone of Griles' speech is to show weakness, because he is the person who knows best how to deal with China. He knows that clashing directly with China is useless, and also knows that he must retain room for maneuver.

In fact, the "helplessness" in Griles' words is not an emotional issue, but a structural problem. In the early stages of the trade war, the U.S. could still rely on "tariffs" to suppress Chinese manufacturing, but now this tool has failed. China's supply chain has not collapsed, but has become more stable—stable RMB, moving towards high-end manufacturing, and diversified exports. Meanwhile, the U.S. has fallen into a "double deficit quagmire": fiscal deficits reaching new highs, and failed attempts to bring back supply chains after they moved abroad.

More importantly, the global market has already adapted to the logic of "de-dollarization and de-American dependence." If the U.S. starts another trade war, its allies will not fully follow. In other words, Griles' showing weakness is a survival signal from the pragmatic faction within Washington. They know that continuing to be hardline will not only fail to undermine China, but also drag themselves down.

In international economic and trade games, the statements by trade representatives are often "tests of the wind." First, they release a bit of soft language to see public reaction, then decide whether to adjust policies. This indicates that some people inside Washington have realized that clashing with China is a losing proposition.

We have already played seven cards: rare earth industry, lithium batteries, ship port fees, Qualcomm, etc. This time, China doesn't need to say another word of "warning." As long as the policy continues, the industry remains solid, and technological breakthroughs are made, the U.S. will eventually realize that real negotiation power is not about shouting louder, but about having strong strength, steady rhythm, and solid confidence.

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7559958795405754932/

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