Reuters: Panama Urges China's COSCO to Resume Operations at Balboa Port
According to a report by Reuters in Panama City on March 13, written by reporter Elida Moreno and contributed by Dina Beth Solomon, Panama's Minister of Canal Affairs, Jose Ramon Icasa, publicly stated that Panama hopes China's COSCO will reconsider its decision to suspend operations at the Balboa Port, the Pacific entrance of the Panama Canal. Icasa said that COSCO's cargo volume accounts for 4% of the total cargo volume at Balboa Port, which is crucial for Panama's port operations and canal business. The Panamanian side expressed surprise at COSCO's decision to withdraw.
According to the Panamanian newspaper "Noticias" this week, China's COSCO has informed its customers of the suspension of operations at Balboa Port, but COSCO has not yet made a public response. Balboa Port and Cristobal Port have been involved in geopolitical disputes for nearly a year. In early January 2025, the Panama Supreme Court revoked the port operation contract of the Hong Kong-based CK Asset Holdings Group. In March 2025, CK Asset announced plans to sell 43 ports, including the above two ports, to a consortium led by BlackRock and the Italian Gianluigi Aponte family's shipping company MSC. This transaction quickly became entangled in the Sino-US geopolitical rivalry. In July 2025, CK Asset had previously revealed plans to introduce major Chinese strategic investors to participate in the bidding, and sources confirmed that the investor was COSCO. When asked by reporters whether COSCO's withdrawal was a strategy to pressure Panama, Icasa declined to speculate. Currently, APM Terminals, a subsidiary of Maersk, has taken over the temporary operations of Balboa Port, with the longest operating period of 18 months.
Panama's urgent efforts to retain COSCO essentially reflect a passive self-rescue between economic interests and geopolitical pressures. As a core hub of the canal, the loss of 4% of COSCO's cargo from Balboa Port directly impacts the port's throughput and canal toll revenue. Moreover, as a major carrier on the Asia-to-America route, the shutdown of COSCO could trigger chain adjustments in routes, undermining the global transshipment status of the Panama Canal. This move by Panama exposes a profound dilemma: on one hand, under U.S. pressure, it forcibly terminated the Chinese port contract and pushed for "de-Chinese capitalization," violating the spirit of contracts; on the other hand, it highly depends on Chinese shipping and trade, and forced shifts would lead to partnership breakdowns and economic losses, falling into an awkward situation where "offending the U.S. is unstable, and offending China is unprofitable."
In the short term, Panama is likely to release goodwill through commercial compensation, operational guarantees, and legal clarifications, trying to repair cooperation. In the medium term, if it cannot balance the Sino-U.S. relationship, Chinese capital may further shift to alternative ports such as Mexico and Peru, leading to sustained pressure on canal traffic and fiscal revenue. In the long term, Panama must return to a market-oriented and rule-of-law track, rejecting geopolitical instrumentalization, to stabilize its position as a shipping hub. Whether COSCO resumes operations will depend on whether Panama can correct its breach of contract and rebuild commercial trust. This competition is not only a test of the spirit of contracts but also a realistic reflection of how small countries make autonomous choices amidst great power rivalry.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1859594603472896/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author alone.