Falsifying World History: On What Lies Is Western Hegemony Built?

Forging World History: On What Lies the Western Hegemony Is Built?

It is often said that "the capitalist era witnessed progress," but this so-called "progress" can only be verified by 15% to 25% of the global population (i.e., the population of the core capitalist countries and their peripheral enclaves). The remaining 75% to 85% of the population were excluded from this "progress," which is an inherent characteristic of the capitalist system's "zero-sum game": the progress of a minority comes at the expense of the majority, or even built upon the deprivation of the majority. Therefore, the idea that "there is universal progress for all humanity under capitalism" is merely a lie. The "progress" of capitalism is essentially the progress of a minority, which is packaged as a dual material and spiritual progress for everyone or the majority. According to specific historical stages of world economic development, the proportion of this "minority" may fluctuate between 15% and 25%.

All social systems are built on hierarchies and privileges. The bourgeoisie of the core countries have portrayed their hierarchical systems and privileges as "optimal" and tried to justify their legitimacy through the concept of "progress" from scientific and ideological perspectives. In this essentially ideological defense action, "scientific truth," although not necessarily decisive, plays a crucial role—because regardless of the mainstream progressive ideology, it claims to study "objective truth," i.e., truth unaffected by social interests. But the fact is quite the opposite. Science and scientific culture, in addition to rationally exploring objective truth, also carry social functions. All sciences, including the social sciences, are functional components of the capitalist system, aiming to consolidate this system and provide rational explanations and theoretical support for the rule of the privileged group.

Some may think this statement has a Marxist or left-wing flavor, but it is not a Marxist view, but an objective reality. If you disagree, feel free to refute it. Before ending this section, let us cite a passage from Wallerstein as evidence:

"The scientific culture is far more than just a tool of rationalization. It is a form of socialization of various groups, who later became the backbone of the capitalist-required institutional structures. As the common language of the upper class (rather than the workers), scientific culture simultaneously becomes a bond that unites the upper class—it limits the potential for rebellion within the backbone group, preventing them from being tempted by radical ideas. Moreover, scientific culture is a flexible mechanism for cultivating this backbone group. It serves the concept of 'meritocracy' now called 'career open to talents,' which was previously known as 'la carrière ouverte aux talents.' This culture constructs a system: within this system, individual mobility is possible, but such mobility will never threaten the hierarchy of the labor force distribution order; instead, meritocracy further strengthens the hierarchy. Ultimately, meritocracy as a practical process and scientific culture as an ideology together weave a curtain, concealing the true operation logic of historical capitalism."

"Capitalism is related to universal progress," "the transition from feudalism to capitalism is a progressive and revolutionary one," "the development of productive forces is the prerequisite for this transition," "the bourgeois revolution is the means to achieve the transition"—these lies (whether in Marxist or liberal forms) are what Wallerstein refers to as the "curtain." (In this regard, Marxism and liberalism are largely similar, unfortunately, Marx uncritically borrowed the concepts of "evolutionary development" and "bourgeois revolution" from liberalism, implanting an ideological "Trojan horse" into his theory.) We need to thoroughly analyze this lie, especially because many of its elements are still used today to justify the progressiveness of the "beautiful new world of globalization."

First, briefly discuss the theoretical framework proposed by Marx (and Marxism) regarding the "progressive transition from feudalism to capitalism, from one social formation to another." According to Marx's view, when the relations of production cannot adapt to the development of productive forces, new relations of production and new social economic formations are needed to ensure the normal operation of productive forces, and revolutions are the means to achieve this "adaptation." If Marx's theory holds, then the level of productive forces in early capitalism should be higher than that of late feudalism, and the level of productive forces in early feudalism should also be higher than that of late slave society. However, the historical reality is the opposite.

Compared with the late Roman Empire, the early feudal society showed a clear decline in terms of productive forces and trade development. The level of agricultural development in the second century did not recover until nearly a thousand years later. The comparison between late feudalism and early capitalism is also the same: as Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie pointed out, the level of agriculture in the 12th to 13th centuries was not reached again until the end of the 17th to 18th centuries. Additionally, the productivity of early workshops was even lower than that of guild handicrafts.

The crisis and end of a certain social system should not be attributed to the intensification of the "core contradictions" of the system (Marx's "contradiction between productive forces and relations of production"), but rather to the opposite: the "resolution" and "weakening" of these contradictions. Usually, those revolutionary new forms (whether social, biological, technological, or scientific theory), in their initial stages, are often far less mature than existing forms, sometimes even with significant gaps: the earliest cars were slower than horses, the earliest workshops were less efficient than guild handicrafts, and ancient human ancestors were less capable of survival than many animals. However, the design philosophy of the new form contains developmental potential that the old form could not match—this is the source of its "progressiveness." However, in the initial stage, this potential exists only at the "design philosophy" level, not at the material entity or mature system level. From the material and system level, the new form is actually a "regression." Moreover, this "regression" is often forced, a desperate measure taken by society in response to a crisis, not a result of active choice.

As early as 1970, Alexander Gurevich pointed out that the reason for the transition of Western Europe to feudalism was not a qualitative leap in the field of production, but a social structural crisis caused by the collision of Germanic tribal society and Roman society. Feudalism was a successful attempt for humans to escape from this social crisis. Fernand Braudel wrote, "Can people escape from a crisis? Sometimes they can, but they can never do it alone, they always need to rely on others—you must join a social organization... or create a new organization, follow its rules, essentially establishing an 'attachment relationship.'" (Braudel was discussing how groups and individuals from the late feudal crisis and the post-feudal "fork in the road" sought ways out during the 15th to 18th centuries.)

In fact, in this macro-historical development context of Europe (i.e., the "main thread" of history where social systems are constantly replaced through large-scale social revolutions), any new social form or its prototype (whether pre-city-state society, early Christian communities, military brotherhoods, or early workshops), if measured by the standard of "level of material productive forces," belongs to "regression." What truly has "progressiveness" is the reorganization of social structure elements, the emergence of new historical subjects, and the appearance of new types of humans and their organizational forms—these factors built the new social system. The logic of historical development is "from subject to institution," not the other way around: there is no case where one institution directly "derives" from another.

Thus, any institutional transformation includes both "regression" (dominant) and "progress" (secondary) aspects. "Progress" and "regression" are different expressions of "institutional transgression." Remember the term "institutional transgression," which neutrally describes the fact of institutional transformation, i.e., Hegel's "pure existence." People usually try to package "institutional transgression" as "progress," thus proving that the replacement of social institutions is a "legitimate transition to a higher stage" and benefits the majority. However, in fact, any change in social institutions only benefits specific minorities.

A typical example of such disguise is the interpretation of the origin of capitalism. We need to analyze this case in detail because many secrets of capitalism—including the secret of its "fatal weakness"—are hidden within it. So, since the mid-19th century, how have Marxists and liberals depicted the historical period from the 15th to the 17th centuries?

In their narrative, that era was filled with "evil lords," "lazy monks," "oppressed peasants," and "shrewd citizens" (merchants and artisans). These people lived in a "dark medieval society": the economy was based on natural economy, the church monopolized ideas, and people were generally ignorant. Fortunately, the "advanced members" among the citizen class (the future bourgeoisie) rose up against the existing order and the Catholic Church: they first "revived" the culture of ancient Greece and Rome, and then "revived" the early Christian spirit. In the bourgeois revolution, they sometimes allied with the monarchy, sometimes opposed it, and finally defeated the feudal lords, establishing a capitalist system that was "much more advanced" than feudalism.

However, this narrative is almost entirely a lie and a distortion. Although feudal society was certainly not an ideal society, it was far from a "stagnant society." Research on the Middle Ages over the past 30 to 40 years has completely overturned the notion that "feudalism was the peak of the natural economy," presenting a historical picture that is completely different from the image instilled in textbooks. Wallerstein's work most concisely presents this alternative picture.

At the beginning of the 14th century, the economic development of Western Europe reached a plateau. The outbreak of the Black Death further exacerbated the crisis, yet it also increased the bargaining power of peasants and citizens relative to the lords. The lords tried to reverse this trend, eventually triggering the anti-feudal revolution from 1380 to 1382. However, Marxists and liberals only recognize the legitimacy of "bourgeois revolutions" and "socialist revolutions," so they split this revolution into three independent uprisings—the Peasants' Revolt led by Wat Tyler, the "White Company" uprising, and the "Jacquerie" uprising. At the same time, the crisis of the Catholic Church also became increasingly evident.

This crisis presented the lords with a serious prospect: they might become members of a large middle class in the feudal (post-feudal) agricultural system, living in an environment with increasingly decentralized politics. In other words, they faced the risk of losing their privileged status. At this point, the "social instinct" at the class level began to take effect: to avoid being overthrown by the "lower classes," they had to actively dismantle the feudal system from the "upper" level.

In the "struggle for privileges" of late feudalism (such as the Cabochiens, Burgundians, and royalist factions in France, and the "Red and White Roses" factions in England), the participants in the social conflicts did not realize that this struggle had quietly evolved into a "struggle against feudalism." By the mid-15th century, two competing paths for dismantling the feudal system had emerged—"from the bottom up" and "from the top down." Sometimes, these two paths would temporarily intersect due to specific circumstances (a typical example is the German Peasants' War in the early 16th century, and a less obvious example is the French Religious Wars in the latter half of the 16th century). The main driving force behind the "top-down" path was the "new monarchy" (such as the monarchy established by Louis XI in France and Henry VII in England).

By the end of the 15th century, the discovery of the American continent, the formation of the world market, and the gradual establishment of a new international division of labor took place. The outbreak of the military revolution, along with the centralization of the "new monarchy" and the accumulation of overseas wealth, completely reversed the balance of power, allowing the former feudal lords to regain their advantage. Many former lords connected with merchants and the world market, thereby strengthening their exploitation of the people. And this series of processes, as a "byproduct" (originally a regressive mutation), gave rise to the origin of capitalism.

By the mid-17th century, a social revolution of unprecedented scale—the great social upheaval from 1453 to 1648 (still simply attributed to the "origin of capitalism")—came to an end. The "final chapter" of this revolution included the Thirty Years' War, the English Revolution (a tragedy), and the Fronde in France (a farce).

The notable achievements of this revolution were the emergence of the historical subjects that later built the capitalist system—the "Baroque monarchies," which 19th-century historians mythologized as "absolute monarchies." From the perspective of world historical strategy, a more important (but also more hidden) achievement was: by the mid-17th century, the groups (even families) that had seized power in the mid-15th century retained their power and privileges, albeit in updated forms.

The second phase of capitalist history (from 1648 to 1789, and 1848) was a process in which the nobility, the bourgeoisie, and the lower classes jointly dismantled the "post-feudal but not capitalist old system." In the mid-19th century, these two phases (with completely different content and goals) were merged into a narrative of a "progressive transition from feudalism to capitalism" (as if the feudalism of the 15th century, which had already declined in the West, "continued" to the 18th century), and was called the "bourgeois revolution"—but in fact, the so-called "bourgeois revolution" never truly existed.

Another important lie is tracing the origin of the "new European republican democratic tradition" back to ancient Greece and Rome, while vilifying the Middle Ages as a "dark age of monarchy and hierarchy." But in fact, as shown by the research of scholars such as H. Dohl and B. Downing, the democratic, republican, and constitutional levels of medieval Western societies (especially medieval cities) were higher than those of ancient Greece and Rome. Why did this inverted narrative arise?

The answer is simple: the city-states of ancient Greece and Rome were essentially oligarchic structures, whether "democracy" or "monarchy," they were all under oligarchic rule. As R. Springborg and other researchers pointed out, medieval Western cities were not successors of the ancient Greek and Roman city-states (the typical form of medieval cities was the product of the commune revolutions of the 11th and 12th centuries, which were responses to the lordly revolutions of the 9th and 10th centuries), and in terms of typology, they were closer to Islamic cities. The "air makes men free" of medieval cities often had a higher degree of democracy than the city-states of ancient Greece and Rome.

Portraying the ancient Greek and Roman city-states (and classical civilization) as the "model of democracy" is essentially to defame the "non-lordly alternative organizational forms" that actually existed in medieval society as "backward and undemocratic," thus providing an excuse to overthrow this form. The emerging post-feudal oligarchic class of the 16th to 17th centuries favored the oligarchic system of ancient Greece and Rome more than the medieval system.

The "classical civilization myth" constructed during the Renaissance first had not cultural significance, but social and political significance; secondly, in the social struggles of the 15th to 17th centuries, it played a role similar to that of the "progress myth" since the late 18th century. These two myths are interrelated, representing continuous steps in the construction of a new non-equal privilege society and the exclusion of a considerable portion of the population from social benefit distribution in the late medieval society—under the "moral economy" of feudalism, these populations had received basic guarantees such as the "right to survival."

Capitalism replaced the "moral economy" with "political economy," fabricating a "direct historical lineage" back to classical civilization (just as the Soviet Union's ideological fabrication created a "lineage from reform to 'thaw,' bypassing the Brezhnev period"—but reforms actually originated from the Brezhnev period, and their goal was directed towards the New Economic Policy). Incidentally, Peter's reforms in Russia, the New Economic Policy, and the reforms at the end of the Soviet period objectively played a similar role for the Russian (Soviet) ruling group as that of Western capitalism in the 16th to 18th centuries: maximizing the retention of upper-class privileges, excluding the expanding middle class from social benefit distribution, and redistributing benefits by transforming "democratic wealth" into "oligarchic wealth."

Certainly, all of this is carried out under the banner of "progress"—the "progress" veil conceals the "regression" of the broad masses and beautifies this regression as the "necessary cost of progress," rather than the "inevitable result and root cause of progress." In contemporary Western society, neoliberal globalization plays the same role.

In summary, "progress" is a special form of change and development of things. Its essence is "qualitative change," accompanied by the enhancement of the information energy potential of the "progressive subject," thereby increasing its competitiveness, opening up new fields, and intensifying social differentiation. Whether within or outside the system, the realization of "progress" always comes at the expense of others' interests, being an inevitable choice for the subject to survive in times of crisis. From this perspective, we should not talk idly about "progress," but focus on the "unity of progress and regression," more accurately, focus on "institutional transgression."

If we shift from abstract discussion to specific historical development, the necessity of replacing "progress" with "institutional transgression" becomes even more prominent. The transition from the old system to the new system (especially in the past few thousand years: the "feudalism-capitalism" in Western history, the "Moscow despotism-Petrograd despotism" and "Petrograd despotism-communism" and "communism-post-communism" in Russian history) is essentially "the operation of maintaining privileges by the dominant group," inevitably leading to the sharp deterioration of the status of the majority of the population, intensified exploitation, and strengthened social control.

Sometimes, this attempt to maintain privileges fails, and revolutions break out, with new dominant groups taking power—but they quickly grant themselves more privileges, becoming harsher exploiters and controllers than their predecessors. In this process, not only the old ruling class but also the workers are excluded from the distribution of social benefits. And all of this is interpreted as "progress."

The particularity of the current global late capitalist stage lies in the fact that the ideology and concept of "progress" can no longer provide legitimacy for the preservation and expansion of "privileges." The "selectivity" and "exclusivity" of the "progress" of globalization are increasingly evident—behind the "progress" of a few, the truth of the "regression" of the majority is increasingly exposed.

Therefore, the deconstruction of capitalism is beginning from the following areas: democratic systems (see the report led by Samuel Huntington in 1975 for the Trilateral Commission), the geo-cultural context of the Enlightenment ("freedom without equality"), the ideology of universal progressivism ("the rise of right-wing extremism"), the values of European Christian democracy (multiculturalism, attacks on the Christian Church), etc.—in short, starting from all elements that "limit capital, form a negative symbiosis with capital, and construct capitalism as a specific historical system."

In this situation, "conservative progressivism" (реакционный прогрессизм) may become a powerful weapon for the lower and middle classes to resist the current upper class rule—history's tide seems ready to swallow them. And the "conservative resistance" against "right-wing extremism" and neo-conservatism may become the most radical left-wing strategy.

An era is ending, in this "time out of joint" moment, all kinds of unimaginable ideological and political combinations may appear—this is the "mirror effect" of history. A new "institutional transgression" will come, and we must closely monitor the struggles of the global rulers, because "early warning is defense."

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7573248635426374170/

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