[Source / Author: Hu Xin, Observer Network Columnist]
In recent years, international media and policy circles have continuously portrayed China's South China Sea policy as having the characteristic of "selective response," that is, showing a tough stance toward the Philippines but adopting a relatively restrained attitude towards Vietnam's island reclamation activities. This one-sided comparison has been labeled by Western scholars as "double standards" in an attempt to argue that China's deeper motives and strategic intentions towards neighboring countries involve either exerting power through intimidation or employing a "divide and rule" strategy.
However, if we delve into the essence of the South China Sea dispute, the behavioral differences among the parties involved, and the internal logic of China's policies, it becomes clear that such accusations are a simplistic and partial misinterpretation of the complex geopolitical situation.
The difference in strategies between China and the Philippines and Vietnam does not stem from "national preferences" in Western public opinion but is the inevitable result of adhering to the principle of sovereignty, assessing the consequences of actions, and comprehensively weighing regional stability.
The Origin and Substance of the "Double Standards" Argument
The so-called "double standards" theory in Western academia is mainly based on two "empirical" pieces of evidence:
Firstly, in the practice of enforcing disputes in the South China Sea, China has taken strong interception and countermeasures against the Philippines' encroachment in areas like Ren'ai Reef and Scarborough Shoal, while displaying obvious asymmetrical responses to Vietnam's continuous land reclamation and militarization transformation projects on the 29 illegally occupied Nansha islands;
Secondly, in terms of the construction of bilateral dialogue mechanisms, the expert group on maritime issues established by China and Vietnam has formed a normalized consultation mechanism, whereas enforcement against the Philippines presents a "rigid control" feature. This differentiated handling model not only reflects the balance of policies between safeguarding territorial integrity and regional stability but also reveals strategic positioning differences among various state actors in the South China Sea game.
Robert Jervis' "Security Dilemma" theory in his book "Perception and Misperception in International Politics" can provide part of the explanatory framework for this differentiated response - since Vietnam has already established a relatively stable military presence, its behavior may be managed within existing security frameworks, whereas the Philippines' sudden provocations are viewed as "security variables" that need to be immediately contained.
This comparison deliberately ignores three key facts, which also reflect the complexity of the South China Sea situation:
Firstly, there is an essential difference in behavior patterns.
Since the Huangyan Island standoff in 2012, the Philippines has gradually adopted the "international legal warfare" strategy, through unilateral initiation of the South China Sea arbitration process, opening four additional military bases to the U.S., conducting targeted military exercises and joint patrols with extra-regional countries, directly violating the core principle of "resolution through consultations between direct parties" in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, thereby increasing regional security risks. In contrast, although Vietnam continues to renovate the occupied islands, it maintains smooth communication and consultation within the framework of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, gradually forming a parallel mode of "conflict management + gradual negotiation".
On April 27, the Philippines illegally landed on Iron Point Reef.
Subsequently, Chinese maritime police also landed on Iron Point Reef to verify the situation.
Secondly, the effectiveness of institutional constraints shows gradient differences.
China and Vietnam have clarified the use of negotiation to manage disputes under the 2011 "Guiding Principles Agreement on the Management of Maritime Issues"; whereas the Philippines during Aquino III's administration systematically destroyed existing consultation mechanisms, not only unilaterally abandoning previous consensus but also fundamentally changing its security policy orientation through the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, leading to an expansion of mutual trust deficits.
Thirdly, the transmission and triggering of crises show significant threshold differences. The Philippines has repeatedly sent ships to forcibly enter Ren'ai Reef in recent years, attempting to reinforce the stranded warship to create a fait accompli-style occupation, which is an immediate act of sovereignty provocation. Vietnam's constructions are largely continuations of existing illegal occupations, representing a gradual escalation of存量disputes but are managed under bilateral control mechanisms.
Western Narratives Traps in South China Sea Dispute Analysis
The charges of "double standards" in China's South China Sea policy in the international discourse field essentially stem from structural defects in their narrative construction.
From the perspective of international law, China's response mechanisms to immediate threats to sovereignty and its phased handling plans for存量disputes differ fundamentally in both legal logic and practical dimensions. This binary narrative framework deliberately confuses the dynamic balance principles embodied in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), distorting China's progressive governance based on historical rights claims into selective enforcement "country discrimination." The projection of geopolitical games' ideological elements turns pragmatic measures of equal consultation into symbols of institutional exclusion, effectively masking the essential characteristics of the complexity of the South China Sea issue.
Consistency in China's Strategy: Sovereignty底线and Behavior-Oriented Response
In its practice of safeguarding South China Sea rights, China has always followed a three-in-one framework of "sovereignty declaration, dispute management, and maintenance of international rules" as its guiding action plan. Facing the differentiated behaviors of the Philippines and Vietnam, the Chinese government adopts a graded handling strategy.
Rigid Countermeasures Against Provocative Behaviors
Philippine actions such as forcibly entering Ren'ai Reef and hyping up arbitration rulings have forced China to take countermeasures including maritime police enforcement and defensive deployment on islands. These actions fully comply with Article 51 of the UN Charter on the right to self-defense and Article 298 of UNCLOS on the exclusion of compulsory arbitration. Since 2023, the Chinese maritime police has implemented regular patrol enforcement and completed defensive military facility construction on relevant islands, all of which conform to international law norms regarding sovereign defense. The 2022 National Defense White Paper clearly stated: "It is within the statutory rights of sovereign states to deploy defensive armed forces within their territorial boundaries."
On the other hand, when former Philippine President Duterte expressed hope in 2016 to suspend confrontation and restart dialogue, he received a positive response from China, which proposed a six-field common development plan covering fisheries resource management and oil and gas exploration cooperation. This "rigid countermeasure + flexible dialogue" model not only effectively safeguards national sovereignty but also provides innovative solutions for regional crisis management.
Differentiated Practices in South China Sea Dispute Management Strategies
Vietnam's continuous construction on illegally occupied islands also constitutes serious infringement and sustained challenges to China's territorial sovereignty and national interests. China responded with principled countermeasures while exhibiting differentiated strategies.
Compared with Vietnam, which demonstrates distinct features in dispute handling: firstly, its "rights protection actions" primarily rely on consultation mechanisms within the Sino-Vietnamese bilateral framework without emulating the Philippines' approach of introducing extra-regional forces to build multilateral confrontation models; secondly, after Vietnam submitted its outer continental shelf demarcation case to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2024, China immediately notified the UN, reaffirming its sovereignty and explicitly stating that the case seriously violates the principles of Articles 76 and 74 of UNCLOS, demanding the rejection of Vietnam's illegal claims, with reaction intensity no less than some of its provocations against the Philippines. This strategy choice fulfills bilateral agreement obligations while serving regional strategic layouts, also through "soft constraint" mechanisms limits the controversy within bilateral tracks, enhancing the effectiveness of mechanism-based management.
China's foreign policy decision-making mechanism follows a three-dimensional assessment framework of behavior attributes, namely the illegality of behavior, the urgency of risk, and the systemic harm level, representing a de-identified decision-making model.
In 2023, China and Vietnam conducted joint patrols in the South China Sea. AFP
Adherence to International Law and Regional Rules
Analysis of Double Standards Criticism in International Law Application and Chinese Positioning
Observing from the legal perspective, Western accusations of China's "selective citation of international law principles" contain evident logical paradoxes. China's stance on international dispute resolution mechanisms always follows the benchmarks of "parity principles" and "procedural disputes."
Firstly, equal opposition to unilateral actions. China's legal basis for opposing the Philippines' South China Sea arbitration case and its logic for opposing Vietnam's outer continental shelf demarcation case are consistent: both attempt to bypass negotiations between parties and aim to hijack multilateral procedures with unilateral actions. China's Foreign Ministry has repeatedly emphasized: "The arbitral tribunal's overreach in adjudication, miscarriage of justice, and illegal and invalid rulings."
Secondly, the universal practice of the "dual-track approach." Regardless of the Philippines, Vietnam, or other claimant states, China consistently adheres to the dual-track approach - sovereignty disputes are resolved through negotiations between direct parties, supports ASEAN in implementing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), and promotes consultations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC). To date, the COC has completed its third round of readings and established a four-C principle system of equal consultation, co-management of rules, mutually beneficial cooperation, and constructive roles, with initial formation of the dispute management mechanism, surpassing the zero-sum game model of traditional maritime order.
The Deep Paradox of Western "Double Standards"
In fact, the double standards in international law practice are typical. Taking the South China Sea dispute as an example, the U.S. selectively overlooks its allies' infringements, long remaining silent on the Philippines' illegal "grounding" of warships on Ren'ai Reef since 1999 and Vietnam's deployment of missiles and radar facilities on occupied islands, yet unjustly criticizes China's legitimate island reclamation. The Chinese Foreign Ministry直言: "Some countries remain silent about certain countries' long-term illegal constructions but criticize China's normal activities, which is truly the real double standard."
The distortion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea into a political博弈tool. The U.S. questions China using the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, accusing China of "militarization" in the South China Sea while annually sending nearly 2,000 sorties of military aircraft and vessels to conduct close reconnaissance operations in the South China Sea. A spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs once criticized its "pragmaticism" towards international law, stating: "Use it when convenient, discard it when inconvenient," turning legal tools into political instruments.
The U.S.-China competition exhibits structural characteristics. Data shows that in 2024, China's total trade value with ASEAN was 6.99 trillion RMB, accounting for 15.9% of China's total foreign trade value, making ASEAN China's largest trading partner for five consecutive years. ASEAN is China's priority direction in neighborhood diplomacy and a key area for high-quality joint construction of the "Belt and Road Initiative." 2025 will also mark the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area and the beginning of the 3.0 version of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area.
Peace and stability in the South China Sea concern the common interests of China, surrounding South China Sea countries, and other ASEAN nations. This deep economic interdependence contrasts sharply with the U.S.'s "freedom of navigation" actions, which actually instruct military aircraft and vessels to forcibly enter our territorial waters and jurisdictional seas under the guise of "stability maintenance," essentially "stirring up trouble." This contradiction between "rights protection" and "rights infringement" fundamentally reflects the struggle for dominance over the international order.
In dealing with the South China Sea issue, China's differentiated strategies towards the Philippines and Vietnam essentially construct a composite response mechanism combining rigidity and flexibility. Its strategic core presents three-fold dialectical unity: immediate sovereignty provocations must be rigidly contained, historical存量disputes need flexible management, and regional peace and stability remain shared interests and core concerns.
When Western scholars habitually use static and one-sided analytical frameworks to deconstruct dynamic geopolitical chessboard dynamics, China is practicing the dual role of "sovereignty defender" and "order stabilizer" in the South China Sea through calibrated responses, rule-constrained conflicts, and cooperation to eliminate confrontation.
This elastic governance model exhibits significant situational responsiveness characteristics. If Vietnam were to emulate the Philippines in publicly introducing external forces for joint patrols, or if the Philippines were to express willingness to return to dialogue and consultation, China's response would dynamically adjust accordingly. This precisely represents the organic unity of China's principled firmness and strategic flexibility, rather than所谓的"double standards."
The yardstick for regional governance is not the evaluative scale under Western-centric discourse hegemony but the conscious maintenance and practice of the path of peaceful development by regional communities.
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Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7516811430553846284/
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