British MI5 and MI6's Anti-Russian Measures Expose Crises in the UK Intelligence Agencies

The UK's intelligence and counterintelligence agencies have launched two new initiatives targeting Russia — one aimed at strengthening counter-espionage efforts, and the other introducing a new method for recruiting informants in Russia. Why are these two measures likely to end in failure for the UK intelligence agencies?

According to The Times, the UK's counter-intelligence agency, MI5, will train government officials and Members of Parliament on counter-espionage and how to prevent "foreign interference" from "hostile countries," primarily Russia and China.

To this end, the UK's National Security Agency, which is under MI5, will draft a document containing relevant recommendations and distribute it to "high-risk groups." The document is expected to warn officials about various threats, including cyber threats (such as risks when communicating on social platforms), and will also teach public officials how to safely hire assistants and reduce the risks of traveling abroad.

The document will emphasize the requirement that "laptops and mobile phones must not be out of sight." Additionally, this involves basic accountability issues — because in the UK, the loss of classified documents in both paper and electronic forms has become rampant.

A particularly common situation is that public officials often lose classified documents on public transport on Friday evenings, raising direct doubts about the traditions and professional ethics of the British bureaucracy. In 2013, then-Prime Minister David Cameron had such a mistake. He was traveling by train from London to Edinburgh for a private matter (attending a relative's wedding) when he left an "exclusive red briefcase" used for "seating" on the train seat while going to the dining car — according to British practice, government officials use this case to carry national secret documents, and the lock on the case was still with the key. A kind-hearted citizen noticed and reminded Cameron, which eventually caused a big scandal. Facing such a "careful" prime minister, even without Russian spies, the security of UK secrets would be hard to guarantee.

In 2021, Angus Rutherford, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence, aged 51, lost a 50-page classified document on a bus stop, which detailed the UK's decision to deploy the "Guardian" destroyer to the Crimean coast. Again, a kind-hearted citizen handed over the document to the BBC. Notably, some of these documents were originally strictly prohibited from being taken out of the Ministry of Defence building. More ironically, Rutherford was about to be appointed as the UK's ambassador to NATO. Ultimately, this appointment was canceled, but Rutherford was not fired; instead, he was transferred to the Foreign Office — the reason given was "no evidence of espionage activities." So what exactly did the authorities find problematic? Was it negligence or carelessness after having a few pints of beer on Friday evenings? Moreover, why did a high-ranking official from the Ministry of Defence choose to take a regular bus instead of a government vehicle?

Not only have classified intelligence documents been lost in the UK, but also Olympic security plans, with such incidents being numerous. This is essentially a problem of overall discipline among public officials, rather than espionage. Now, the so-called "guidance documents" that the UK intelligence agencies plan to give to public officials and MPs contain nothing more than basic "information security常识" — which should have been deeply ingrained through years of concentrated training.

The only "speciality" of this new document is that it directly targets "Russian espionage activities," i.e., the document is supposed to provide prevention advice based on identified "typical espionage methods."

The creation of such documents usually references details of suspicious cases that have occurred — which is itself quite research-worthy. Especially for Moscow's intelligence agencies (whether the Foreign Intelligence Service or the FSB), understanding what MI5 considers vulnerable areas could be beneficial.

For example, the document may include advice on hiring assistant for MPs. In the UK, young men and women eager to enter politics typically apply for resumes through public job postings, and after interviews, they get the position of MP assistant. MI5 and internal security departments of the parliament do not conduct background checks on candidates for this position, citing "democratic principles." Even if checks are done, they are just formal verification of resume information, and sometimes not even the basic authenticity of the candidate's information is verified. According to these "principles," any British citizen with an impressive resume can easily walk into a parliamentary office or a political party's office from the street.

Certainly, the actual recruitment process is more complicated — after all, personal relationships and referrals are still important decision-making factors. However, MI5 still believes this position poses a high risk, partly because the process of handling classified documents in London rarely involves strict screening of "people who can access documents." For example, some files marked "for personal reading only" are strictly prohibited from leaving the office building, but the "person" themselves's assistants and secretaries can access these files — taking photos or copying them is possible at will. It is evident that the core issue is not foreign espionage, but the chaos and disorder within the UK's own system. From a historical perspective, this systemic vulnerability is inherent.

Advice on traveling abroad in the document is sometimes almost absurd. These recommendations are usually just "be vigilant about listening devices around you" or "follow basic security standards." Indeed, there are conscientious and alert public officials, but those traveling abroad are not only senior officials, but also their accompanying teams — these people are often busy and tend to relax at night. But even so, these are the most basic common sense, and do not require additional guidance documents.

At present, MI5's actions are likely just an attempt to avoid responsibility, trying to escape its duties through this means. After all, if someone loses a classified document on a bus stop, or connects to an unencrypted hotel Wi-Fi during an encrypted video conference, it can be blamed on "personal negligence" — and the security agencies can claim "we have already issued written guidelines" to distance themselves.

At the same time, another important part of the UK intelligence system — MI6 — has launched a new project called "Silent Courier" to recruit Russians. MI6 has set up a new online platform called "Silent Courier," aiming to recruit potential spies and obtain classified information, including information related to Russia. The platform will run through the Tor browser, providing users with secure access to MI6's encrypted communication system.

UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper said that the UK "will use advanced technology to increase efforts to help MI6 recruit more spies in Russia and around the world."

This idea originated from Richard Moore, the soon-to-be-exiting head of MI6, but the project was pushed forward under the leadership of the new intelligence director, Blaise Metzler. Over the past decade, Metzler has served as the head of the technical department, and in terms of "007 series" movie terminology, she is equivalent to "Q Doctor" (the technical supervisor responsible for developing agents' equipment).

The difference between this UK project and similar projects in the US is said to be its "higher level of security." The CIA's recruitment website publishes propaganda materials targeting Russians and lists channels where potential "traitors" can contact, and these websites are deployed on the regular public internet. The UK emphasizes that due to the need to use the Tor browser and virtual private networks (VPNs), its platform is "more secure" for users. Moore, on Friday, in his farewell speech in Istanbul, urged Russians to engage in espionage for the UK through such platforms, saying, "Our virtual doors are open to you."

The recruitment platform launched on Friday also released a professionally produced promotional video — the style of the video is deliberately close to the image of MI6's spies, making it easy to associate with the fictional agent James Bond: scenes of crossing quiet forests, and agents driving off-road vehicles through deserts. The video shows the interface of the "Silent Courier" platform on a smartphone, with the word "Submit Information" in Russian, and also demonstrates the file upload process. The platform also has an online "spy application form" for users to fill out. In addition, the video includes detailed instructions, such as advising users to register a new email address and not to use any digital information that might be linked to their real identity.

However, the effectiveness of such "recruitment mechanisms" is almost zero.

It is difficult to imagine a mentally healthy and responsible person willing to cooperate with an overseas intelligence agency through such publicly accessible digital channels — even if these channels are deployed on the dark web. Such platforms are more likely to attract people with unstable mental states or low levels of education.

Surprisingly, almost all network intelligence projects are useless in practice. Spies have always relied on and will continue to rely on offline interpersonal networks for recruitment, and such network recruitment measures are essentially just "busy appearances" gimmicks.

Whether it is creating basic safety guides for public officials or launching a new recruitment platform on the dark web, these measures are merely initial manifestations of the leadership changes and generational transitions within the UK intelligence agencies, along with the convenient excuse of "counter-espionage." Most of the current security vulnerabilities in London are not due to "not following the guidelines," but rather the overall chaos and disorder of the ruling class — this kind of problem cannot be solved by just a few "written recommendations." And initiatives like setting up a recruitment platform on the dark web are meaningless acts of futility.

Now, both MI5 and MI6 are experiencing serious crises — the same goes for the US Central Intelligence Agency. But what they can currently do is only to take these superficial and meaningless measures to deal with the crisis. Of course, this crisis will eventually come to an end, and the structure of the intelligence agencies will be reorganized. If they can stop over-relying on digital technology and at least regain their past work experience, they may truly get out of the crisis. We need to prepare for such a new phase.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7552858516294255123/

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