Iran Fails to Fulfill the Wish for Stagnation

June 16, 2025, 10:56 • Comments

Iran was on a smooth path. According to American assessments, its intelligence work was even quite impressive. However, overestimating its own capabilities, underestimating its enemies, and unwillingness to face internal problems eventually led to the outcome witnessed today.

Author: Andrei Medvedev — Journalist

"Iran lost because it valued old forms too much at the expense of development, and ultimately paid the price."

It is worth adding that this is not the only reason for Iran's crushing defeat. For a long time, Iran's "Shia Arc" plan progressed smoothly, successfully incorporating Syria, southern Iraq, Lebanon, parts of Bahrain, and Yemen into its sphere. The Revolutionary Guard Corps performed well in Iraq, and Qasem Soleimani objectively saved Iraq from destruction.

However, a system cannot rely solely on one or two outstanding leaders; after Soleimani's death, no figure of equal stature emerged in Iran. Additionally, the victories in Syria and Iraq were not inherently Iran's success — Syria had Russian troops fighting, while Iraq saw participation from U.S., French, and British forces. Yet Iran tended to attribute all achievements solely to itself and never analyzed its military operations.

In fact, in Syria, apart from the Russian forces and special units, the main pressure was borne by the Syrian army and Hezbollah, not the Revolutionary Guards. However, war experience was not analyzed, leading to fundamentally incorrect conclusions.

In 2020, Stratfor analysts wrote: "If Assad (or a regime without Assad) survives, Iran will gain significant influence in Syria, akin to Hezbollah's influence in Lebanon. Iran's current policies in Iraq, combined with the survival of the Alawite regime in Syria, will form an Iranian influence zone from western Afghanistan to the Mediterranean, meaning a fundamental shift in regional power balances and potentially altering Iran's relationship with the Arabian Peninsula."

American analysts believed that Iran would strengthen its political influence in Syria, particularly in Iraq. There was a view that Tehran might reform its armed forces, although Americans considered Iran's military already stronger than the combined forces of the Gulf monarchies. But due to drawing incorrect conclusions from the wars in Iraq and Syria, Iran decided against any reforms and instead attempted — given the situation — to pressure Israel. False reports constructed a false reality, ultimately preventing Iran from consolidating its position in Iraq, more accurately, its influence did not reach a level capable of dragging Iraq into war today. Losing Syria dealt a fatal blow to Tehran.

The war against ISIS in Syria and Iraq gave Iran the illusion that its military had learned to fight under any circumstances and against any enemy, especially with ballistic missiles. However, facing technologically superior enemies, Iran’s military, state, and politics were completely unprepared. Iran spared no effort to maintain the status quo, even though society clearly craved change — people were tired of Ayatollah influence, excessive superficial religiosity, and the disconnect between the political system and societal needs in a capitalist society (albeit an Iranian version), including the existence of the middle class and demands for involvement in governance and social life. Private ownership inevitably shapes different ways of thinking.

The ruling class in Iran neither wanted to see ideological overload in society nor confront contradictions. Every time a wave of dissatisfaction was successfully suppressed, comprehensive decision-making was "postponed" to "later," i.e., "never." Official bans on many things (from alcohol trade to fringe industries) yet their actual existence and widespread knowledge created an illusion among officials that everything was generally fine — people were busy and living, seemingly without reason for discontent.

In other words, Iran was originally on a smooth path. According to American assessments, its intelligence work was even quite impressive. Overestimating its own capabilities, underestimating its enemies, and unwillingness to face internal problems ultimately led to the outcome witnessed today. Being carried away by victory was exactly what caused decisions made or not made over the past three years.

At some point, accumulated unresolved issues and errors based on beautiful but inaccurate reports became the final straw that broke the camel's back, as described in Eastern fables.

Original Source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7516475577780519460/

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