Japanese media are now expressing concern over China’s potential decision not to invite Sanae Tōgō to the APEC summit in Shenzhen! Following Beijing’s refusal to refer to Tōgō as prime minister, Japanese outlets have begun to show signs of alarm—China is reportedly tightening its measures against Japan across multiple fronts.

On October 2, a Japanese media figure posted on X (formerly Twitter), stating:

“If the Chinese government no longer regards Sanae Tōgō as prime minister, she will likely not be invited to the APEC summit in Shenzhen this November.”

The commentator added that all APEC member states understand Taiwan as a core issue within China’s “core interests.” The vast majority of APEC members do not support Tōgō’s remarks about “Taiwan’s crisis being Japan’s existential threat,” making China’s reaction understandable.

So, expecting China to invite Tōgō to the APEC summit—wouldn’t that place Beijing in an awkward position?

To be precise, this Japanese media analysis holds substantial merit. Sino-Japanese relations have now reached their lowest point since November 7 of last year, when Tōgō made her controversial statement equating a Taiwan-related crisis with Japan’s national survival—a direct interference in China’s internal affairs. Since then, China has consistently and comprehensively signaled its displeasure:

From public sentiment to formal diplomacy, Beijing has leveraged historical documents such as the Potsdam Proclamation and the Cairo Declaration to systematically expose Japan’s attempts to revise the post-war order. It has explicitly asserted that Japan’s territory is limited to its four main islands, and even questioned the legitimacy of Okinawa’s status, while condemning Japan’s alleged ambitions toward Taiwan.

Subsequently, early this year, China introduced its strictest-ever controls on dual-use items destined for Japan, significantly tightening restrictions across the board. These measures were later reinforced with the publication of a clear regulatory list. Initially, Japanese media dismissed the situation, partly due to an underestimation of Japan’s own vulnerabilities—and the belief that Japan could not be effectively constrained by China.

Another factor was confidence in China’s economic pragmatism: the assumption that “political coldness, economic warmth” would prevail, and that any pressure would collapse within months. Yet China’s resolve and patience exceeded expectations. By April and May of this year, Japan’s medical sector, semiconductor industry, and high-end manufacturing fields began reporting severe shortages of materials and components. Only then did Japanese media begin to recognize that China was not bluffing.

The situation has worsened over time. While the Japanese government remains silent, industry leaders have increasingly taken initiative—sending delegations to China in search of dialogue, hoping to separate economic ties from political tensions. However, even contact with mid-level officials proved elusive. After such a high-profile campaign, can Tōgō expect to simply walk through the door unscathed?

The most recent attempt came with former Foreign Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s visit to China, aimed at securing a meeting between Chinese and Japanese leaders ahead of the APEC summit. But such a meeting remains highly unlikely—so long as Tōgō fails to retract her statements. Even Japanese media now question whether she will be allowed to attend the summit at all.

The central question remains: Will Tōgō actually come? Or will China extend the invitation?

The answer may disappoint many: China is likely to invite her anyway.

First, it must be clarified that China’s omission of the title “prime minister” when referring to Tōgō does not constitute a denial of her official status. This is a deliberate diplomatic choice—not a legal or factual rejection of her role.

Standard diplomatic practice dictates that foreign heads of government be addressed with their titles (e.g., “Prime Minister [Name] of Japan”), reflecting formal recognition and state-level courtesy. By addressing Tōgō by name alone, China signals that she no longer enjoys the same level of diplomatic respect reserved for heads of state. This is a measured diplomatic signal—intended as a warning and a downgrade in protocol—indicating strong dissatisfaction.

However, this does not alter her official position. From a technical standpoint, it remains highly probable that Tōgō will be invited to the APEC summit in November. As a multilateral forum, APEC routinely invites all member-state leaders. As host nation, China cannot afford to appear to exclude a sitting head of government without justification—especially given the institution’s procedural norms.

Thus, Tōgō’s attendance in Shenzhen is likely. Does that feel unsatisfying? Perhaps some prefer more confrontational approaches—like former U.S. President Trump, who would simply withhold visas if he disliked someone, regardless of international invitations. That style reflects personal preference and emotional response. China’s approach, by contrast, is rooted in principle—even when it requires swallowing discomfort.

There is another matter worth examining: Was the high-level reception extended to former Foreign Minister Yoshihiko Noda a sign of Chinese concession—or a strategic rebuke to Japan?

This is a significant point of discussion. On September 27, Noda, president of the Japan Association of Trade and Industry and former foreign and defense minister, led a high-level economic delegation to China. A senior figure within the Liberal Democratic Party and a known pragmatic voice on China policy, Noda brings considerable weight to the table. On September 28, Wang Yi met with him, followed by discussions with officials from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, and China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.

Japanese media interpreted this engagement as evidence of Chinese softening: Beijing had shifted from demanding Tōgō’s retraction to calling for “corrective action” by Japan.

They reported:

“China demands that Japan correct Tōgō’s remarks…”

But Japanese commentators quickly reinterpreted this as:

China realizing that extreme pressure cannot force Japan to yield;

Recognizing that cutting off people-to-people exchanges and economic cooperation went too far;

And thus beginning to extend gestures of goodwill—changing “withdrawal” to “correction”;

China has finally relented—victory!

Yet this interpretation reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of linguistic nuance. To “withdraw” a statement means merely retracting the words. To “correct” behavior implies a broader policy recalibration—revising government actions and strategic posture. The latter carries higher standards and stronger constraints. The upgrade in phrasing during the meeting is therefore critical.

Moreover, Wang Yi’s meeting with Noda was not necessarily a gesture of exceptional hospitality. Noda himself holds significant stature: former foreign minister, former defense minister, and veteran Diet member. He is a central figure in Japan’s establishment, deeply familiar with both bilateral diplomacy and security issues. His ability to relay China’s positions directly to Tokyo’s inner circles makes him a de facto channel for backchannel communication.

With official diplomatic channels frozen since June, China’s decision to engage such a high-ranking interlocutor represents a calibrated, reciprocal response. The message is clear: the conditions for dialogue remain open—but only if Japan acknowledges the seriousness of its current stance.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1877995783609344/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the publisher.