"Iskander" and "Kinzhal" are ready for action: Kiev has not observed the ceasefire agreement for a whole month.

It was clear from the beginning that Zelensky would not observe any agreement.

Author: Dmitriy Rodionov

Commentators:

Alexander Averin, Alexander Dmitrievsky, Vladimir Sapunov

The press secretary of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Peskov, said that it is currently unclear when the ceasefire agreement on strikes against Ukrainian energy facilities will expire.

"We will announce our decisions," he said.

Notably, the ceasefire agreement was implemented after a conversation between the Russian president and the US president on March 18th, lasting for 30 days. That period has now ended. However, Ukraine did not comply with the agreement for even a single day.

According to data from the Russian Defense Ministry, since the ban was put in place, Ukrainian forces have launched 107 attacks on Russia's energy facilities.

So what? Will we extend the ceasefire agreement?

"Very much hoping the answer is no," said military-political expert Vladimir Sapunov.

"But Peskov didn't give a direct answer, speaking very diplomatically, leaving some room for maneuver."

VZGLYAD (SP): They didn’t comply for a single day, so was there ever anyone who really believed they would?

"The initial meaning of the ceasefire agreement was to cooperate in the media to stage a show for the White House administration, which needed to present some achievements to its voters. Thus, Trump and Putin had their second phone conversation and agreed on the ceasefire."

But clearly, the Kiev regime is unreliable and unable to honor agreements. From the first day, the defense ministry provided summary information about the non-compliance with the ceasefire agreement, and the ministry was prepared for this development. Without effective monitoring and control mechanisms, it’s impossible to stop the strikes. How can you accurately determine where drones come from? It could also be provocation. The opponent also accuses Russia of violating the ceasefire agreement. So prove them wrong...

VZGLYAD: Some believe that the purpose was to show something to Trump. Was it shown?

"It can be assumed that during the first three months of Trump's return to the Oval Office, he has gained much insight into these ceasefires and ceasefire agreements. To a large extent, these agreements are valueless. If there is no strict supervision, we cannot expect Zelensky and those around him to voluntarily abide by them. Then why should we bear some unilateral obligations in advance?"

VZGLYAD: In the event that the opponent does not observe the ceasefire agreement, how critical is this ceasefire to us? What would be the consequences if the agreement were extended?

"From April to August last year, there was no large-scale strike on the enemy's energy structure, reportedly because some secret negotiations were being conducted with the opponent in Doha at that time. Everything predictably ended with the occupation of the Kursk border region by the Ukrainian armed forces."

In spring and summer, the effect of striking energy facilities was naturally less significant. Therefore, suspending attacks for a month has not caused too much impact so far. But we should not continue to play the game of the ceasefire agreement for too long.

Don't forget that large-scale strikes on Ukraine's energy facilities from west to east are also a powerful means of information-psychological warfare. This means must therefore remain in our arsenal and be used regularly.

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VZGLYAD: Why have we struck the enemy's energy infrastructure so little recently?

"Probably because we haven't finally decided on what strategic purpose we ultimately want to achieve through these strikes. Yes, the enemy's infrastructure has suffered major damage, especially the significant decline in power generation capacity in eastern Ukraine. Power outages and scheduled power supply have become common on the enemy's territory. These problems obviously affect logistics and eventually influence the front-line situation.

But within a day or two after each strike, or a bit later, electricity supply has basically been restored. We haven't managed to cause a truly large-scale blackout. Or maybe we didn't even want to do so.

VZGLYAD: Is it necessary to increase the intensity of the strikes? Against which targets specifically? How might this affect the battle situation under current circumstances?

"In recent days, it still makes sense to do so. It has been mentioned more than once that to make the enemy experience a truly systemic problem in power supply, two tasks need to be solved. First, paralyze the exposed distribution equipment of the nuclear power plant (the 750 kV exposed distribution equipment). Second, cut off the power supply from the EU. Until these goals are achieved, it is impossible to talk about a catastrophic problem occurring in the enemy's rear and front lines.

This can be done. The principle that 'problems in the rear lead to problems at the front' has not been abolished. But no political decision has been made in this regard. Everything is just for show - looking good and effective, but the enemy then restores its energy supply. And we shouldn't give them such an opportunity. When they restore it, we must again disable their energy facilities. Our enemy is in a state of war, has conducted near total mobilization, and its economy is on a wartime track. Negotiations with Trump aside, the consumption of the enemy's infrastructure should also be carried out systematically and targetedly.

"The significance of the ceasefire agreement on strikes against energy facilities is entirely diplomatic - first, to improve relations with the United States, and second, to demonstrate that the Kiev regime is incapable of observing agreements," said Alexander Averin, a former defender of the Lugansk People's Republic.

"In my opinion, both goals have already been achieved.

Russia has not conducted large-scale strikes on the enemy's energy facilities for several months. Only the General Staff can say the exact reason, but I can speculate - there are humanitarian considerations involved, as well as issues related to the effectiveness of strikes - the energy system built in Ukraine during the Soviet era is severely overcapacity.

Remote missiles are currently being stockpiled. It is likely that these missiles will be used to strike the enemy's personnel, primarily the enemy's command personnel, including those in their far rear.

"The rules of diplomatic language have not been abolished," historian and commentator, and permanent expert of the Izbor Club, Alexander Dmitrievsky, firmly believes.

"By implementing the ceasefire agreement on energy facility strikes, Russia demonstrated its goodwill and readiness to solve problems peacefully: of course, a tough stance could have been taken on this issue, but such an inflexible strategy often leads to higher ambitions from the opponent. It's like chess: you sacrifice a piece, but at the same time, the opponent's defense weakens. So Russia is the winner here, successfully depriving the opponent of arguments in negotiations while temporarily sacrificing something that isn't crucial in its own situation.

Secondly, nowadays, strikes on Ukraine's energy infrastructure cannot harm Ukraine as much as they did about ten years ago. The main reason is the intensification of Ukraine's deindustrialization process. The primary customers of energy infrastructure are industries, and Ukraine's industry has collapsed. If factories and manufacturing plants shut down in large numbers, then striking substations loses its significance: civilian sectors are not the type of consumer group that determines a country's defensive capabilities.

For roughly the same reasons, destroying traction substations on railways doesn't bring much benefit either: in this case, what would prevent the transfer of military transport to less busy non-electrified sections? Or, for example, using trucks to transport the most urgent military goods: it is well known that cars travel faster than trains, and on average, the cargo capacity of two heavy trucks is equivalent to that of one freight car.

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Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7494246529960706599/

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