[By GuanchaNet Columnist Pan Yu]
In 2015, Professor Charles Glaser from George Washington University published a paper destined to be remembered by history.
Responding to the concept of a new type of major-country relationship characterized by no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation, this renowned international relations scholar boldly proposed an idea for a "grand bargain" between China and the United States. In Glaser's vision, the status quo power and the rising power could avoid falling into the Thucydides Trap through strategic mutual concessions.
However, regrettably, Glaser's vision for the grand bargain was quickly submerged by a starkly contrasting picture after intense debates.
After the smoke of the 2016 election cleared, U.S. policy toward China swiftly moved in the opposite direction of Glaser's conception. The shadow of trade wars, the sword of technological decoupling, and the threat of military confrontation—these words have seemingly become the main themes of U.S.-China relations over the past decade. A chilling effect has quietly taken hold within Washington's foreign policy circles; anyone calling for cooperation with China is almost akin to committing academic suicide.
From Obama's administration's "pivot to Asia," to Trump's first term's maximum pressure strategy, and then to Biden's administration's "strategic competition," Washington elites seem to have fallen into a collective strategic conundrum. They stubbornly believe that applying sufficient pressure will force China to submit to the international order designed by the United States.
This somber atmosphere persisted for a full decade. Until late 2024, this somber atmosphere began to change.
U.S. Capitol
From "Grand Bargain" to "Great Concert"
"If you think about it carefully, China and the U.S. can work together to solve all the problems in the world."
When Trump made this groundbreaking statement during his first press conference after winning re-election at the end of 2024, the ripples that followed were not hard to imagine.
In the long-standing U.S. policy discussion on China dominated by hardliners, more moderate voices began to emerge.
Notably, Glaser's concept of the "grand bargain" was further developed by a new generation of scholars into a new framework known as the "concert of great powers."
In April this year, an article published on "American Conservatives," one of the key theoretical strongholds of the MAGA movement, garnered significant attention. Young scholar Ivan Eland detailed in the article the possibilities of achieving great power concert between China and the United States.
The subtitle of the article succinctly highlighted the core argument: in a multipolar era, having only one global policeman is insufficient.
Eland's analysis reveals the sharp insight of a new generation of American scholars regarding changes in the international landscape. He wrote: "Trump's attitude toward other major powers—China and Russia—is refreshingly novel and cautiously optimistic." In his view, placing U.S. relations with Moscow above those with Kyiv was the right choice.
Even more notably, Eland's assessment of Sino-U.S. relations. He believed that, facing the only rival that could match the U.S.—China—Trump's public willingness to seek cooperation should reassure analysts concerned about the potential for catastrophic conflict between superpowers.
Eland further analyzed that Trump seemed to envision a new era of international cooperation, where major powers would coordinate consistently to address global issues, much like the European powers did in the 19th century. This "great concert" model once maintained relative peace in post-Napoleonic Europe for nearly four decades.
Soon after Eland's article was published, the "establishment" responded forcefully.
Stacy Goddard, a renowned scholar of international relations, published a heavyweight article in Foreign Policy magazine, which reflects Democratic elite views, comprehensively discussing the contemporary prospects of great power concert.
Goddard's article titled "The Rise and Fall of Great Power Competition—Trump’s New Sphere of Influence" initially seems to be a critical piece. However, upon closer reading, one finds that Goddard actually shows considerable understanding, if not implicit approval, of the concept of great power concert.
Stacy Goddard: "The Rise and Fall of Great Power Competition—Trump’s New Sphere of Influence"
Goddard agrees with the observation that Trump's worldview is not one of great power competition but rather great power concert.
In Goddard's analytical framework, the rise of great power competition thought over the past decade, culminating to its peak, does not define a specific strategy but represents a powerful narrative in world politics. This narrative provides crucial perspective for understanding how U.S. decision-makers see themselves and their place in the world, and how they wish others to perceive them.
Her observation hits the nail on the head. Over the past decade, Sino-U.S. relations have been largely held hostage by a specific narrative. In this narrative, the United States is always the protagonist. Sometimes, the country is portrayed as a powerful and awe-inspiring hero with unparalleled economic vitality and military might. But Washington may also be depicted as a victim, as in Trump's 2017 National Security Strategy document, which portrays the U.S. as a victim in a "dangerous world," with competitors actively undermining U.S. interests globally.
In contrast, in Trump's current advocacy of the "concert" narrative, the U.S. is neither the hero nor the victim of the international system. This represents a fundamental cognitive shift.
Of course, compared to the enthusiastic expectations expressed by newcomers in the MAGA camp, Goddard's outlook on Trump's vision for great power concert is much more cautious. She acknowledges that after the European concert mechanism was established, the great powers indeed maintained nearly forty years of peace. From this perspective, a concert mechanism might offer a feasible framework for an increasingly multipolar world.
But Goddard also raises key preconditions. In her view, achieving this goal requires a narrative that reduces conflict coordination and increases cooperation, a narrative where major powers work together not only to advance their own interests but also to promote broader interests.
This article, which graced the cover of Foreign Policy magazine, clearly demonstrates the trend of renewal in current U.S. diplomatic ideas.
From Covert Arrogance to Open Respect
If we widen our perspective, we will find that this shift in diplomatic philosophy is far from an isolated phenomenon. If the dominant discourse on China policy over the past decade has been characterized by an implicit arrogance and prejudice toward Chinese innovation capabilities, development model, and social system, then both the left and right wings share a commonality in the new wave of thinking: the acknowledgment and even implicit respect for China's rise.
This shift is particularly evident in conservative circles. At NatCon, the largest ideological forum of the MAGA movement, we witnessed an unexpected phenomenon:热情介绍中国的发展经验和成就已成为会议的常见话题。
演讲者们开始认真探讨中国的基础设施建设成就、制造业升级经验以及长期战略规划能力。这种坦诚的自我反思，在十年前的华盛顿精英圈子里是不可想象的。
更令人印象深刻的，就连拜登政府时期的对华政策“沙皇”库尔特·坎贝尔（Kurt Campbell），也开始疾呼美国对华“胜利主义”幻想的危害。同样发表于《外交政策》的文章中，这位资深外交官向自己的同事发出严厉警告：
“这是一个战略优势将再次向那些能够大规模运作的国家倾斜的时代。中国拥有规模，而美国则不具备——至少单靠自身是如此。”
坎贝尔的这番话，代表着华盛顿建制派对现实的一种痛苦但必要的承认。中国的崛起不再是可被忽视或轻易逆转的现象，而是美国必须学会适应的新现实。
因此，对华政策“新思维”的涌现，既是特朗普个人特质所塑造的现象，也有深刻的必然性。当深层次的偏见开始消退，由偏见催生的敌意自然难以持续。
展望未来，我们固然不能对这种新思维当前的影响抱有过于乐观的预期。大战略的转变往往是一个缓慢而复杂的过程，尤其是在涉及国家核心利益和战略资源分配的问题上。
即使对中国崛起的长期前景有了更理性和冷静的认识，新一代美国精英在穷尽其他手段之前，也极不可能戏剧性地与中国达成“大协调”。这种渐进性的特征，在当前负责对华军事威慑政策的关键人物身上体现得尤为明显。
埃尔布里奇·科尔比（Elbridge Colby），这位被誉为MAGA对华大战略“设计师”的年轻人，在其代表作中集中展现了这种复杂的心态。一方面，他竭尽全力构想着对华军事威慑甚至武装冲突的情景；另一方面，他也真诚地表示：“它不要求任何人，包括中国，给予任何他们无法以高尚和尊严提供的东西……中国可以自豪地生活在这样一个世界里；它将成为世界上最伟大的国家之一，其偏好和观点将赢得尊重。”
科尔比这番看似分裂的话语，既体现了美国战略界对中国实力的尊重，也反映了他们在承认中国崛起的同时试图维护美国利益的努力。
Elbridge Colby, file photo
This contradictory mindset precisely illustrates the complexity and gradual nature of the transformation in current U.S. diplomatic thought.
As the late strategic giant Henry Kissinger summarized in his last public speech: in China, the United States encountered for the first time a nation with resource potential comparable to its own. Each country believes itself unique, but in different ways. China expects its civilization's continuity and grandeur to earn respect. The United States firmly believes its values are universal. The key test lies in whether these ideas about national greatness can coexist.
Kissinger's judgment can be said to be the most incisive summary of the essence of Sino-U.S. relations. How two nations, each believing itself unique and great, can harmoniously coexist in the same world order is the most important geopolitical question of the 21st century.
The acceptance of a new type of major-country relationship by U.S. elites still requires more real-world education. But it is reassuring to note that this educational process has already begun and is accelerating.
Final Thoughts
From Professor Glaser's "grand bargain" proposal in 2015 to recent discussions on "great concert" by Eland and Goddard—this trajectory of theoretical evolution clearly outlines the profound changes in U.S. policy thinking toward China.
Ten years ago marginalized cooperative voices are now returning to the center of Washington's policy discussions. This shift reflects both the objective changes in the international power structure and the gradual correction of cognitive biases among U.S. elite circles.
Of course, there is still a long way to go from conceptual transformation to practical policy implementation. But at least, those hoping for the eventual realization of a new type of major-country relationship see the glimmer of hope. In an increasingly multipolar world, the inspiration of great power coordination opens a promising beginning for more realistic strategies.
The wheels of history roll forward, and no force can stop them. As the two most important countries in the world, China and the United States will eventually discover that cooperation serves their respective fundamental interests better than confrontation and is more conducive to the common well-being of humanity.
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Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7516735912462516790/
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