According to "Breaking Defense" on August 20, in recent days, the Chinese Navy's aircraft carrier fleet crossed the Second Island Chain and conducted joint exercises in the eastern waters of Nansha Island.

This is the first time China's aircraft carrier has entered the heart of the Western Pacific in a combat-ready posture. It not only means that the Chinese Navy now has the capability for long-range multi-aircraft carrier operations, but also marks that the U.S.-led "Island Chain Blockade" system has become ineffective against China.

Therefore, from the American perspective, this is not just an ordinary distant sea training exercise, but a major shift in strategic situation.

For a long time, the United States has regarded the First and Second Island Chains as walls to contain China's maritime rise. However, the recent sortie of the Liaoning and Shandong aircraft carriers demonstrated to the U.S. that this wall has already failed.

Especially in the sensitive context of the Taiwan Strait issue, if China's aircraft carriers can operate near Guam, it will severely interfere with U.S. reinforcements, making the U.S. idea of using the island chain as a shield lose its practical foundation.

This is why U.S. media frequently uses words like "turning point," "breakthrough," and "new stage" in their reports, because they know that the previous order in the Pacific has been rewritten by China.

Chinese Navy

Face with the reality of China's continuous advancement into the deep sea of the Western Pacific, U.S. media and strategic circles have proposed a sinister countermeasure.

The article clearly points out that the U.S. should promote an upgraded version of the so-called "crew deployment agreement" in the Pacific island countries, gradually transforming these non-military law enforcement cooperation into quasi-military bases with combat functions.

These suggestions may seem to be strengthening maritime security cooperation with island countries, but in fact, they aim to bypass the sensitive issue of traditional garrisons, and use the name of "cooperation between coast guards" to carry out military infiltration.

The specific measures include constructing "rotational deployment platforms" in regions such as Micronesia, Palau, and Marshall Islands, building regional maritime training centers, and finally integrating them into the U.S. Indo-Pacific combat system.

This means that the U.S. is trying to weave another invisible military network outside the Second Island Chain, creating a group of lightweight bases that are not restricted by traditional treaties but can immediately become support nodes during wartime.

Compared with the high cost and high political risk of traditional military bases, this kind of front-line deployment under non-military cover is more deceptive and expansionary.

Pacific islands

To counter these bad moves, China cannot rely solely on military countermeasures, but must take action from multiple dimensions including diplomacy, public opinion, and strategic layout.

First, China can deepen diplomatic efforts with South Pacific island countries, consolidate partnerships with island countries through development assistance, infrastructure, and climate projects, and push for the signing of sovereignty protection agreements that do not introduce third-country military forces, locking up space for U.S. gray zone penetration.

Secondly, on the maritime level, China can use the ocean-going patrol of the coast guard and research ships to demonstrate non-military existence as a countermeasure, responding to the U.S. coast guard's actions under the name of "enforcement" entering sensitive waters, and shaping the legitimacy of China's civilian maritime presence.

At the same time, in terms of technology and military, we must continue to advance the construction of long-range strike and system confrontation capabilities, including strengthening the deterrent capability of the DF series missiles against nodes such as Guam, developing stealth unmanned ships and aircraft to conduct reconnaissance and infiltration behind the Second Island Chain, and conducting selective long-range exercises to make the U.S. realize that their backyard is no longer safe.

Chinese and American flags

The current facts are clear, no matter how much the U.S. tries, its containment strategy against China is destined to fail.

China is no longer a regional country that can be sealed off. In the era of globalization, China has deeply integrated into the global economic system and the geopolitical network.

Geographically, China has a vast land port, which can go west to Central Asia to reach Europe, and south to Pakistan to arrive at the Arabian Sea. It is not a country that can be surrounded by a few island chains.

In the economic aspect, China is the global manufacturing and trade hub. Any form of containment would cause great fluctuations in the global supply chain, and the backlash would be America itself.

From a military standpoint, China has established a systematized anti-containment capability centered on long-range strikes, air defense and anti-submarine warfare, and information confrontation, making the island chain containment appear on the surface but hollow in essence.

Moreover, more and more countries are moving towards de-dollarization and reducing dependence on the U.S., and the trend of South-South cooperation is washing away the U.S.-led unipolar system.

The more pressure the U.S. applies, the more it stimulates China to accelerate technological breakthroughs and strategic independence. The final result can only be that the U.S. gradually loses control in the Indo-Pacific.

Containment is not a card that can be played forever, nor is it a strategic weapon that can suppress China's rise. The U.S. is doomed to be unable to stop China's steps.

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7540862765750174247/

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