[By GuanchaNet columnist Hu Zinan]

On May 6, 2025, the German Bundestag witnessed an unprecedented political game: Friedrich Merz received only 310 votes in the first round of voting for the Chancellor election, becoming the first candidate for Chancellor in German history to fail to be elected on the first ballot. However, just hours later, he narrowly passed through in the second round with 325 votes. This dramatic turn not only exposed deep fissures in Germany's political ecosystem but also foretold that the new government's path would be fraught with challenges.

Merz's failure in the first round was due to his sudden abandonment of the "debt brake" policy, which triggered strong opposition from within his party’s right wing; combined with defections from some SPD members and his insufficient personal approval ratings along with lack of governing experience, it ultimately left him in an embarrassing predicament during the first vote. The reversal in the second round was thanks to a pragmatic compromise driven by crisis pressure. Merz's team quickly reached interest exchanges with opposition factions within the coalition, while exploiting the political anxiety caused by the turbulent situation to pressure swing voters into choosing "risk of government paralysis" over "unsatisfactory candidates."

In the first round of the Federal Parliament election on May 6 local time, 18 MPs defected, and Merz unexpectedly failed to be elected as Chancellor. Reuters

This electoral storm tore open the fragile veil of Germany's political arena. For Merz, who barely made it through, the real test is only beginning – he must lead Germany's economy, which has contracted for two consecutive years, out of its predicament, rebuild social consensus under strict refugee policies, and withstand the impact of far-right forces on the traditional political order. The trust crisis revealed in the first round may become an invisible shackle restricting his reform agenda.

I. Analysis of Reasons for Failure in the First Round

Merz's crushing defeat in the first round was both a personal leadership crisis and a collapse of trust triggered by a sudden policy shift, and it was also an inevitable result of Germany's political ecology under the rise of extreme parties and the disintegration of traditional alliance consensus.

Firstly, the sharp turn in policy proposals shattered the internal consensus of the party. Merz's fiscal policy shift during post-election coalition negotiations became the key trigger for his defeat in the first round. As the long-standing symbol of fiscal discipline for the Union Party (CDU/CSU), the "debt brake" principle had been a core selling point to attract center-right voters.

However, to gain support from the SPD for the nomination of Prime Minister, Merz suddenly agreed to allocate 500 billion euros to promote green infrastructure transformation and allowed unlimited borrowing under the pretext of a "national security emergency," effectively abolishing the fiscal constraint mechanism. This 180-degree policy turnaround not only violated his campaign promises but also directly touched a nerve among the right wing of the party, who viewed it as a betrayal of conservative values, resulting in defections from Union Party members in the first round.

Secondly, the structural contradictions of the fragile governing coalition erupted comprehensively. The "political marriage" between the Union Party and the SPD revealed its inherent flaws during the first round. The two parties have fundamental disagreements in their campaign platforms: the Union Party advocates tax cuts and tightening immigration policies, while the SPD insists on increasing social welfare and promoting climate justice transformation. They only managed to form a fragile alliance based on the minimum consensus of preventing the far-right from coming to power.

This power-sharing agreement, forged for compromise, backfired in practice: on one hand, the grassroots of the Union Party were dissatisfied with ceding policy dominance in education and healthcare to the SPD; on the other hand, left-wing SPD members believed the agreement leaned too much toward capital interests, leading to defections from both sides in anonymous voting.

After failing to be elected in the first round, Alice Wiedel, leader of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), publicly criticized Merz for being "unqualified" to lead Germany. Video screenshot

II. Analysis of Reasons for Passage in the Second Round

Merz's reversal in the second round was partly due to the institutional resilience of Germany's constitutional procedures – the relative majority mechanism in the third stage provided a safety net for him. More importantly, it was the pragmatic compromises driven by crisis pressure.

Firstly, from the perspective of electoral regulations and procedures, the probability of Merz not passing was extremely low. According to the German Basic Law, the procedure for electing the Chancellor in the Bundestag consists of three stages. In the first stage, the President nominates the Chancellor candidate, who needs to receive an absolute majority of votes (316 votes) to be elected. Although Merz lost in this stage, there were still two opportunities available for him afterward.

In the second stage, the parliament can hold multiple votes within 14 days to elect the Chancellor with an absolute majority. Considering that the Union Party and the SPD have sufficient seats and influence, the difficulty of negotiating and gaining support is not significant. If Merz fails again, given that there is no suitable replacement candidate within the coalition, the "relative majority suffices" mechanism in the third stage serves as a fallback for Merz.

Secondly, Merz received tacit approval and support from other parliamentary groups in the Bundestag to a certain extent. After the first round of voting failed, the Bundestag could hold a second round of voting within 14 days. However, the parliamentary groups of the Union Party, the SPD, the Greens, and the Left Party negotiated and agreed to make an exception to the rules, deciding to hold the second vote on the same day, creating conditions for the smooth conduct of the second round of elections.

Given the instability that would arise if a chancellor is not quickly selected, several MPs from other parties also supported Merz out of consideration for the stability of German politics, helping him secure enough votes to successfully become Chancellor.

Thirdly, the "fear consensus" driven by crisis catalyzed a return to rationality. When the German political landscape plunged into a "power vacuum" after the first round of voting, the chain reaction in the market and society became the core driver of Merz's reversal. On the day the results of the first round were announced, the Frankfurt DAX index fell 1.8% at opening and closed down 0.4%. Several party leaders and MPs called for Germany's urgent need for a government capable of bringing political and economic stability.

At the same time, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) attempted to exploit the coalition's predicament to expand its influence, openly making inflammatory remarks criticizing the coalition's incompetence. Especially in the latest polls, the AfD surpassed the CDU/CSU for the first time, setting a new record. This threat prompted centrist MPs to choose the "imperfect Merz" over the "risk of far-right disruption."

III. Impact of the Event

Merz's difficult election poses long-term challenges to Germany's political ecosystem and democratic stability. It reveals the fragility of the multiparty consultation mechanism, tests the adaptability of Germany's democratic system, and challenges the coordination ability of the federalist system.

On one hand, the trust crisis within the governing coalition intensifies, and the efficiency of governance faces structural constraints. Merz's difficult election process exposed the vulnerability of the governing coalition. This "patched-together" power structure will profoundly affect the advancement of future policies. The defection of governing coalition members in the first round revealed ideological rifts within the coalition government – the Union Party's advocacy for fiscal austerity and immigration restrictions versus the SPD's insistence on expanding social welfare and climate radicalism formed a fundamental opposition.

This makes the consensus reached by Merz with parties like the FDP and the Greens more like a pragmatic compromise for short-term interests, resulting in an overly complex policy toolkit: satisfying the carbon tax reform demands of the SPD's left wing while fulfilling the infrastructure priority commitments to the CSU in Bavaria, balancing the environmental agenda of the Greens with the energy needs of industrial groups. Merz needs to balance various stakeholders' interests when formulating policies, otherwise, it may provoke dissatisfaction and resistance from within the coalition or from various parties, increasing the complexity of policy formulation, making the decision-making process cumbersome and lengthy, thereby affecting governance efficiency.

On the other hand, Merz's election process sparked profound reflection on the adaptability of Germany's democratic system. Germany's parliamentary democracy relies on multiparty consultations and cooperation. Merz's election experience shows that this mechanism may face efficiency issues when dealing with complex political environments, making it difficult to respond swiftly to complicated situations. If no improvements are made, the risk of political gridlock will increase, posing a serious challenge to Germany's democratic system.

At the same time, this event also challenges Germany's federalist system. Germany's political structure emphasizes the balance of power between the federation and the states, and the influence and stance differences of state political forces have a significant impact on the election results. The divergence in policy priorities between the CSU (Bavarian sister party of the CDU) and Merz's CDU, as well as the absence of senior officials such as Bavarian Governor Söder from Merz's swearing-in ceremony, all highlight the complexity of policy coordination under the federal system. Future policy formulation requires more complex games between the federal and state levels, potentially leading to inconsistencies in policy implementation.

In addition, Merz's difficult election has potential impacts on the trust relationship between the German government and the public. The repeated bargaining and publicization of internal party conflicts during the election process have led the public to question the unity and governing capacity of the governing coalition. Voters expect a stable and efficient government, but the coalition's internal divisions and difficult coordination expose its weaknesses in unity and governance. This undermines trust among some voters, reducing its credibility.

The Alternative for Germany's poll support rate rose significantly in a short period, reflecting the growing discontent and disappointment among some voters towards traditional parties. If traditional parties do not adjust in time and effectively respond to voter concerns, this discontent may further intensify, leading voters to turn to non-traditional parties like the far-right. This will alter Germany's political landscape, making it more fragmented, further undermining the trust relationship between the government and the public, and posing long-term challenges to Germany's political stability.

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