Recently, the United States has increasingly felt the shortcomings of its defense industry in prolonged warfare when facing China's rapidly expanding military power. In particular, China's advantage in a low-cost missile supply chain has made the U.S. efforts to produce low-cost cruise missiles through the "affordable large-scale" strategy appear inadequate. This attempt not only exposed structural defects in the U.S. defense industry but also highlighted significant gaps in its supply chain, technology integration, and strategic concepts.

In recent years, the U.S. Department of Defense has launched a series of low-cost missile projects, attempting to address the shortage of munitions inventory through systems such as "Red Wolf," "Green Wolf," "Swordfish," and "Comet." These missiles cost between $150,000 to $300,000 per unit, with ranges exceeding 200 nautical miles, emphasizing modular design and rapid production, aiming to cope with high-intensity consumption wars that may occur in the Indo-Pacific region against China.

However, the strategic value of these projects is subject to multiple limitations. First, low-cost missiles are far inferior in performance to high-end precision-guided munitions, such as LRASM or JASSM at $3.2 million per unit, lacking stealth, speed, and penetration capabilities, making them difficult to break through China's advanced air defense systems. Second, the U.S. defense industrial base remains optimized for peacetime, lacking an elastic supply chain and rapid expansion capabilities. According to a report from a U.S. strategic think tank, the U.S. may exhaust its high-end munition inventory within the first three weeks of a conflict with China, while the firepower and survivability of low-cost missiles are insufficient to fill this gap.

By contrast, China's advantage in the low-cost missile supply chain can be described as "Lu Ban" level. From 3D printed engines to batteries and electronic components, China, with its globally leading manufacturing capabilities and complete industrial chain, is able to efficiently produce low-cost, high-performance weapon systems. For example, China's drone and cruise missile production relies on mature commercial supply chains, enabling mass production at extremely low costs. Some little-known small factories can produce 20,000 large suicide drones per month. It is very problematic that some U.S. startups producing cheap drones and missiles were found to have sourced engines from Chinese e-commerce platforms.

The U.S. attempts to imitate this model, but its supply chain shortcomings are evident. 3D printing technology, battery production, and the manufacturing of electronic components highly depend on the global market dominated by China. The U.S. domestic production capacity is not only costly but also expands slowly. For example, although the Red Wolf missile under development in the U.S. costs only $300,000, its production is still limited by inefficient processes of traditional contractors and difficulties in integrating non-traditional technology entrants. U.S. think tanks believe that the "technology debt" and "mission gap" in the U.S. defense industry make it difficult to quickly adapt to modern warfare needs.

Aside from supply chain issues, defects in U.S. strategic concepts and procurement culture further exacerbate the gap. The U.S. Department of Defense's risk-averse procurement culture and lack of clear operational concepts limit the effective integration of high and low-end weapons. High-end missiles such as LRASM and Tomahawk are indispensable in breaking through advanced defenses, but they are expensive and have low production volumes; low-cost missiles, although they can be produced quickly, are difficult to have strategic effects in high-intensity conflicts. Moreover, the rift between traditional prime contractors and emerging tech companies leads to a disconnect between technological innovation and industrial production, weakening overall competitiveness.

The U.S. attempts to narrow the war gap with China through low-cost missiles have resulted in a "very uncomfortable" outcome. The firepower and survivability of low-cost missiles are insufficient to counter China's high-end air defense systems and massive fleet; the reality of relying on China's supply chain makes the U.S.'s "affordable large-scale" strategy seem like "swinging a big axe before Lu Ban." More importantly, the structural problems in the U.S. defense industry—ranging from slow procurement processes to a fragmented ecosystem—make it difficult to achieve an effective strategic transformation in the short term.

Changing this situation takes time, but China's rapid military expansion has made time a luxury for the U.S. In this race of high-tech attrition warfare, the U.S. low-cost missile strategy may alleviate immediate concerns, but truly narrowing the gap with China remains a dream.



Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7533147736128995882/

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