【Text by Observer Network Columnist Yang Zhi】
Several days ago, the "hot brother" Trump, who had always been enthusiastic about Putin, the "fiery younger brother," suddenly transformed into a nagging "complainer," thereby solidifying his other nickname: "Face-changing Master."
He changed his previous friendly attitude and began to complain that Putin didn't keep his word, always misleading him. He said that Putin was a good person during the day but a ghost at night, and that he had just spoken eloquently with him, only to go to Ukraine and drop bombs.
To prove that he wasn't acting on a whim, he even brought his wife Melania into the picture: "When I went home and told my wife that I had a good talk with Putin, she said, 'Really? Another city has been bombed.' " Her words undoubtedly deepened his doubts about Putin, leading him to decide to deal with Moscow in another way.
On July 14, Trump publicly announced a 50-day deadline for Moscow: either negotiate a ceasefire or face unprecedented "sanctions" (a 100% increase in tariffs).
Trump roaring and Putin smiling, German media
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov quoted the proverb "The one who digs a pit falls into it, and the one who plays with fire burns himself." The chairman of the Committee on International Affairs of the State Duma, Slutskey, stated that the resumption of arms supplies from the United States to Ukraine was a regression, but this would not change the situation on the front lines. Russian President's Press Secretary Peskov said more clearly: "The essence of Western military aid to Ukraine is business, but the decision made by the United States and other NATO countries will not be seen as a peace signal by Ukraine, but as a call to continue the war."
Russian former president Medvedev said on the social platform "X" that Trump's ultimatum was "theatrical", which essentially meant "too exaggerated". He stated that Russia did not care about it, and it sounded like the classic line from the film "Lenin in 1918": "We ignore him."
From the current situation, it is likely that the recent series of actions by the West are related to the upcoming "summer offensive" that Russia is about to launch. Russia's performance on the battlefield this summer may determine the final outcome of the military conflict. Perhaps for this reason, Europe and the United States have decided to continue their "two-pronged strategy" of providing aid to Ukraine and sanctioning Russia after a period of rest.
Regarding the real purpose of Western aid to Ukraine, the shift in Berlin's tone towards Ukraine, and why Germany has once again become Russia's "number one enemy," the author has discussed these issues in other articles. In this article, we will discuss the topic of "sanctions," which is quite complex, through two famous cases of success and failure.
South Africa: "The Land of Rainbows Should Not Have Black and White Boundaries"
Origin:
The racial segregation in South Africa began in the early colonial era of Dutch and British rule. "South African Apartheid Policy" refers to a system of racial segregation and discrimination implemented by the white government of South Africa from 1948 to 1994. This policy divided the population of South Africa into four races: whites, blacks, colored people, and Indians, and implemented a series of discriminatory laws and policies that deprived blacks and other non-white races of basic human rights and political rights, thus triggering peaceful protests and armed resistance (anti-apartheid movement) in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as international sanctions.
Participating organizations and countries:
United Nations and its member states, Organization of African Unity (now African Union), Commonwealth of Nations, European Economic Community (now European Union), international sports organizations (International Olympic Committee, etc.).
Scope and types of sanctions:
Trade sanctions, financial sanctions, freezing of diplomatic relations and other political measures, arms embargoes, sports and cultural boycotts, etc.
Difficulties and effects of sanctions:
At the beginning, the forces supporting the sanctions were limited to non-governmental organizations and churches. Major economies in Europe and America, due to their own interests, only took minimal intervention measures, so the effect was very limited.
By the 1970s, the international attitude toward South Africa gradually hardened, and the criticism of apartheid received the support of most governments. However, the South African government did not change its course, but rather intensified it, prompting non-governmental organizations and churches to protest even more strongly. Governments in Europe and America had to begin to pay serious attention to the situation there and consider taking sanction measures.
However, companies with economic interests in South Africa warned against implementing sanctions and hoped to overcome apartheid by supporting the so-called "liberal economic circle" in South Africa. Their argument was "trade for change," believing that increasing prosperity could eliminate apartheid. Finally, under political pressure, these companies promised not to implement apartheid within their own enterprises.
In fact, there were also differences of opinion within American industries regarding sanctions, such as the lack of enthusiasm from American industrialists for sanctions, while union leaders clearly supported them. However, the reason for their support was not to concern themselves with the fate of black South Africans, but to use this as a way to save jobs in the United States.
Political alternation among European and American countries was another important reason for the poor effectiveness of sanctions.
Different from all previous U.S. governments, President Carter explicitly stood on the side of anti-apartheid, and the official position also changed accordingly, such as refusing to issue orders and supply contracts to U.S. companies, banks, or insurance companies that invested in South Africa. But with Reagan's election, the U.S. government returned to the position of opposing sanctions.
Although the European Community joined the ranks of sanctions, its actions were very hesitant.
In September 1986, the German magazine "Der Spiegel" described a cabinet meeting of its own government as follows: "On Wednesday, Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Genscher asked if anyone opposed his report on the European Community's decision to sanction South Africa. To his surprise, both the Interior Minister Zimmermann of the Christian Social Union and the Agricultural Minister Kirschner clearly expressed opposition. Genscher asked them what exactly they opposed. Zimmermann replied directly: He considered the Brussels sanctions decision to be 'pure hypocrisy' (Pure Heuchelei)."
The article pointed out that the stance of European and American countries was "double hypocrisy": when deciding to impose sanctions, they claimed it was to oppose the apartheid policy and protect the suffering black Africans, but in reality, it was for their own votes; when opposing sanctions, they said that the biggest victims of sanctions were the black South Africans who needed help. Then British Prime Minister Thatcher believed that sanctions would "increase poverty, narrow-mindedness, and hunger among the South African people."
The article finally cut to the heart of the matter, stating that the German government's position was not unwilling to offend South Africa, but due to its own economic considerations, because West Germany was the second-largest trading partner of South Africa (after the United States). German companies exported 330 million marks of machinery and vehicles, and 620 million marks of chemical products to South Africa. "What if the Japanese take advantage?" - this was actually what Chancellor Kohl was really worried about.
A propaganda poster from West Germany against apartheid: "Don't eat Outspan oranges / Don't drain the South African people"
Moreover, European and American companies showed different attitudes towards sanctions when it came to industry interests.
Taking the coal industry and agriculture as examples: power plants wanted to remove coal from the sanctions list because their country's rigid resource allocation system increased production costs, and it was cheaper to import coal from South Africa; however, mining and miners supported sanctions because not importing coal from South Africa would ensure their enterprises and employment. For example, in agricultural products such as grapes, meat, or grains, South Africa is an exporter and competitor, so European and American agricultural sectors supported sanctions, and the campaign to boycott buying South African apples received widespread support from farmers.
Sanctions against South Africa must also take into account the understanding and participation of other African countries south of the Sahara. Although these countries have close relations with South Africa and are members of the Commonwealth, they have consistently opposed apartheid and supported sanctions. Why? Because in terms of tropical agricultural products and mineral raw materials exports, South Africa is their competitor, and sanctioning South Africa means opening up a path for themselves.
In summary, the sanctions against South Africa must be viewed against the backdrop of the extremely contradictory goals of the sanctioning countries, because sanctions not only involve morality and ethics, but must also consider the economic and industry interests of the country itself. Moreover, many governments believe that due to South Africa's strategic importance, it should not be overly isolated and weakened politically and militarily. The international community must find a way to reduce the economic and political risks contained in apartheid through peaceful transformation.
Therefore, the reason why the apartheid policy in South Africa lasted nearly half a century is not only because the corporations and enterprises of Europe and America have never given up this country, which is relatively legally sound and can serve as a "platform" for entering the African continent, but also because the measures of international sanctions are difficult to be comprehensive due to the above reasons, and their effectiveness is greatly reduced.
However, it is not entirely objective to say that the sanctions have no effect at all. Without the "joint" actions and public opinion pressure of the international community, the South African government might not have eventually initiated a reform process and led to the end of the apartheid policy. Moreover, the sanctions against the South African white government have legal and moral basis and were initiated by the United Nations.
It is precisely for these reasons that the international sanctions against South Africa are classified as a "successful example."
Cuba: "Giant" Can't Crush the "Ant"
Origin:
After the Cuban Revolution, Castro's government implemented land reforms and nationalization policies, and the assets of the United States in Cuba (banks, factories, stores, and farms) were confiscated. Havana established a wide and close relationship with the Soviet Union, which was seen as a security threat by the United States. On October 19, 1960, the United States imposed trade embargoes on Cuba, although the initial embargo did not include food and medicine. On February 7, 1962, the scope of the embargo expanded to almost all items. Since 2000, the embargo has again excluded food and humanitarian supplies.
Since 1992, the United Nations General Assembly has passed a resolution every year demanding that the United States end the economic embargo against Cuba. The U.S. trade embargo against Cuba has lasted over 60 years, making it the longest sanction in history.
Participating organizations and countries:
United States
Scope and types of sanctions:
Trade and economic embargoes, financial sanctions, third-country complicity sanctions, personnel and visa restrictions, investment bans and property claims, tourism and remittance restrictions, specific commodity embargoes and export controls, restrictions and exemptions for private enterprises and markets, comprehensive embargoes on defense materials and technology, and listing Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism, etc.
Difficulties and effects of sanctions:
The U.S. sanctions against Cuba are a typical case of Cold War legacy and international geopolitical rivalry. Its process spans half a century, and the content system is extremely complex, with actual effects and difficulties widely discussed in international political history.
Starting from 1960, the U.S. "giant" tried to crush the "ant" Cuba, enacting a series of regulations such as the Trading with the Enemy Act, the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, the Cuban Democracy Act, and the Helms-Burton Act, which systematized and legalized the sanctions, and gave extraterritorial effect, i.e., not only U.S. domestic companies, but also foreign companies, ships, and banks operating in the U.S. that have trade, investment, or financial dealings with Cuba can be penalized, known as "third-country penalties" or "collective punishment."
The sanctions include comprehensive trade embargoes, financial blockades, prohibition of dollar settlements, freezing of Cuban assets in the U.S., blocking tourism and technology exports, prohibiting investments and third-country trade with Cuba. The U.S. also frequently imposes "named" sanctions on the Cuban government, military, and officials, freezing their overseas assets and denying them entry visas. Its measures have been continuously upgraded, and new international crises, internal political unrest, and social demonstrations in Cuba have been used as opportunities to deepen the sanctions.
American blockade of Cuba cartoon
For over 60 years, the U.S. sanctions against Cuba have been strongly opposed by Cuba and the international community. Since 1992, the United Nations General Assembly has passed a resolution every year with a large majority demanding that the U.S. lift the blockade against Cuba, with only the U.S. and a few allies (such as Israel) voting against it. The European Union, Canada, and many governments and citizens in Latin America have continuously criticized the U.S. approach for violating the principles of sovereignty equality and free trade. Including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, many human rights organizations have also condemned the hardships caused by the embargo to the Cuban people.
The U.S. long-term blockade of Cuba has produced the following difficulties:
1. The legitimacy and moral basis of the sanction policy have continued to be questioned by the international community and have been isolated in the United Nations, putting the U.S. global "rules and human rights diplomacy" promotion into an awkward situation.
2. Extraterritorial sanctions have brought losses to the interests of American companies and allies. For example, many European companies and banks have been fined millions of dollars for "involvement with Cuba," causing continuous trade and economic disputes and contradictions with the U.S.
3. The original intention of the U.S. sanctions was to drive Cuba to reform its system and regime through strong pressure, but the result has been the opposite. Unilateral sanctions have severely restricted Cuba's economy, especially its export-dependent industries, and the financial system, leading to long-term shortages of essential goods such as food, medicine, and medical equipment, and lagging social development. However, the Cuban regime has not collapsed, but instead has strengthened its governing legitimacy under the atmosphere of "external threat" and has gathered a nationalist consensus.
4. A large number of Cubans have tried to illegally emigrate to the U.S. due to economic hardship, deepening the immigration and humanitarian crisis between the two countries.
5. Sanctions have directly affected the interests of the U.S. Cuban-American community, tourism, finance, and agriculture sectors, keeping the policy in a dilemma between intra-party struggles and public controversy. From 2015 to 2016, the Obama administration temporarily relaxed some humanitarian, commercial, and personnel exchange restrictions, but the core measures and legal provisions of the sanctions did not loosen. After 2017, the Trump and Biden administrations repeatedly intensified the sanctions due to the internal political movements and social demonstrations in Cuba.
6. Sanctions have not only caused economic difficulties and suffering for Cuba, but have also weakened the U.S.'s moral appeal in Latin America and globally, becoming a paradox in contemporary international relations research and practical policy.
7. From the number of participating countries, the U.S. stands alone, losing support in the international community, and therefore cannot be called "international sanctions." From the perspective of strength comparison, the world's first superpower has imposed a 60-year sanction on a "tiny country" ranked 100th in GDP, but Cuba, despite its economic decline and impoverished people, still stands firm. This makes the U.S. look like a joke on the international stage.
In summary, the U.S. embargo on Cuba is a major example of failed sanctions.
The "Legitimacy" and "Appropriateness" of Sanctions
From the above two cases, it can be seen that any sanctions should have "legitimacy" (legal and moral basis) and "appropriateness" (the purpose and means should not be broadened or extreme), otherwise they are difficult to sustain and have little effect.
The "legitimacy" and "appropriateness" of international sanctions are theoretical and practical issues that have been widely discussed in the fields of international law and international relations. To discuss them, it is necessary to start from multiple dimensions, including international law principles, institutional procedures, moral considerations, and actual effects.
Firstly, "legitimacy" is the primary foundation on which international sanctions rely, mainly involving the legality of the legal level and the justice of the moral level.
Traditional international law emphasizes the principle of equal sovereignty of states and non-interference in internal affairs. Only sanctions resolutions authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and made by the Security Council based on maintaining international peace and security are widely recognized as having an undeniable international legal "legitimacy" foundation.
Security Council sanctions are based on collective security and global consensus, not only having legal enforceability, but also having moral appeal. Many unilateral or extraterritorial sanctions, which have not been authorized by the Security Council, are often questioned in the international community. The U.S. sanctions against Cuba fall into this category.
2022, German street anti-sanction demonstration banner: "Stop the crazy sanctions! We don't want to pay for your policies"
According to the general standard recognized by the international legal community, unilateral sanctions are prone to violate the "non-intervention principle" and even be considered a form of disguised interference in the internal affairs of other countries, undermining the fairness of the international legal framework. In recent years, the United Nations and most countries have increasingly focused on the legitimacy of the purpose of sanctions, the legality of the procedure, the transparency of the behavior, and the respect for the sovereignty and international fairness of the sanctioned country when assessing the "legitimacy" of sanctions.
Secondly, "appropriateness" focuses on whether the selection and implementation of sanction measures comply with the "proportionality principle" and "necessity principle." According to international laws and precedents such as the WTO and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, any restrictive measures imposed on another country must undergo dual review of "proportionality" and "necessity."
The "proportionality" (i.e., "appropriateness") principle emphasizes that the sanction measures must be proportional to the nature and severity of the problem to be solved, and must not exceed the "minimum intervention limit" necessary for maintaining international justice. For example, when the Security Council and some regional organizations discuss whether to initiate sanctions, they focus on weighing the pros and cons of comprehensive trade embargoes, targeted sanctions, and halting development cooperation, to avoid excessive damage to innocent parties.
In terms of "necessity," the international community requires the sanctioning party to prove that all other mild and effective alternative measures have been exhausted; implementing unilateral sanctions measures must be able to fully prove that they are the "last resort" for maintaining international peace and human rights.
Furthermore, when evaluating the "legitimacy" and "appropriateness" of international sanctions, international authoritative institutions such as the UN Security Council also emphasize five standards: "legitimate purpose, verifiable threats, last resort, proportionate measures, and consequence balance." For example, when the Security Council freezes the assets of certain individuals or entities and restricts their travel, it simultaneously establishes a monitoring mechanism, dynamically adjusts the sanction list according to the specific circumstances of the case, ensuring the rationality, effectiveness, and availability of relief channels for the measures.
However, in reality, it is often difficult to balance the "legitimacy" and "appropriateness" of sanctions.
On one hand, some major powers often abuse sanctions for their own national strategic interests, ignoring international norms, which leads to a crisis in the authority of international law in global governance. On the other hand, economic or financial sanctions often have spillover effects, not only affecting the target country's government, but also often causing harm to the livelihood of ordinary people, intensifying distributional conflicts, and posing challenges to the appropriateness of sanctions and human rights protection.
WTO and other multilateral organizations emphasize that any sanction measures should try to minimize distortions of free trade and multilateral relations, avoiding an infinite expansion of the scope of impact, otherwise the "legitimacy" of sanctions will be hard to stand.
Take Cuba as an example: In many resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly, it is confirmed that the sanctions against the Republic of Cuba completely violate international law, and the U.S. government is required to revoke the relevant laws.
As one of the most important countries in the world, the United States, for its own interests, seriously exaggerates the "foreign threat" and has long implemented "unilateral sanctions," seriously disrupting and destroying the international order. Trump's love for "tariff wars" is a typical example. Singapore scholar Kishore Mahbubani once reminded the United States to be careful with its words and deeds, because if the current "first power" acts recklessly and selfishly, it may be emulated by future "first powers."
Conclusion
Whether it is international sanctions or unilateral sanctions, apart from the two key points of "legitimacy" and "appropriateness," it is also necessary to pay attention to the actual effect of the sanctions, i.e., whether the sanction goal is ultimately achieved.
History has taught us that the only certain effect of large-scale sanctions is "if the nest is destroyed, how can the eggs remain intact," and everything else remains unknown. In this sense, whether in the past, present, or future, sanctions are changing the course of history and the international landscape.
According to a large-scale study assessment conducted by the U.S. in 1990, out of 120 sanctions implemented between 1914 and 1990, 65.8% (79 cases) did not meet expectations, and only 34.2% (41 cases) achieved the goals. Weapon embargoes that weaken the enemy's military capabilities accounted for 20%, while the "destabilization strategy" (economic sanctions causing regime instability) had a 52% success rate. Among 80 trade embargoes, only 37.5% led to the national economy of the sanctioned country suffering a loss of more than 1%.
One point that cannot be ignored is that the economic losses caused by economic sanctions not only affect the target country, but also hit the initiating country, i.e., the so-called "backfire effect": export bans cause overcapacity, increased unemployment, and economic recession, while import bans, without finding substitute goods or supply chains, lead to supply shortages and inflation.
Economic sanctions often target developing countries, which already have serious shortcomings in life and development. For export-oriented or import-dependent countries, sanctions directly affect the health and lives of the people, often resulting in more harm than benefit, and the actual effect may be counterproductive.
Taking Afghanistan as an example, the U.S. led a 20-year intervention in Afghanistan. After withdrawing in 2021, the Taliban quickly regained power. The West then imposed economic sanctions on the Taliban, mainly impacting the country's banking system, causing the Afghan economy to collapse, remittances to be blocked, and the price of imported food to skyrocket.
In October 2023, the United Nations World Food Programme issued a warning that the humanitarian aid funding for Afghanistan in that year was reduced by about 80% compared to 2022, from 16 billion to 3.4 billion. The U.S. "Foreign Policy" magazine reported that these sanctions deepened the suffering of Afghans and did not truly shake the stability of the Taliban regime. This situation is likely to become a breeding ground for the growth and spread of terrorism again.
The German quarterly journal "International Politics and Society" published in April 2025 addressed the issue of post-war reconstruction in Syria: "The biggest obstacle is still the U.S. sanctions."
Another issue worth noting and thinking about is: Why have most of the sanctions after World War II been initiated by Western countries?
Summarizing, there are the following main reasons:
1. Economic strength support. With its strong economic strength, the Western countries can effectively pressure other countries through trade embargoes or financial sanctions. 80% of the world's international settlement currencies and 65% of the reserve currencies are controlled by Western countries, giving them a unique sanction leverage advantage.
2. Ideological motivation. Liberal values (democracy, human rights, rule of law) constitute the "legitimacy" basis for Western sanctions. A 2022 Stanford University study showed that 78% of Western sanctions included clauses to "promote democracy." In reality, this clause is often abused.
3. Multilateral mechanism coordination. Relying on international organizations such as the United Nations and the EU, Western countries form a institutionalized sanction coordination network. Data from the European External Action Service (EEAS) of the European Union show that 92% of EU joint sanctions cases from 2000 to 2020 involved the United States.
4. Historical path dependence. The Western political and economic alliance formed during the Cold War has continued as a "sanction community." A Brookings Institution report pointed out that the probability of G7 members participating in joint sanctions is 17 times higher than that of non-members.
5. Deterrence narrative building. The West claims to be the "guardian of the international order," establishing behavioral norms through sanctions. However, Harvard humanitarian research shows that from 1980 to 2015, sanctions caused the average death rate of civilians in the target country to rise by 21.3%.
It is particularly worth pointing out that the actual effect of sanctions often deviates from expectations. According to statistics from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), only 34% of modern sanction cases achieve political goals, and 87% of the cases lead to humanitarian crises. This "moral dilemma" is increasingly causing reflection in the international community.
It is supposed that "sanctions" should become a means to "uphold justice" and "punish evil and promote good," but from the practical results, "sanctions" have the danger of becoming an instrument of "low-level politics" and replacing traditional diplomatic efforts.
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