With Trump taking office and signaling a possible easing of US-Russia relations, many people in the country are discussing the possibility of Russia abandoning its "look east" strategy and turning back to the West.
In response to the strategic choices for Russia after US-Russia interaction, Observer Network interviewed Igor Makarov, director of the Department of World Economy Research at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, asking him to analyze from the perspective of Russian scholars the future development trend of Russia and look forward to the prospects of Sino-Russian relations.
[Text/Igor Makarov, Dialogue/Gao Yanping, Transcription and Translation/Tang Xiaofu]
After years, the United States is finally ready to listen to the opinions of Russians.
Observer Network: The recent U.S. government's efforts to repair relations with Russia have sparked much discussion, including among Chinese scholars. How does Russia view this issue?
Igor Makarov: Among the most important events in the global public opinion field over the past five months is President Trump's second term. With the start of Trump's second term, changes have occurred in many areas of the existing international order, and the relationship between China and Russia is probably the only stable component.
Trump's presidency is often associated with the end of the liberal order and the decline of globalization. But I believe that the starting point of all these actually predates Trump: he is not the fundamental cause of these changes, but rather a symptom of them. During Trump's administration, two key aspects have really changed:
First, the new president and the new American administration have caused a deep divide within the Western world;
Second, the new president has a completely different and commercialized view of the international economic system, particularly international trade relations (viewing economic relations from the perspective of transaction completion).
These two changes are tactically beneficial to Russia. For Russia, the weakening of the transatlantic partnership system has loosened the anti-Russian camp, and studying international relations from the perspective of completing transactions, although less comfortable than emphasizing the maintenance of national interests, is more acceptable to Russia than the previous administration's approach of negating the possibility of dialogue and promoting a single value.
In US-Russia dialogue, the most critical aspect is that, after many years, the United States is finally willing to listen to the opinions of Russia. Although this does not mean that the US-Russia dialogue will achieve positive results or that the United States will become a reliable partner for Russia in the foreseeable future, even if there are contradictions, dialogue remains a normal way of communication. For example, despite many differences between China and the United States, they still maintain dialogue on many key issues; Russia also hopes to maintain such a communication mechanism with the United States.
Putin and Trump had a direct phone call previously
So, what impact do these changes have on the Sino-Russian relationship? I think, while the value of the US-China relationship is undeniable, the relationship between the US and Russia also has its significance, but neither will affect the Sino-Russian relationship. Currently, some actions by the new US administration may remind people of the measures taken by the US toward China and Russia in the 1970s, but the roles have shifted.
Some experts believe that Trump hopes to use Russia to defeat China, just as Nixon restored relations with China to contain the Soviet Union; but I don't think this is Trump's main motivation. Even so, such a strategy is very likely to fail. As multiple spokespersons have repeatedly emphasized recently, the friendly Sino-Russian relationship has strong internal driving force and unique strategic value, and cannot be influenced by any third party.
Moreover, by 2024, bilateral trade between China and Russia reached $244.8 billion, while bilateral trade between the US and Russia was less than $3.5 billion. The US and Russia are located at opposite ends of their respective hemispheres, whereas China and Russia are neighbors who cannot be moved, truly embodying the saying that "distant relatives are not as helpful as close neighbors." In the context of increasing interdependence among members of the international economic system, China and Russia are undoubtedly our partners and friends, and this relationship will remain stable for the next hundred years.
Russians believe that only on the basis of conditions that meet Russia's requirements can a solution to the Ukrainian issue be found through mediation of the Ukraine conflict. However, this does not mean that Russia wants to restore its foreign relations and economic policies to the state of 2021.
Russia needs to first ensure the security of its western borders. To some extent, normalizing economic relations with Europe is necessary, but ensuring the security of the western border is essential for Russia, which will provide a crucially stable foundation for Russia's "looking east" strategy. Russia needs to adjust from stagnant markets to developing fastest markets, which are located in Asia.
In this sense, China need not worry about dialogue between the US and Russia. Regardless of how the relationship between the US and Russia evolves in the future (there are still many uncertainties here), it will not affect the Sino-Russian relationship, and we are confident in the stability of the Sino-Russian relationship.
Even if US-Russia relations normalize in the future, it will not affect Russia's "turning to the East" strategy.
Observer Network: After the Ukraine war, Russia's "looking east" strategy clearly accelerated. Do you think this is a long-term strategy or a short-term one?
Igor Makarov: This is undoubtedly a long-term strategy. Ten years ago, my colleagues and I published a book titled "Turning East." And even earlier, in the early 2010s, we had already insisted on the "looking east" perspective. Actually, when exactly Russia's "looking east" strategy started, different people have their own views.
In my view, the "looking east" strategy began in 2012. At that time, in an article written before his campaign, Putin proposed that Russia's economy and society should "ride the东风 of China to set sail for Russia," seize China's development opportunities, and integrate China into the Russian market. The same year, we held the APEC summit in Vladivostok (Primorsky Krai), which greatly promoted the development of Russia's Far East region and attracted considerable attention.
In general, these factors, along with the growing recognition by the Russian people of China and other Asian economies' increasingly important role in the global economy, collectively prompted the Russian authorities to turn eastward.
The "looking east" strategy has always had a very clear strategic layout. When Putin addressed the Federal Assembly in 2013, he pointed out that the development of the Far East and the "looking east" strategy would be a major project running throughout the 21st century—this gives you an idea of the long-term nature of this strategy.
Of course, it cannot be denied that there were several key nodes that accelerated this process. First, during the Ukraine crisis in 2014, many Russian elites who were previously fully or partially aligned with the West began to realize that Russia could no longer maintain good relations with the West. Many political elites explicitly stated that Russia must seek new development opportunities, namely the economic development opportunities in Asia.
Russia's share of trade with the West has been stagnant for a long time, while the eastern market holds numerous opportunities. Therefore, considering both economic and geopolitical factors, the "looking east" strategy is more rational and advantageous; it's just that due to previous political situation changes and delayed personal cognitive shifts, the turning point became visible in 2014.
The second key node occurred in early 2022, when not just part of the political elite but the entire society generally realized that Russia's future lies nowhere in Europe. It is worth emphasizing that this change reflects more of a shift in public perception than just an objective reality change. Because the objective situation had been clear ten years ago, but due to public perception inertia, the shift was not rapid.
Therefore, the nodes in 2014 and 2022 played a significant role in accelerating the implementation of the "looking east" strategy. It should be noted that Russia's "looking east" strategy is not directly driven by these nodes; it is essentially a long-term plan. Objectively, however, these nodes had a profound impact on the public's and some policymakers' conceptual shifts.
Observer Network: Do you think the changes in Russia's relations with the US and Ukraine will affect Russia's "looking east" strategy?
Igor Makarov: Absolutely not. We do hope to restore dialogue with the US, and we expect this process to continue; but no one can claim that this dialogue will ultimately lead to breakthrough progress in talks to resolve the Ukraine conflict or result in a complete resolution of the Ukraine issue. I sincerely hope that dialogue can be restarted, simply hoping that US-Russia relations can return to some normalcy, since the current situation is far from normal. However, this restoration does not affect the relationship between Russia and China, because the two belong to entirely different domains.
We do need to engage in dialogue with the US, and perhaps later with Europe, but Russia believes its future lies not in Europe and America but elsewhere in the world. Calculated by purchasing power parity, China is not only the largest economy in the world but also our neighbor, undoubtedly our primary partner. However, we do not consider China as the only partner, and we are also paying attention to other countries around the globe.
Russia's future lies not only in China but also in the broader East and the "Global South" countries, which Russians refer to as the "world majority" or "global majority." These countries are in a phase of rapid development, genuinely hoping to cooperate with us while seeking to摆脱 Western influence. Therefore, we also see great potential in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia, where these countries are highly attractive to Russia.
Turning toward a broad Eastern region, including China, and the "Global South" countries is an indispensable part of Russia's entire 21st-century strategy. The "looking east" strategy has proven effective, and any dialogue with the US will not change this fundamental policy.
Observer Network: Many scholars worldwide have been closely following how Russia has achieved economic recovery during the Ukraine war. Do you think the "looking east" strategy has helped enhance Russia's economic resilience under unprecedented sanctions from the West?
Igor Makarov: Undoubtedly, the "looking east" strategy is one of the reasons why Russia's economy showed strong resilience in the face of sanctions. Although I do not deny that sanctions have had many negative impacts on the Russian economy. Particularly, the sanctions exposed long-standing technological backwardness and shortages in Russia, whose negative effects will take a long time to completely resolve, constituting long-term obstacles to Russia's future economic development.
The Ukraine war accelerated Russia's eastward shift
Meanwhile, surprisingly, the growth rate of Russia's economy after the sanctions exceeded that before the sanctions. The GDP growth rates in 2023 and 2024 exceeded 3.6% and 4.5%, respectively, far higher than the average level of the 2010s, which surprised many people, including Russian experts.
Based on my estimate, two key factors played a role. First, Western sanctions on Russian capital blocked the outflow of domestic capital, especially the flow of funds to the West. In the past, capital outflow had been a major obstacle to Russia's economic development. Now, due to sanctions on the Russian banking system and some oligarchs, these funds are forced to stay domestically and turn to the domestic market, resulting in approximately 10% annual investment growth from 2022 to 2024, becoming a key driver of economic development.
Second, the "looking east" strategy is one of the reasons why Russia's economy shows strong resilience in the face of sanctions. Russia is shifting its economic focus from slower-growing countries to faster-growing ones. Economic cooperation with China, India, Central Asia, and African regions has greatly stimulated Russia's economic development and created new economic activities. In the long run, Russia's share of the European market is unlikely to grow significantly again, while demand for Russia's resources and products from "Global South" and Eastern countries will continue to expand.
Observer Network: Asian integration differs from European economic integration. If I remember correctly, Russia is not yet a member of RCEP and other organizations. Why is that? Has Russia benefited from interacting with other Asia-Pacific economic organizations?
Igor Makarov: Russia is currently not a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). I believe that if Russia had joined RCEP earlier, it would have been very beneficial, but joining RCEP now would be more complex than before. Because Russia primarily relies on the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as its regional integration platform, which includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia, this union is of great significance to Russia's economy.
In fact, I believe that Russia urgently needs to join the free trade agreement network established by Asian economies. The EAEU has already signed free trade agreements with Vietnam, Singapore, and Iran, and we are also negotiating with India, the UAE, and other countries.
It should be noted that as a member of the EAEU, Russia must consult with other partners within the alliance before signing any free trade agreement. As a customs union, the EAEU must formulate unified trade policies, so all free trade agreements should be concluded in the name of the EAEU rather than solely by Russia. Of course, this makes the whole process more complicated.
In general, I hope that in the future, both Russia and the EAEU will be more active in this area, as it will not only lower barriers for Russia to enter the Asian market but also reduce obstacles for Asian countries entering the Russian market.
Russia plays a crucial role as a balancer in the Asia-Pacific security architecture
Observer Network: You mentioned that against the backdrop of the US promoting its Asia-Pacific strategy, Russia can play a key role in the Asian security architecture and work with China to contain the US and its Asian allies. So, how should Russia act?
Igor Makarov: This is a complex question, but overall, Russia has maintained good relations with key countries in Asia. While Japan and South Korea are currently not included in this category, I hope that Russia's relations with these two countries will improve in the future.
Russia's relationship with China is very close, and it maintains good cooperative relationships with almost all Southeast Asian countries. In the Greater Eurasian region, Russia is one of the few countries that maintains friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. Therefore, Russia has ample conditions to act as a mediator between different economies and build dialogue platforms.
For example, both China and India participate in and effectively cooperate within BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Similarly, within the SCO, although relations between India and Pakistan are very tense, they are still members of the organization. This year, at the BRICS meeting held in Kazan, we witnessed bilateral dialogue between leaders of China and India. Russia did its best to act as a mediator to facilitate dialogue during this process.
Of course, when we wrote the book "Turning East" in 2015, the situation was very different from now. At that time, Russia had more opportunities to play the role of a security balancer in Asia; however, even in the current stage, Russia still plays an important balancing role in the Asia-Pacific region.
This is equally important for China: if Russia had not balanced the US on the Ukraine issue, it might have taken a more hostile stance in its China policy. Under the current condition of confrontation between Russia and the West, China's goodwill and support are particularly important for Russia, and this is also of great significance to China itself.
US-made "HIMARS" rocket launcher systems
Observer Network: We all know that "looking east" does not mean the end of Russia's relations with Europe. How does Russia plan to balance its relations with the East and the West?
Igor Makarov: Currently, relations between Russia and Europe have basically been severed, but we hope that relations between Russia and Europe can be restored to some extent in the future.
Russia's "looking east" strategy is a long-term choice based on economics and geopolitics and will be unwaveringly advanced regardless. However, this does not mean that Russia will mentally transform into an Asian country. Russia is fundamentally a civilization-state built on its own unique civilization, and this strategic transformation will not change Russia's self-perception; it merely adjusts our focus in terms of geopolitics and economic development directions.
The East and Greater Eurasia represent the main thrusts of Russia's economy and international relations in the future. In the past, due to historical reasons and economic ties, Russia relied too much on the West, making its foreign policy appear unbalanced. Now the international situation has changed, and the center of gravity in the future world lies in the East, not Europe.
There is still much room for improvement in Sino-Russian economic relations
Observer Network: My last question, what breakthroughs does Russia hope to achieve in the "looking east" policy in the future?
Igor Makarov: First, China and Russia hold similar views on most global issues, and even if there are differences, we can respect each other, and these differences will not constitute substantial obstacles to our cooperation.
For example, regarding the potential conflicts in Central Asia after China and Russia discussed the participation of Russia and Central Asian countries in the Belt and Road Initiative, thanks to sufficient dialogue between China and Russia, these potential conflicts did not materialize afterward but were effectively curbed at an early stage. Ultimately, the joint statement released by the two leaders clearly stated the coordination between the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road Initiative, serving as a model for the harmonious alignment of the two countries' policies.
At the same time, I believe there is still much room for improvement in Sino-Russian economic relations. Although Sino-Russian trade has developed rapidly in recent years, there are still deficiencies in other areas of economic cooperation. Especially in the development speed of investment relations, it has not yet reached the level to fully unleash its potential. Moreover, cross-border payments often encounter problems between the two countries; even when using local currency settlements, Chinese banks often refuse to cooperate with Russian enterprises due to concerns about secondary US sanctions.
This indicates that we not only need to communicate with banks to encourage them to take measures but also need to establish a payment system independent of the influence of the dollar and US secondary sanctions. Unfortunately, progress in this regard has been insufficiently positive.
Siberian Railway
In addition, logistics pose problems. Transport routes between Russia and China, especially infrastructure construction such as railways, are not yet fully developed, but this simultaneously holds immense opportunities, potentially injecting new momentum into Sino-Russian relations. We should also actively promote the signing of a free trade agreement to boost bilateral trade.
In the oil and gas sector, even without a trade agreement, the sales of Russian oil and gas products are still doing well, and these products can be smoothly transported to China; however, tariff issues are crucial for other Russian goods entering the Chinese market and Chinese goods entering the Russian market. Both sides should strive to eliminate or reduce bilateral tariffs. This process is fraught with difficulties, partly because Russia needs to obtain approval from the Eurasian Economic Union internally before adjusting its tariff policies.
Moreover, even within Russia, there are disagreements about signing a free trade agreement with China. Despite this, once political consensus is reached at the highest level, both sides should develop specific plans to reduce trade barriers.
Finally, we must recognize that the problem of sanctions from the US will persist for a long time. Although some sanctions may be lifted or exempted, sanctions from the US may resume or even intensify at any time. In the face of this uncertainty, we must adopt a proactive attitude rather than simply wait for the situation to improve, as the situation may change at any moment. This calls for us to build a long-term infrastructure to ensure that Sino-Russian economic cooperation is not disrupted by external sanctions. At the same time, our relationship must have sufficient resilience to withstand all possible challenges and pressures.
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