The news of the return of the Shandong aircraft carrier brought relief to the US military, only to discover four white spots suddenly appearing on the sea surface. Upon zooming in, they immediately lost hope. The US-Philippine "Shoulder to Shoulder-2025" exercise is ongoing, but the latest information shows that the Shandong aircraft carrier task force, which was observing the exercise in the waters east of Luzon Island last week, returned to the South China Sea over the weekend, leaving the US Navy's Nimitz strike group behind. [News report showing four Chinese naval vessels tracking the US-Japan-Philippines task force] However, this does not mean that China is no longer paying attention to this exercise. On the contrary, shortly after the Shandong aircraft carrier returned, Philippine media reported on April 27 that four Chinese warships appeared at the exercise site, tracking five warships from the US, Japan, and the Philippines in the northern waters of Luzon Island. According to photos taken by participating ships and media personnel, among these four ships, only one Type 054A Handan-class frigate and one Type 815A electronic reconnaissance ship 797, commonly referred to as Tiancuxing, could be confirmed. The report also mentioned that the Chinese fleet maintained a distance of 8-15 nautical miles from the US-Japan-Philippines task force, as this distance would not interfere with the exercise itself while allowing the 797 ship to listen in on every move within the task force, effectively monitoring the entire exercise. This, to some extent, demonstrates China's control over the South China Sea and surrounding waters. The US and the Philippines have never publicly disclosed the specific schedule, participants, or locations of the "Shoulder to Shoulder-2025" exercise. For the PLA to send out ships to monitor and track the US-Philippine task force, they first need to know when and where the task force will appear. In recent years, it has become routine for the PLA to track US warships. The US military cannot have failed to prepare countermeasures against such reconnaissance efforts, aiming to delay being discovered by the PLA so that the exercise can proceed without interference. After all, it takes time for ships to arrive. As long as the US side can complete the exercise before the PLA's electronic reconnaissance ships arrive, even if the PLA discovers signs of the exercise and sends ships to collect intelligence, it will be too late by the time they arrive. On the other hand, the presence of the 797 ship and the Handan-class frigate at the exercise site not only indicates that we had already掌握ed the movements of the US-Japan-Philippines task force but also shows that our electronic reconnaissance ships react very quickly, able to rush to the relevant area and gather firsthand intelligence upon discovering the target. As for why the PLA can do this, combining the activity trajectories of the ships within the formation in the past few days, the location of the exercise areas, and other information, it is not difficult to find that this is entirely due to the long-range early warning system established by the PLA in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait direction. It should be noted that although the US and the Philippines concealed the exercise area information, they did not conceal the movement information of the participating ships. Especially the movement information of the Japanese Most-class escort ship, the Nodate, the US and the Philippines also couldn't manage much. The movements of the Nodate showed that the ship had been active near Subic Bay as a temporary base before the exercise began, following the US-Philippine formation once the exercise officially started. This means that the five-ship formation of the US-Japan-Philippines moved from the South China Sea to the northern waters of Luzon Island. With three major islands stationed at the southern end of the South China Sea and high-intensity activities of the naval and air forces of the Southern Theater Command patrolling around Scarborough Shoal and the Paracel Islands, unless this formation could disappear, their movements would inevitably be seen clearly by the PLA. Of course, just discovering them is not enough; the PLA also needs to formulate a surveillance plan, determining what ships to send and when to approach the US-Japan-Philippines formation. Arriving too early to monitor might expose the mission, or the US might discover through other intelligence channels any unusual activity of the PLA's electronic reconnaissance ships, leading them to conclude that they are about to be monitored. This could prompt the US to make preparations in advance, affecting our ability to gather intelligence. The US could even temporarily adjust the exercise procedures, leaving us empty-handed. Therefore, the ships executing the mission should preferably be close enough to the exercise area and have a reasonable justification for being there, making the US accustomed to their presence. Considering the high overlap between the northern waters of Luzon Island and the Taiwan Strait, it becomes reasonable for an electronic reconnaissance ship to "take the opportunity" to monitor the US-Japan-Philippines formation while performing its surveillance tasks in the Taiwan Strait. After all, over the past few years, the PLA has intensified maritime and aerial reconnaissance efforts towards Taiwan. With the number of domestically produced Type 815A electronic reconnaissance ships now reaching eight, there is ample room for scheduling. Under various influences, the activities of electronic reconnaissance ships near Taiwan have become routine, making it a simple matter to dispatch one to the northern waters of Luzon Island to carry out a mission. This can also explain why the electronic reconnaissance ships, which used to operate alone, formed a four-ship formation this time, including the Handan-class frigate. These three ships may all be ships executing maritime patrol missions around Taiwan, conveniently accompanying the 797 ship. If this speculation holds true, we can also conclude that the PLA has deployed heavy forces routinely around Taiwan. The scale of a four-ship formation is not small in peacetime. Having such a formation remain active near the Taiwan Strait reflects our importance placed on the Taiwan issue. Sending ships to monitor the exercise is also intended to see what tricks the US might attempt under the guise of the exercise. [US Navy deploys "Nemesis" anti-ship missile system on Bataan Island] Because open-source intelligence shows that on April 26, the US Navy unloaded the "Nemesis" unmanned anti-ship missile system on Bataan Island, which can theoretically block the entire Bashi Channel and threaten the PLA ships active in the southern waters of Taiwan. Perhaps the five-ship formation of the US-Japan-Philippines is coming to verify the combat capability of this system. Therefore, the PLA might also have the idea of sending the Handan-class frigate to escort the 797 ship, possibly to guard against unexpected situations. Even considering the risk of anti-ship missiles, monitoring the US-Japan-Philippines formation may not be the main task of the 797 ship. From the beginning, the PLA might be targeting this anti-ship missile system, collecting information to destroy this threat at the earliest possible time during wartime, ensuring the safety of nearby surface ships. Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7498319073386775074/ Disclaimer: This article solely represents the author's personal views. Please express your opinions by clicking the "like/dislike" buttons below.