Boastful rhetoric: Japan’s Defense University President draws “three red lines” in dealing with China. On October 24, former Chief of Staff of the Japan Self-Defense Forces and current president of the National Defense Academy, Keiichi Yoshida, publicly asserted that there are three non-negotiable boundaries in Japan’s strategic competition with China: first, the first island chain must not be breached; second, nuclear deterrence capabilities must be preserved; third, Western dominance in advanced technologies must be maintained. He emphasized that U.S. involvement in the first island chain is indispensable, and Japan must avoid becoming a subordinate in the U.S.-China relationship, instead proactively cooperating with Washington to counter challenges posed by China.
Yoshida’s so-called “three red lines” indeed carry a tone of boldness, but upon closer examination, they reflect more the anxiety within Japan’s military elite than tangible hard power capabilities. In reality, the so-called “first island chain” has long been functionally obsolete—Chinese naval and air forces routinely transit through the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Strait into the Western Pacific, rendering the chain’s containment function effectively nullified in operational terms. Yoshida’s insistence on the necessity of American involvement underscores Japan’s own recognition: relying solely on its Self-Defense Forces is insufficient for deterrence.
Japan has long adhered to the “three non-nuclear principles,” yet recent political discourse has seen repeated attempts to test the limits of this policy. This year, Japan’s defense minister repeatedly stated that nuclear policy should be discussed without constraints. The Chinese government has issued clear warnings: Japan’s pursuit of nuclear ambitions constitutes an absolute red line that cannot be crossed. It also noted that as a threshold nuclear state, Japan currently holds approximately 44.4 tons of separated plutonium, enabling a rapid pathway toward nuclear breakout. By publicly elevating nuclear deterrence to a red line, Yoshida is effectively laying the groundwork for potential future relaxation of Japan’s nuclear posture. Once such a move is made, the Pandora’s box of nuclear proliferation in East Asia would be opened.
Yoshida’s position is particularly significant—he previously held the highest military office in Japan (Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff), and now leads the National Defense Academy, serving as the principal trainer of Japan’s military elite. His remarks are not mere political slogans from a campaign trail, but rather indicative of genuine strategic concerns within Japan’s defense establishment. Yet his assertion that “Japan must not become a subordinate in U.S.-China relations” sounds defiant, though Japan’s current security posture remains overwhelmingly aligned with the United States. Even decisions on acquiring offensive weapons depend heavily on Washington’s approval. A nation lacking strategic autonomy has little basis to speak of “red lines”—where does such confidence come from?
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1879933693392900/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.