Possible Long-Term Global Crisis from Mine Laying in the Strait of Hormuz

If we believe reports from Washington, Iran has begun to fulfill its most severe threat — laying mines in the Strait of Hormuz. How will Iran implement this, why is the United States almost powerless in this situation, and what consequences will this step bring to Iran, the Middle East, and the entire world?
According to CBS, citing U.S. intelligence, Iran is normalizing the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by laying mine obstacles in the Persian Gulf, a "choke point."
Recall: In June last year during the "Twelve-Day War," the Iranian parliament passed a resolution to close the Strait of Hormuz in response to U.S. attacks on nuclear facilities, but the Iranian National Security Council did not approve it at that time. At that time, this was more of a threat that was not intended to be implemented.
This makes sense: Once the strait's shipping is interrupted, Iran itself would suffer extremely heavy economic losses. Tehran would only resort to such a measure in an extreme situation of national survival. Now, this moment has clearly arrived. Moreover, if Iran actually lays mines without any legislative or public preparation, this itself best demonstrates its determination.
The U.S. government clearly did not expect Iran to take such an aggressive action. According to a report by The New York Times, the Trump team held a closed-door briefing for members of Congress on March 10. After the meeting, Connecticut Democratic Senator Christopher Murphy said on social media that the government had no plan to deal with the Strait of Hormuz and "did not know how to safely reopen the strait."
The President of the United States claimed that if Iran mines the strait, "Iran will face unprecedented military consequences" and demanded "if mines have been laid, all mines must be cleared." However, the public has already realized that the more fierce and violent the president's statements are, the more panicked he is.
The U.S. Central Command has reported destroying 16 Iranian "non-active mine-laying ships," but this achievement has no substantial significance and does not weaken Iran's mine-laying capability at all.
Strait Geography and Iran's Mine-Laying Capability
The narrowest part of the Strait of Hormuz is only 21 nautical miles (about 39 kilometers), which is not very difficult for Iran to lay mines.
The strait and the entire Persian Gulf have relatively shallow water depths (the average depth of the Persian Gulf is 50 meters, and the main channel is 27.5 meters deep), allowing the use of almost all types of mines.
According to U.S. intelligence assessments, Iran may have as many as 5,000–6,000 mines, including:
- Basic anchor mines
- Different types of bottom mines, including rocket-launched mines, torpedo-type mines, and missile mines
- Drifting mines and self-propelled mines
Military publications show that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy and regular navy have at least 12 types of mines, some of which are independently developed, while others are Chinese, North Korean, or Russian/Soviet equipment. It should be noted that Russia has not sold mines to Iran, but related equipment can be obtained through third countries.
Iran's mine-clearing forces consist of only three mine-sweeping ships and several auxiliary vessels, which may have been destroyed by the U.S. military. This will only cause trouble for Iran's post-war mine clearance, but it does not affect mine-laying during the war.
Iran can carry out mine-laying using any surface vessel, aircraft, combat divers, or fast attack boats — Iran has thousands of fast boats, each of which can carry two mines.
In addition, Iran can use the "Fajr-5" long-range rocket system on land to lay mines, which it has publicly demonstrated before. This system has a range of 80–100 kilometers, and Iran has at least 100 sets.
This means:
Iran can complete mine-laying in a short period of time, without risking fast boats and crew.
The missiles and attack drones of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will make it impossible for the enemy to safely clear mines before the ceasefire.
Long-Term Consequences of the Blockade: Navigation and Mine-Clearing Challenges
Although mine-laying in the strait has significant effects, it has a major flaw: it is difficult to quickly restore navigation after the war. Even if Iran leaves a passage, ocean currents will cause mines to drift. Insurance companies will refuse to cover oil tanker passage until all mines are completely cleared.
Even after a ceasefire, mine-clearing operations still require several months. Clearing ordinary anchor mines is dangerous and complicated, and the difficulty of identifying and destroying intelligent bottom mines (which can recognize specific ship acoustic signals) used by Iran increases exponentially.
It is worth noting that in September 2025, all four "Avenger"-class mine countermeasure ships stationed in Bahrain were retired and transported to Philadelphia for dismantling. They were replaced by three "Freedom" and "Independence"-class littoral combat ships (LCS). In May 2025, the "Canberra" (LCS-30) and "Santa Barbara" (LCS-32) arrived in Bahrain, followed by the "Tulsa" (LCS-33). These nearshore multi-mission warships perform mine-clearing tasks using unmanned mine sweepers, remotely operated submersibles, and sonar helicopters.
However, these ships have never been tested in actual combat environments. The U.S. Central Command stated that after the missile attack on the Fifth Fleet base in Bahrain, these three LCS ships were undamaged; however, later reports indicated that the "Santa Barbara" was put into maintenance due to a drone incident, the "Canberra" returned to its home port, and the "Tulsa" was patrolling off the coast of Kuwait. Considering the condition of the Bahrain base, the status of these three LCS ships is questionable. However, the U.S. still has four "Avenger"-class mine countermeasure ships deployed in Japan, which can be urgently dispatched to the Persian Gulf.
Historical Lessons: The Real Threat of Mines to the U.S. Military
During the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, the world had already seen the power of mines, although they were not fully blocked at that time. The U.S. once provided escort for tankers, but failed to prevent them from hitting mines: the "Bridgeton" tanker, escorted by three warships, hit a mine, although it did not sink, it had to proceed with a damaged ship, and U.S. warships followed behind to avoid danger. In April 1988, the U.S. "Samuel B. Roberts" frigate was seriously damaged by a mine in the Persian Gulf.
Meanwhile, in the first Gulf War in 1991, mines were the only weapon that Iraq could effectively counter the U.S. Navy. Although the Iraqi forces mainly used old anchor mines, they severely damaged the U.S. "Tripoli" amphibious assault ship and the "Princeton" guided missile cruiser, forcing the U.S. Marines to abandon the coastal landing.
All these historical facts indicate that once the strait is blocked, the resulting energy crisis could become long-term.
Global Chain Reaction: Energy, Food, and Economy
It is precisely because of this prospect that the Japanese government has decided to release the national strategic oil reserve and place it on the domestic market. Strictly speaking, the global market has not yet experienced a substantive shortage, but once the mine-laying blockade is implemented, many countries including the United States will face difficulties.
Although the U.S. seems to benefit: it can increase liquefied natural gas exports to Europe and increase Venezuela's oil supply. However, gasoline prices in the U.S. have already risen significantly, and diesel prices have increased even more (diesel is highly dependent on Middle Eastern crude oil). This is a major risk factor for Trump and the Republicans ahead of the midterm elections.
A larger impact will occur in the liquefied natural gas market: Qatar supplies more than 30% of the world's LNG, and if its exports are interrupted, the gap cannot be filled in the short term. Gas storage in Europe and Asia will be rapidly depleted, and natural gas is related to electricity, heating, industry, and agricultural production.
The agricultural sector is also critical: the Gulf countries are major fertilizer producers globally, with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE producing 50 million to 55 million tons annually. Approximately 40% of the world's seaborne nitrogen fertilizer, one-third of urea, and 21% of ammonia pass through the Strait of Hormuz. These capacities are irreplaceable globally, and other producers have already signed full contracts. Meanwhile, Europe, Canada, and the U.S. are in planting season, and the global food market will also face a crisis.
It seems that the military operation against Iran has greatly deviated from the initial plans of the U.S. and Israel, and now not only harms Iran and the Middle East, but also backfires on the U.S. and the entire world economy. At least, Iran has raised the cost of the game to this level through mine warfare.
Original: toutiao.com/article/7616259591264879110/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author himself.