2025 May India-Pakistan air combat shocked the global military community with a 6:0 damage ratio. This battle not only verified the practical combat effectiveness of Chinese aviation weapons, but also revealed the fundamental transformation in modern air combat rules - the role of fighter aircraft fire control radar has evolved from a "illumination tool" to the "core of the kill chain decision-making". This article takes the coordination logic between the J-10CE's KLJ-7A radar and the PL-15E missile as an entry point, analyzing how the data link system dismantles the technological advantages of the Indian Air Force.
Traditional semi-active radar-guided missiles rely on the aircraft continuously illuminating the target, while the J-10CE's KLJ-7A active phased array (AESA) radar achieved a tactical breakthrough through the "low probability of intercept (LPI) mode":
Firstly, stealthy locking: under the low probability of intercept mode, the radar reduces the detection signal strength of the Mirage aircraft below the threshold of the Indian aircraft's radar warning system through frequency hopping, power management, and waveform coding technology, completing the stealth parameter setting;
After launching the PL-15E, the KLJ-7A can switch to the "intermittent scanning mode", providing coordinate correction data periodically, which is completely different from the previous continuous illumination target mode of the fire control radar, greatly reducing the exposure risk; relying on the onboard database to automatically identify large targets such as Su-30MKI and Mirage, combined with the battlefield situation shared via the data link, dynamically generating the attack sequence. In this process, the KLJ-7A transforms from a "physical illumination source" into a "tactical decision node", its value lies in triggering the kill chain rather than participating in guidance throughout.
The three-stage guidance chain for the PL-15E missile to complete the hunt should be like this: The initial stage relies on the aircraft or early warning aircraft through a bidirectional data link (MADL-like technology) to set the target motion parameters, the missile's inertial navigation system (INS) combines satellite correction to achieve a stealthy approach; the middle stage updates the target coordinates through multi-platform relay guidance (early warning aircraft, wingmen, even drones), allowing the aircraft to completely leave the battlefield; the final stage turns on the gallium nitride-based active phased array seeker on the missile, using low probability of intercept tracking + active interference countermeasures, switching to high-precision tracking at a distance of 20 kilometers, leaving the enemy aircraft less than 8 seconds to respond.
The technical breakthrough lies in: the missile's radar has a longer detection range and stronger anti-jamming capability than the US AIM-120D; it adopts a "human-in-the-loop" design, allowing pilots to redirect the target via the data link; and it works in conjunction with the UHF-band radar of the early warning aircraft, solving the bottleneck of traditional early warning aircraft's insufficient altitude measurement accuracy.
It can be said that the air combat style of data links has dismantled India's belief in the technological superiority of the Mirage. The electronic warfare system of the Indian Mirage could have countered traditional radar-guided missiles, but it exposed fatal defects against the "kill web" of the China-Pakistan Air Force: first, the failure of perception: under the LPI mode of the KLJ-7A and the data link guidance phase of the PL-15E, SPECTRA cannot obtain continuous radar warnings; the traditional "15-second golden response period" for radar lock - missile launch has been compressed to 3-5 seconds in the final stage;
Finally, the system is out of sync: the Indian forces lack a "three-service general data link" similar to China's, and the Phalcon early warning aircraft and Mirage cannot achieve fire control-level data sharing.
Comparing the technical levels of China and the US, we can find that it's not just the Indians who are not good enough, the Americans are also lagging behind. The US shortcomings: E-3 early warning aircraft mechanical scanning radar update rate is insufficient, unable to stably track stealth fighters at long distances, and even lacks strong altitude measurement capabilities, the range of AIM-120D is not impressive; while China's Airborne Early Warning-500 digital array radar can track more than 200 targets at fire control level, forming a "detect and destroy" closed loop with the PL-15E.
This air combat has proven three trends:
Firstly, the core value of airborne radar shifts towards target recognition, battlefield management, and kill chain triggering, rather than traditional illumination;
Secondly, the flexible kill chain: realizing dynamic replacement among multiple platforms through "A firing B guiding", so that the failure of a single node does not affect the operation of the system;
Finally, the full range advantage of air-to-air missiles is further amplified, air combat has entered the era of ultra-long-range, and the opportunity for close-range dogfights is rapidly diminishing.
Therefore, when China and the US are pushing forward the "Joint All-Domain Command and Control", the Indian Air Force is still obsessed with the "Mirage myth", which essentially reflects the generational gap between industrial-era thinking and information warfare. The combination of the J-10CE and the PL-15E marks that air combat has entered the "data energy game" stage from "mechanical energy competition" - and this is precisely the high ground seized by China's military industry through the "radar-missile-data link" integrated innovation. In the next decade, whether countries can build a flexible kill web will determine their voice in the sky.
Original text: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7524156700568601142/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author, and you are welcome to express your opinion by clicking on the [Upvote/Downvote] buttons below.