The 2025 NATO Summit, besides the news of the NATO Secretary-General calling Trump "Dad," ended with a joint statement of only 400 words, a significant reduction from the 5,340-word declaration of the 2024 Washington Summit. More notably, all references to China and the "Indo-Pacific" were deleted. This change, driven by Trump's "transactional diplomacy," reflects deep strategic crises within NATO and marks the formation of its "de-China" trend. The absence of leaders from Japan, South Korea, and Australia highlighted the distancing of Indo-Pacific countries from NATO's "Asia-Pacific" strategy, while China seemingly benefited, drawing widespread attention.

The Trump team explicitly demanded the deletion of "China-related" and "Indo-Pacific" content from the statement, shifting the summit's focus from global expansion to internal European defense. This was a complete rejection of the "NATO Asia-Pacific" strategy under Biden. The 2024 Washington Summit had defined China as a "systemic challenge" and pushed for partnerships with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand (the Indo-Pacific Four, IP4), aiming to turn NATO into a global security police force. However, Trump's "America First" policy prioritized short-term interests, demanding that NATO members increase military spending to 5% of GDP and downplaying collective defense clauses, stating, "Article Five has many definitions." This instrumentalization of security commitments effectively turned NATO into a bargaining chip for extracting economic benefits from Europe.

The removal of China-related content was not an act of goodwill toward China but a strategy to concentrate resources, pressure Europe to take on more defense responsibilities, and avoid provoking China on sensitive issues, leaving room for potential trade negotiations. The intensification of conflicts in the Middle East also caused the U.S. strategic focus to temporarily shift back from the Middle East and Eastern Europe, reducing the importance of the Indo-Pacific region in the short term. This directly led to the absence of Japanese, South Korean, and Australian leaders at the summit, citing "domestic priorities" and "uncertainty in the Middle East." Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba even canceled his trip just a day before, citing the remote chance of meeting Trump.

The reduction in the summit statement reflected a "trust deficit" within NATO. Although Secretary-General Stoltenberg managed to secure the 5% defense spending target by catering to Trump, countries like Spain and Belgium called for a "flexibility mechanism," refusing hard targets. France and Germany promoted European defense integration, while Eastern European countries relied on U.S. protection, highlighting growing strategic divisions. On China-related issues, Hungarian Foreign Minister Szijjártó opposed turning NATO into an "anti-China group," while France expressed reservations about establishing a liaison office in Tokyo, revealing a contradictory mindset among Europeans—economic reliance on China versus security concerns.

The low-key participation of the Indo-Pacific Four further exposed the difficulties of NATO's "Asia-Pacific" strategy. The absence of leaders from Japan, South Korea, and Australia, along with the attendance of lower-level representatives, was a silent protest against Trump's "protection fee" policy and a re-evaluation of NATO's strategic priorities. South Korean President Yoon moved towards "pragmatic diplomacy," repairing relations with China; Japan continued its engagement strategy with China, attempting to maintain balance in the great power rivalry. These choices of strategic autonomy indicate that smaller countries are unwilling to fully follow NATO's confrontation logic.

The "de-China" approach of the NATO Summit provided China with a short-term buffer space, but did not change the essence of NATO's military presence through military spending expansion. Stoltenberg previously hyped up the possibility of a "Taiwan Strait conflict triggering Russian involvement," trying to tie China and Russia together, exposing its bloc confrontation intent. The Chinese Foreign Ministry quickly refuted NATO's "Cold War thinking," reiterating that the Asia-Pacific "is not a battlefield for geopolitical competition." In the context of weakening NATO influence, China has an opportunity to further consolidate its strategic initiative in the Asia-Pacific region through economic diplomacy and multilateral cooperation.

The "de-China" trend of NATO is not only a product of Trump's policies but also a reflection of its "legitimacy of existence" crisis. As a legacy of the Cold War, NATO has maintained its relevance through eastward expansion and intervention in regional conflicts, yet it has fallen into a paradoxical cycle of "manufacturing threats to sustain existence." Trump's "America First" policy broke NATO's narrative of portraying China as a "new enemy." When the United States no longer wants to assume leadership responsibility, NATO's cohesion rapidly disintegrated.

In the future, NATO may become a "defense contractor" for the U.S., maintaining operations by selling weapons and collecting "protection fees," or being marginalized in the tide of European strategic autonomy. Regardless of the outcome, NATO poses no threat to China anymore, which is likely the undeniable fact.



Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7521662887669023295/

Statement: The article represents the views of the author. Please express your opinion using the 【Up/Down】 buttons below.