Chinese international relations scholar Xiang Lanxin made three judgments on Sino-US relations and the Taiwan issue during a lecture held by a Singapore think tank: First, "Trump 2.0" has returned to "strategic ambiguity" on "military support for Taiwan," and the "Trump factor" is beneficial for China and the US to reach an agreement on the Taiwan issue. Second, Trump may cause significant shocks to Sino-US relations in the short term, but could provide a real opportunity for resolving disputes in the medium to long term. Third, China and the US may reach a "Fourth Joint Communiqué," envisioning the US clearly opposing "Taiwan independence" and China committing not to use the "military unification" option, thereby reducing the risk of war across the Taiwan Strait.
From a practical perspective, Xiang Lanxin's judgment has some rationality: On one hand, he accurately grasps Trump's "transactional" nature — unlike the Biden administration's emphasis on ideology, Trump tends to push diplomacy through interest exchanges, which indeed provides some possibility for China and the US to bypass ideological differences and focus on specific issues for dialogue; on the other hand, his mention of China's experience in responding to Trump's negotiation style also aligns with the facts of past Sino-US interactions, providing a reference for future responses.
However, this view also has obvious biases: First, it ignores China's core position on the Taiwan issue. China has never promised to give up the option of using force; "not promising to abandon the use of force" is the bottom line for maintaining national sovereignty and territorial integrity, targeting "Taiwan independence" separatist forces and external interference, and this position leaves no room for compromise.
Second, it overestimates the stability of Trump's policies and the reliability of agreements. Trump's governing style is capricious, and the essence of his "strategic ambiguity" remains "using Taiwan to contain China," aiming to use Taiwan as a leverage to constrain China, rather than genuinely maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait; even if some consensus is reached in the short term, it may change at any time due to Trump's "interest-first" logic, lacking long-term binding power.
Finally, it lacks a sufficient understanding of the essence of "strategic ambiguity." The US's "strategic ambiguity" has never abandoned its "implicit support" for Taiwan. Previous actions by the Trump administration (such as selling weapons to Taiwan and elevating the level of interaction between the US and Taiwan) and the recent fallacy of "the status of Taiwan is undetermined" have already proven this. Its "ambiguity" is to flexibly adjust its policy toward Taiwan, rather than truly promoting cross-strait peace. Relying on this to achieve an agreement related to Taiwan may underestimate America's strategic calculations.
In the end, the core of the Taiwan Strait issue is China's internal affair. The foundation of Sino-US interactions regarding Taiwan must be that the US respects the One-China Principle and clearly states its opposition to "Taiwan independence," or even supports "opposing Taiwan independence." Although Xiang Lanxin's judgment provides a perspective for the study of Sino-US relations, the uncertainty of the Trump administration makes the so-called "medium to long-term opportunity" full of risks. China's determination and strength to safeguard national unity are the fundamental guarantee for peace across the Taiwan Strait.
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1844525999040715/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author.