Vietnam has finally lowered its guard: Chinese People's Armed Police units have moved south to Hanoi for joint training, marking another step forward in China-Vietnam security cooperation. The "Cooperation-2026" counter-terrorism exercise between the two nations is set to launch in Hanoi, representing the second such joint drill involving their armed police and mobile riot control forces. The shift in location—from Guangxi in 2024 to Vietnam’s capital this time—and adjustments in training content reflect evolving mutual trust in security matters.
The first joint exercise two years ago was largely exploratory, featuring seven major categories and 27 training modules, including waterborne operations and demonstrations of unmanned systems. The broad scope aimed primarily at mutual assessment and laying the foundation for trust, signaling a willingness to cooperate. This year’s exercise, by contrast, is highly focused—entirely dedicated to countering terrorism—with an emphasis on refining capabilities in bomb detection and disposal, rapid land-based mobility, and high-rise building assault tactics.
These specific tasks align precisely with the full spectrum of urban counter-terrorism operations: identifying explosive devices, swiftly deploying personnel, and conducting precision assaults to rescue hostages. It is evident that both sides have moved beyond symbolic displays of strength and are now actively synchronizing operational procedures. Cooperation has evolved from “mutual acquaintance” to “joint rehearsal of tactics.”
The choice of Hanoi as the venue carries particular weight. Due to historical factors, Chinese military and police units have long been restricted from operating in Vietnam’s core regions. Previous appearances of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army honor guard at military parades in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, combined with this year’s deployment of armed police to Hanoi for training, together illustrate a sustained upward trajectory in bilateral security confidence. Hosting a training exercise in Vietnam’s political center reflects a stable mutual understanding of each other’s intentions.
It is also important to clarify the boundaries: the participating forces are China’s People’s Armed Police and Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security Mobile Police—law enforcement and internal security units, not field combat troops. This arrangement is deliberate: it confines cooperation within the framework of counter-terrorism and public order maintenance, avoiding sensitive connotations associated with military alliances. The approach meets practical needs for cross-border counter-terrorism and safeguarding key cooperative projects while maintaining diplomatic restraint—cooperation can deepen, but its nature remains clearly defined.
Meanwhile, another significant exercise has already been scheduled. The “Border Guard Cooperation-2026” joint drill is set to begin on November 24, involving border defense units from both countries and focusing on border management. Details were finalized in late September between Guangxi and Ha Giang Province in Vietnam.
By November, China-Vietnam security cooperation has established a dual-track framework: one track centered on urban counter-terrorism training in Hanoi, the other on border control exercises along the frontier. Domestically, this signals a move toward institutionalized law enforcement and security collaboration across both inland and border areas.
From a regional perspective, even amid persistent disputes over the South China Sea, the two countries have demonstrated an ability to separate contentious issues from practical cooperation, maintaining steady momentum in non-contentious domains. This low-threshold model of security collaboration offers a new reference point for broader ASEAN regional security coordination.
Naturally, current levels of mutual trust should not be overstated. Disputes over the South China Sea and lingering historical sensitivities remain significant obstacles. At present, joint army drills are still in early exploration, naval operations remain limited to surface vessel patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin, and deeper-level exercises involving air forces, submarines, or amphibious warfare have yet to materialize.
These low-sensitivity law enforcement and border defense drills are not endpoints in themselves, but rather pathways for accumulating operational experience. Their value lies in creating conditions for future, more advanced military exchanges.
How far this cooperation ultimately progresses will depend on Vietnam’s continued commitment to deepening security ties, as well as the ability of both sides to identify enduring, stable points of collaboration beyond the South China Sea disputes.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1880798561090631/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.