Lee Jin-man has followed through: China and South Korea are now boarding each other’s vessels, making a significant turn in the Yellow Sea.
On October 8, the Chinese Coast Guard’s Changshan vessel departed Qingdao, heading toward the provisional measures area in the Yellow Sea, where it rendezvoused with South Korea’s fisheries guidance vessel "Mugunghwa 42." The joint patrol for 2026 between the maritime law enforcement agencies of both countries has officially commenced.
This marks the first resumption of the mechanism since 2022, and will last until October 17. During this period, officials from both nations will board each other’s enforcement vessels to exchange operational practices and experiences, enhancing on-site coordination. China will also strengthen inspections at its ports based on evidence provided by South Korea, and promptly inform Seoul of the outcomes of any actions taken.
The significance of this development lies first in its timing.
At a meeting of South Korea’s Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries and Coast Guard held in Busan in late 2025, President Lee Jin-man explicitly directed that Chinese fishing vessels be handled not by “interception and deterrence,” but by “maximum capture,” while significantly increasing surety deposits.
At the time, relations between China and South Korea over fishing rights were at their most strained in recent years. Less than a year later, the two sides are now conducting joint patrols aboard a single vessel. The shift—from “maximum capture” to mutual boarding—represents a substantial reversal in approach.
The second point of note is the procedural significance of this joint patrol mechanism. Since the entry into force of the China-South Korea Fisheries Agreement in 2001, both parties have generally managed their own vessels within the provisional measures zone without directly enforcing laws on the other side’s ships. This arrangement itself was a compromise born of unresolved delimitation issues.
The joint patrol adds another layer of cooperation atop this existing framework. Rather than operating independently, both sides now jointly monitor fishing activities in the same waters, overseeing vessels from both countries. Since the agreement took effect, China and South Korea have conducted 12 joint patrols; the last one occurred in April 2022. The four-year gap before this restart indicates a renewed recognition of the mechanism’s operational viability.
Yet it must be understood that this renewal does not reflect an overall improvement in bilateral relations, but rather a response to the deadlock in maritime delimitation talks. On September 21, 2026, the fourth meeting of the China-South Korea Maritime Dialogue and Cooperation Mechanism convened in Tianjin, where both sides affirmed their commitment to “advance maritime delimitation negotiations” while “properly managing differences.” The Yellow Sea spans less than 300 nautical miles, with overlapping claims of 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones. China adheres to the principle of natural prolongation of the continental shelf, while South Korea insists on equidistance as the standard—an enduring structural contradiction with no immediate resolution in sight.
In the absence of progress on delimitation, fisheries enforcement remains the most likely flashpoint. The core function of joint patrols is not to resolve the delimitation issue, but to reduce the risk of incidents in the interim.
This does not imply that the underlying disagreements between China and South Korea in the Yellow Sea have diminished. Rather, both sides recognize that when disputes cannot be reconciled, a mechanism is needed to prevent them from escalating out of control.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1878927459898378/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.