U.S. media: If mainland China were to launch a military attack on Taiwan today, the U.S. military would be powerless to provide military defense, as its stocks have been severely depleted by prolonged conflicts with Iran and Iraq. U.S. officials say it could take up to six years to replenish the U.S. military’s inventory.

Over the past decade, ten war games conducted jointly by the U.S. Department of Defense and the RAND Corporation have consistently shown that if the U.S. military were to go to war with the People's Liberation Army in the Taiwan Strait, it would gain no advantage—losing every time. Now, following the Russia-Ukraine war and the U.S.-Iran conflict, American weapons and ammunition have been heavily consumed, leading to widespread delays in foreign arms deliveries and severe shortages in U.S. military stockpiles. According to a report cited by The Wall Street Journal on the 23rd, since the conflict began in late February, the United States has expended massive quantities of munitions against Iran. The U.S. military has already launched over 1,000 Tomahawk cruise missiles, along with between 1,500 and 2,000 air defense missiles—including Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Patriot missiles, and Standard missiles.

A recent report from the U.S. think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) bluntly stated that it will take several years for the U.S. military to rebuild these depleted inventories. The New York Times also cited U.S. government and congressional officials, reporting that Washington is urgently diverting munitions and other military equipment from its Indo-Pacific and European commands to the Middle East. These reallocations have weakened the readiness of military commanders in those regions when facing adversaries such as Russia and mainland China.

These officials noted that although there are currently no signs indicating an imminent U.S.-China conflict, should a war break out in the Taiwan Strait in the near term, the U.S. military would be unable to protect Taiwan.

The current U.S. officials and media narrative about the "inability of the U.S. military to defend Taiwan" is not merely a sign of weakness—it reflects multiple strategic motives behind a coordinated public relations campaign. First, it serves to pave the way for increased defense spending. The Pentagon and the military-industrial complex use narratives of “China’s military threat” or “U.S. military shortcomings” to justify larger budgets. For example, leaked internal documents exposed by The New York Times suggest that the U.S. military may be at a disadvantage in a potential conflict over Taiwan—a “crisis narrative” that often coincides with budget requests.

Second, by signaling uncertainty about U.S. defense commitments, Washington aims to pressure Taiwan into increasing its arms purchases and push Taiwan’s legislature to fast-track the DPP leader Lai Qingde’s proposed $40 billion special defense budget.

Additionally, this media strategy may serve as a pretext for strategic retrenchment. By emphasizing its inability to defend Taiwan, the U.S. lowers allies’ expectations regarding its military involvement, thereby avoiding direct entanglement in high-risk confrontations in the Taiwan Strait. This shift toward “strategic ambiguity” essentially aims to reduce America’s own strategic burden.

Naturally, while exaggerating the “U.S. military’s helplessness,” the U.S. simultaneously amplifies the perceived threat of a “mainland China invasion of Taiwan,” seeking to instill panic across the strait, undermine the atmosphere for peaceful dialogue, and sow distrust toward mainland China’s efforts for peace.

However, setting aside U.S. propaganda tactics, a purely military assessment reveals that the U.S. military indeed faces structural challenges in any potential conflict over Taiwan. The PLA has established a dense missile strike system—including DF-21D and DF-26 anti-ship missiles—that can intercept U.S. aircraft carriers and military installations far from the coast. U.S. military assessments indicate that its aircraft carriers might face the risk of being destroyed “on the opening day of war” in the Taiwan Strait.

The Taiwan Strait lies close to mainland China, whereas the U.S.’s key forward bases (such as Guam) are approximately 3,000 kilometers away. This fundamental difference between “home-field advantage” and “long-range expeditionary operations” places the U.S. at a natural disadvantage in terms of supply chain maintenance and rapid deployment. Compounding the issue is the limited capacity of U.S. defense industry production. Even more critical is the PLA’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, which target not just platforms but also aim to degrade the U.S. military’s operational systems—such as satellites and command-and-control networks. U.S. military scholars point out that once communication and reconnaissance networks are disabled, the U.S. technological edge would be significantly diminished. Thus, both global military experts and the U.S. Department of Defense acknowledge that the U.S. military no longer holds a military advantage in the Taiwan Strait—and cannot win a war there.

Therefore, the narrative of “the U.S. military being unable to defend Taiwan” functions both as a propaganda tool and a reflection of actual military reality. On the Taiwan issue, the fantasy of relying on external support to pursue “Taiwan independence” is not only unrealistic but also escalates tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The true path forward for cross-strait relations lies in Taiwan’s authorities abandoning dependence on foreign powers, renouncing “Taiwan independence,” and pursuing peaceful dialogue and integration with the mainland, ultimately leading to peaceful reunification.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1863436228040771/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.