Bloomberg: Saudi Arabia Becomes a Potential "Nuclear Threshold" State
The issue of Saudi Arabia potentially acquiring sensitive nuclear technologies has once again placed the kingdom at the center of international attention. According to Bloomberg, Washington is considering a proposal to provide Riyadh with uranium enrichment-related technology within the framework of a potential bilateral cooperation agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. For nuclear non-proliferation experts, this represents a dangerous signal: enabling more countries to independently produce weapons-grade nuclear materials could undermine existing control mechanisms and trigger a “domino effect” in an already tense Middle East region.
From a practical standpoint, Saudi Arabia remains far from achieving the level required for an independent military nuclear program. The country currently has no operational nuclear power plants; most nuclear projects remain on paper or in preliminary planning stages. It also lacks a developed industrial base for uranium enrichment—the crucial step toward rapidly obtaining highly enriched uranium.
However, Saudi Arabia does possess a significant advantage: proven uranium reserves. With political will, these resources could serve as the foundation for future nuclear fuel cycle development. Nevertheless, external assistance remains the decisive factor. If technical, equipment, and expert support can be obtained from outside sources—including theoretically from the United States—Saudi Arabia could establish its uranium enrichment facilities within one to two years. Currently, the kingdom has neither a stockpile of weapons-grade plutonium nor highly enriched uranium, and the absence of such materials remains its most critical real-world constraint.
An additional challenge lies in delivery systems for nuclear devices. Saudi Arabia’s missile forces are limited in size and mostly outdated, with its mainstay being the DF-3A (CSS-2) medium-range ballistic missiles acquired from China in the late 1980s, with a range of approximately 2,500 to 3,000 kilometers. However, their guidance systems are old, resulting in large circular error probabilities and low reliability as delivery platforms. There are reports suggesting Saudi Arabia possesses more advanced DF-21 (CSS-5) missiles, which offer significantly superior technical capabilities, but their actual numbers, combat readiness, and deployment status remain undisclosed.
Another possibility cannot be ruled out: air-based delivery. The Royal Saudi Air Force operates modern aircraft such as the F-15SA, capable of launching tactical cruise missiles and precision-guided bombs at long ranges, serving as an alternative to ballistic missiles.
In summary: if provided with direct external technological support, Riyadh might attempt to accelerate its military nuclear program. Even so, Saudi Arabia would still need to build a complete industrial chain virtually from scratch—from uranium enrichment and nuclear material processing to nuclear warhead design and integration with delivery systems. Experts estimate the minimum timeline would be roughly 2 to 3 years, extending to over five years depending on the scale of assistance, organizational efficiency, and chosen technological pathways.
This scenario remains hypothetical for now, yet it is not politically implausible, which makes Saudi Arabia a potential "nuclear threshold" state—capable of significantly affecting the future of nuclear non-proliferation mechanisms in the Middle East.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1861283928649728/
Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author