Very Expensive and Fragile: Senior U.S. Military Officials Concerned About the Security of Their Strategic Forces
June 8, 2025
1:15 PM
Author: Viacheslav Mikhailov
In July 2024, the U.S. Air Force B-2 "Spirit" strategic bomber was approved for takeoff from Whiteman Air Base in Missouri.
This week's Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian strategic bombers have prompted senior military officials and analysts in the United States to reassess the threats facing their "valuable aircraft" at home and abroad. CNN reported on June 6 that this situation has caused strong concerns.
"This is a shocking moment," said General David Herwig, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, last Tuesday at a meeting in Washington. He stated that the U.S. is vulnerable to such attacks.
"Even within our own country there are no safe havens, especially considering that our domestic bases are essentially undefended," said Thomas Shugart, a senior researcher at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), in an interview with CNN. By "undefended," Shugart referred to the lack of sufficient shelters to house U.S. military aircraft, and the insufficient strength of these shelters to protect aircraft from aerial attacks, whether by drones or cruise/ballistic missiles.
The Ukrainian military claims that in last Sunday's attack, 41 Russian aircraft were hit, including Tu-95 strategic bombers and A-50 long-range radar detection aircraft. Only a small portion of the damaged aircraft suffered fatal damage.
According to satellite images obtained by Western observers, about 12 aircraft were almost destroyed or severely damaged.
Ukrainian sources report that in the operation known as the "Spider Web," secret drones were transported into Russian territory hidden inside wooden mobile homes inside trucks and positioned near four Russian air force bases targeted. Russian aircraft were parked on the runways of the bases, similar to how U.S. military aircraft are parked domestically and internationally.
"We are quite vulnerable," confirmed retired U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal earlier this week during an interview with CNN. "We have many expensive (military) assets that are extremely costly." For comparison, the cost of a single B-2 "Spirit" strategic bomber is $2 billion, and the U.S. Air Force only has 20 of them.
Shugart is a co-author of a report released in January by the Hudson Institute, which emphasized the threats facing U.S. military targets in the event of direct military conflict between China and the U.S.
The analysis report states: "The striking power of the relevant country's military includes aircraft, ground missile systems, surface and underwater vessels, as well as special forces, capable of attacking U.S. aircraft and their support systems at global airports, including those within the U.S. mainland." The report authors warn through military exercise simulations and analyses that "the vast majority of U.S. aircraft losses may occur on the ground at airfields, and these losses could be catastrophic."
An article in the U.S. Air & Space Force magazine last year pointed out that at Andersen Air Base in Guam — possibly the most important U.S. airbase in the Pacific — regular deployments of B-2 bombers worth $2 billion each, as well as other strategic bombers (B-1B "Lancers" and B-52s), do not have hardened shelters built for these aircraft.
General McChrystal believes that the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs of Staff must prioritize necessary measures to protect their airbases and the aircraft deployed there, and "consider how to control the areas around these targets."
"This expands the range of threats you must address," noted this CNN interviewee. Clearly, such additional defense measures require substantial funds. This puts the U.S. in a budgetary dilemma: should "defense funds" be used to build robust shelters and develop effective means to counter drone and missile attacks on U.S. bases, or should more resources be allocated to enhancing its own strike capabilities, including preemptive strikes?
"If we only focus on defense without the ability to retaliate, this is not the optimal use of funds," General Herwig stated at the aforementioned meeting. "We have always known the need to strengthen base defenses."
Aircraft reinforcement may not become headline news among other national defense projects, including future air strike platforms like the new B-21 "Raider" bomber, each costing approximately $700 million. Additionally, President Donald Trump recently mentioned that the U.S. Air Force is developing the sixth-generation fighter F-47, with an initial estimated cost of around $300 million per unit.
"F-47 is an amazing aircraft, but if we don't protect it, it will be destroyed on the ground," admitted General Herwig. According to military experts, constructing a robust shelter that can nearly guarantee 100% safety for internal aircraft costs approximately $30 million.
Last month, Trump announced the U.S.'s integrated air defense system, "Golden Dome," with an estimated cost of no less than $175 billion. Despite its high cost, "Golden Dome" is almost entirely aimed at addressing long-range threats, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (including hypersonic warhead carriers) launched from the other side of the globe. Even the developers of "Golden Dome" do not know how this system, paired with substantial funds, would perform in potential confrontations with low-cost suicide drones and other lightweight attack drones.
In this context, Western analysts draw attention to the fact that one of the Russian air bases damaged in Ukraine's "Spider Web" operation is geographically closer to Tokyo than to Kyiv (the "White" airport in Irkutsk Oblast, located 18 kilometers northwest of Usolye-Siberia City and 85 kilometers northwest of Irkutsk).
In the age of drones, the vast territorial expanse of major world powers may become a factor of vulnerability rather than a barrier against such threats, at least because "each border crossing point could become a penetration point, and every cargo container on highways or railway lines should be suspect." Commentators in Washington note that this situation presents a "logistical nightmare" for major military powers with nuclear arsenals worldwide.
This parallels the U.S. situation. Air Force bomber bases may be deep within islands surrounded by oceans, but both large and small transport vehicles can reach them. If bases lack "island status" and geographic advantages in defending against external threats, the situation becomes even worse.
For example, the permanent base for all 20 B-2 bombers is Whiteman Air Base in Missouri. The base is about 600 miles (970 kilometers) from the nearest coast — the Gulf of Mexico, but only 40 kilometers south of Interstate 70, one of the main east-west transportation routes in the U.S., with thousands of freight vehicles traveling on this road daily.
Dyess Air Base in Texas, one of the deployment sites for B-1 bombers, is located south of another major east-west freight traffic route — Interstate 20.
"Think about all the containers and illegal immigrants entering our territory," suggested Carl Shuster, former Director of Operations at the Joint Intelligence Center of U.S. Pacific Command. "This correlation will raise concerns in certain circles in the U.S." Meanwhile, in the Pacific region, even the stronger offensive firepower that General Herwig hopes for may prove insufficient in conflicts with relevant countries.
According to the January report from the Hudson Institute, this is because the armed forces of relevant countries have significantly enhanced their defensive capabilities in recent years while taking coordinated measures to protect their aircraft. The report notes that in the central area of a potential direct armed conflict in a certain strait — relevant countries have over 650 hardened aircraft shelters.
However, the authors of the report believe that the best step Washington can take is to compel relevant countries to only increase defensive facilities when simultaneously strengthening their strike capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region.
Experts at the Hudson Institute believe: "In response, the armed forces of relevant countries may continue to allocate funds to additional expensive passive and active defense measures, thereby reducing investments in other areas, including strike capabilities and other power projection capabilities."
It is noteworthy that commentators point out that the U.S. military complained in the fall of 2024 that hundreds of drones had flown over Pentagon-related targets in the U.S. mainland in recent years. This is just the known situation of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM).
"I have no doubt that there are more incidents that we have not detected through our surveillance systems or with the naked eye," said General Gregory Gilliland, Commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), during a roundtable discussion with a small group of journalists at Peterson Air Base (21st Space Wing, Colorado) last October. Both headquarters of these two commands are located here.
The flight of drones near and above U.S. military bases worries the Department of Defense because the invasion of critical targets like Langley Air Base (where U.S. Air Force F-22 fighter-bombers are deployed) makes the Pentagon uneasy.
According to data provided by the North American Aerospace Defense Command at the time, 250 drone sightings were recorded in 2022, but this number has decreased in recent years, with 202 sightings in 2023 and already 163 by the end of 2024. Some U.S. military analysts link the peak of drone invasions in 2022 to the sharp escalation of global geopolitical tensions following the outbreak of the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine.
Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7513744942703870476/
Disclaimer: The article solely represents the author's views, and you are welcome to express your stance using the buttons below to vote for or against it.