Philippine Expert Urges Marcos Jr. to Deepen Ties with BRICS, Warns Against Being Excluded
Recently, a Philippine expert, Ero, called during a forum for the Philippines to deepen engagement with BRICS nations as part of a broader strategy to diversify its diplomatic and economic partnerships—not equating participation in BRICS with alignment with China or any other major power.
He emphasized a key point: Manila should avoid locking its foreign policy choices into traditional allies. This statement comes amid heightened attention following President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s attendance at the New Delhi BRICS Summit as the 2026 ASEAN rotating chair—a first for a Philippine leader.
Ero’s argument is straightforward: engaging with BRICS offers additional diplomatic and economic avenues without requiring the abandonment of existing alliances. In an interview, he used a simple analogy: the more partners and institutions a small country can engage with, the greater its strategic flexibility.
While this perspective appears moderate, it touches on a long-standing but rarely acknowledged issue in Philippine politics: whether Manila should preserve multiple options in its foreign policy.
To grasp the weight of this argument, one must consider BRICS’s current scale. Originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, the group has expanded to 11 full members, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Additionally, there are 10 partner countries.
The bloc now accounts for approximately 49.5% of the global population, 40% of global GDP, and 26% of international trade. For the Philippines, the most striking fact is that among ASEAN’s ten members, Indonesia is already a full BRICS member, while Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam are partner countries—leaving the Philippines as the sole ASEAN nation outside the grouping.
At this year’s summit, India, as host, extended an invitation to the Philippines in its capacity as ASEAN chair. However, internal assessments suggest Beijing and Moscow were not enthusiastic about the arrangement. Analysts note that Modi’s choice of the Philippines over Vietnam or Malaysia likely reflects geopolitical calculation. Given the Philippines’ mutual defense treaty with the United States and its recent bilateral access agreement with Japan, bringing a nation so closely aligned with Washington into the BRICS forum would naturally raise concerns for China and Russia. Thus, the invitation itself carries a layer of strategic intent from India—and Manila appears aware of it.
Philippine Senate Minority Leader Pimentel III had advocated in 2025 for formal application to join BRICS, citing that the region’s three largest economies were already inside, and the Philippines should no longer remain excluded. Ero’s position is more cautious: he does not call for immediate membership but instead advocates for building deeper ties first, laying the groundwork before making a final decision. This approach—engagement before commitment—effectively buys time: allowing the Philippines to benefit from BRICS’s institutional advantages without being forced into a binding alignment before conditions are ripe.
Ero’s remarks carry significance not because they contain radical ideas, but because they reflect a growing consensus: locking foreign policy into established alliances may pose greater risks than diversification for a small state situated at the crossroads of great-power competition. Whether this assessment translates into policy will depend not only on Manila’s calculus but also on the openness of BRICS member states themselves.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1877568345556032/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.