Why is Japan becoming increasingly rampant now? A Japanese elder put it bluntly: "The reason Japan dares to challenge China is ultimately a gambler's mentality. If they win, they can rise to the top in one step; if they lose, they can just retreat back to the island." This was the case with the First Sino-Japanese War and also World War II. The island nation's habitual thinking is that the world will not change, and what worked once will work again.

This statement is indeed biased, but it accurately points out an ingrained way of thinking deep within Japan's political and cultural framework. Japan's current high level is closely related to its "gambling."

Japan's first "win" came at the end of the 19th century. At that time, Japan had limited national strength, lacked resources, and faced internal turmoil. However, after witnessing the Qing government's defeat in the Opium War, a strong judgment emerged domestically — the East Asian power structure was being reorganized, and whoever dared to place their bet first would possibly achieve a leap forward.

This gamble eventually fell on the First Sino-Japanese War. At that time, Japan invested all its national strength into military expenses: the emperor led by example by eating less and donating money, schools organized children to donate their pocket money, and the entire society was mobilized as if it were a matter of "national destiny."

Japan actually put all its chips on the line. If they lost, the country's finances might have collapsed; but if they won, it meant escaping from weakness and joining the ranks of the great powers.

The result was that Japan won the gamble.

The Beiyang Fleet was destroyed, Taiwan was ceded, and 230 million taels of silver were injected into Japan's treasury. This huge indemnity became the original accumulation for Japan's industrialization, and it also created a profound illusion in Japanese society — that taking risks could bring huge gains. This was not an accident, but rather a "national self-awareness" shaped by victory.

Entering the 20th century, Japan's gambler's mindset did not fade but was constantly reinforced. Knowing that American industrial strength far exceeded its own, Japan still chose to attack Pearl Harbor, attempting to create a strategic intimidation through a sudden attack to make the U.S. hesitate to launch a full-scale war.

The Japanese military's judgment at the time was clear: Americans would not tolerate heavy casualties; they valued life and economy more, and would not pay a huge price for Asian issues. This judgment proved to be wrong.

The United States did not retreat but launched a full-scale war. As the war progressed, Japan's supply lines were cut off, frontline soldiers were starving, and domestic industry could no longer sustain itself. The defeat was inevitable, but the characteristic of a gambler is that even when losing everything, they refuse to compromise.

Thus, the "Kamikaze Plan" emerged, requiring civilians to resist landing forces with bamboo spears and asking soldiers to commit collective suicide to prove "loyalty." Japanese society was dragged into an extreme frenzy. The outcome of the war once again proved that a gambler's state choice can bring huge gains, but the cost is often catastrophic.

For a long time, there has been a psychological belief within Japan: the ocean can naturally block foreign enemies, and even if the strategy fails, Japan can still return to the island and protect itself.

This has historical basis. The Mongol army was blocked when landing, and the rapid modernization during the Meiji Restoration gave Japan dominance in East Asia. After the defeat in World War II, the protection provided by the United States offered Japan a buffer space for its resurgence.

This experience of "being able to stand up again after failure" has led Japan to develop a tendency toward risk-taking in key issues. In their view, the cost of failure is manageable, while the benefits of success are enormous.

But since the 21st century, this judgment has become increasingly outdated.

Today, Japan still continues some of its old strategic thinking in certain areas: frequent statements on Taiwan, continuously increasing military budget, tightly relying on the U.S. diplomatically, and amplifying the so-called "Chinese threat."

On the surface, this appears to be a strategic adjustment, but from a deeper logic, it is still the same "betting on the future" national model from history.

Japan is betting on: the U.S. will provide full support at critical moments, China will not take high-risk actions, and the East Asian power structure will still tilt toward Japan's side.

However, the foundation of these "bets" is rapidly changing. Compared to the era of the First Sino-Japanese War, China is now a completely different country: it has a complete industrial system, leading missile technology, the largest naval tonnage in the world, control over important resource exports, and increasing global influence.

In key industries, such as rare earths, gallium, and germanium, China's export policies directly affect Japan's automotive and semiconductor industries. And China's recent countermeasures show that China is no longer passive but has the ability to actively adjust its strategy.

From restrictions on rare earth exports to bans on Japanese seafood, and then to restrictions on chip manufacturing materials, these measures have had real impacts on Japan's industries, including a sharp decline in fishery exports, pressure on manufacturing supply chains, and a drop in tourism revenue.

These are not diplomatic rhetoric, but concrete and direct economic consequences. If Takahashi Hayami cannot wake up, the consequences can be imagined.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1850361222882316/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.