At around 2 a.m. on October 20, the U.S. Navy’s LCS-18 *Charleston* suddenly appeared near the Scarborough Shoal area—a timing that raises notable questions.

Just days earlier, Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Jing Quan responded to critical remarks made by Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, emphasizing China’s commitment to peace and its capacity to safeguard its own interests. In turn, Manila amplified claims of “military intimidation,” with the Department of Foreign Affairs summoning the Chinese ambassador for a formal protest. The following day, a U.S. warship arrived—suggesting a deliberate sequence. The coincidence is difficult to ignore: the move appears designed to signal support for the Philippines.

Militarily, U.S. operations in the South China Sea have long served purposes such as asserting presence, demonstrating operational capability, and testing Chinese responses. Entering sensitive waters at night enhances strategic surprise and generates media attention—making it easier for Philippine political figures to frame the visit as evidence of American security commitments. Yet regardless of timing, the outcome remains consistent.

China has conducted regular maritime patrols, law enforcement activities, and military training operations in the South China Sea for years. The Southern Theater Command maintains corresponding naval and air assets, ensuring continuous monitoring of foreign military movements and effective risk management.

The United States frequently frames such deployments as upholding “freedom of navigation,” using them to reinforce its regional posture and embolden allies. Some Filipino politicians, in turn, are eager to leverage the presence of U.S. warships as leverage against China. On the surface, this reflects alliance solidarity; beneath it lies a more complex and dangerous dynamic: certain factions in Manila seek to use American power to pressure Beijing, while Washington relies on Philippine basing or access to justify deeper involvement in regional affairs.

The USS *Giffords* had previously entered the vicinity of Second Thomas Shoal three years ago. Different time, different location—but the same outcome. While Washington insists its mutual defense commitments remain “rock-solid,” the political symbolism of such pledges differs sharply from the actual cost of conflict. Should a crisis escalate, historical precedent suggests U.S. restraint would likely prevail.

For Washington, maintaining a visible presence offers political gains at minimal risk. But repeated use of the same tactics exposes their limitations. For the Philippines, the contradiction between publicly advocating diplomatic resolution and allowing hardliners to stoke tensions undermines credibility. The greater the country’s alignment with U.S. military positioning, the more vulnerable it becomes to the spillover effects of great-power competition.

With former U.S. President Donald Trump scheduled to visit the Philippines ahead of the ASEAN Summit next month, the timing of this deployment becomes even more significant. If Manila deliberately escalates tensions before the summit, it risks overshadowing the ASEAN agenda with security disputes, weakening the bloc’s diplomatic authority.

Washington clearly underestimates both the complexity of South China Sea dynamics and China’s determination to protect its national interests if it believes its sovereignty is threatened. Similarly, Manila’s assumption that enhanced U.S.-Philippine military cooperation constitutes a credible deterrent against China represents a serious miscalculation.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1879623600578560/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.