[By Guancha Network Columnist XU Sai and ZHOU Jiaqi]
On April 15th, the decision made by the previous Biden administration to designate South Korea as a "sensitive country" officially took effect. This means that if South Korean researchers need to access laboratories under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Energy, they must apply 45 days in advance and undergo additional security reviews. Surprisingly, since January when the Biden administration made this decision, South Korea has not been officially notified through official channels but learned about its inclusion in the "Sensitive Countries List" (SCL) through informal channels.
As part of the U.S. strategy in East Asia and the only "ally" on the list, South Korea has felt a significant gap. Currently, South Korea is in the midst of a presidential early election, with political circles, business circles, and public opinion circles continuously reacting to this event. The "sensitive country" incident not only reflects the diplomatic asymmetry under the transition of U.S. administrations and the chaotic political situation in South Korea but also mirrors the uncertainty in the future direction of U.S.-South Korean relations.
Aftereffects of Yoon Suk-yeol's pro-American diplomacy
On April 4th, the Constitutional Court passed the presidential impeachment case, making Yoon Suk-yeol the second president of South Korea to be impeached. From his inauguration in March 2022 until his impeachment and resignation, Yoon Suk-yeol's government leaned heavily toward the United States, fully promoting value-based diplomacy, closely following the Biden administration's steps in energy, military, diplomacy, industry, and other fields.
This time, being listed as a "sensitive country" by the Department of Energy indirectly declared the bankruptcy of South Korea's value-based diplomacy.
Worse still, Yoon Suk-yeol, who should have mediated with the United States, was dismissed due to the "December 3rd" martial law order, leaving Prime Minister Han De-soo to act as president but facing numerous restrictions, particularly in diplomatic authority. With less than two months until the presidential election, facing the "surprise blow" from the U.S. government, it seems that South Korean elites and the public are only realizing now how many "misfortunes" Yoon Suk-yeol has sown—far more than they had imagined.
Since Yoon Suk-yeol fully implemented value-based diplomacy, South Korea has become overly dependent on and deeply tied to the United States, including in energy security, global supply chains, and national security. This has resulted in an increasing reduction in leverage during future government negotiations.
For instance, Samsung Group holds foreign investments accounting for 45% of its total shares, compared to domestic investments at only 16.2%. Among foreign investors, BlackRock Fund Advisors holds 3,444,030 shares, representing 5.01% of the company. Additionally, in key industries like automobiles and semiconductors, in 2024, South Korea's total car exports to the U.S. amounted to $34.7 billion, totaling 1.43 million units, accounting for 27% of all U.S. imports from South Korea, ranking first; SK Group, the third-largest conglomerate, announced in 2022 that its subsidiaries would invest $50 billion in the U.S. to build semiconductor, clean energy, and bioenergy industries.
Shareholding structure of South Korean Samsung Corporation Source: Samsung SDI
It is evident that during Yoon Suk-yeol's term, the national economy was significantly inclined toward American capital, indirectly providing Trump with more leverage after he assumed office. To some extent, whoever takes over, will need to prepare mentally for the "mess" left behind by Yoon Suk-yeol.
Thus, this continuous pro-American policy has left South Korea with no leverage to negotiate today.
In fact, South Korea has not been idle. Since being designated as a sensitive country, South Korea has never ceased diplomatic efforts with the U.S. In March, Minister of Trade, Industry and Energy An De-gon visited the U.S. to mediate and request the removal of the sensitive country designation, but failed to achieve the goal. South Korean parties continued efforts to communicate with the U.S., yet still could not immediately connect with the U.S. government.
Upon closer examination, the problem lies primarily within South Korea itself. With the old president removed and the new one yet to be elected, South Korea’s governance faces a transitional challenge. From December last year until June 2025, South Korea will struggle to effectively handle diplomatic matters for nearly half a year, with the "sensitive country" incident being a prime example.
In the face of Trump's tariff policies that continue to pressure South Korea's automotive and semiconductor industries, South Korea remains unable to send effective negotiation representatives. By contrast, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe dispatched confidants to lead a delegation to the U.S. on April 16th to negotiate tariff policies, even receiving special treatment for talks with Trump. This news drew significant attention from various sectors in South Korea, prompting the country to seek adjustments in its expectations regarding U.S.-South Korean alliance negotiations.
The U.S.' shifting attitude towards South Korea is intriguing
Regarding the classification of South Korea as an energy security-sensitive country, the U.S. cited research institution security concerns as the reason. As the "sensitive country" incident sparked the ongoing "nuclear armament theory," some opposition parties insisted that this move by the U.S. was related to South Korea's domestic "nuclear armament theory," while members of the ruling party also emphasized that South Korea should possess "nuclear potential." Thus, the issue of "nuclear possession" once again became a topic of South Korean national security.
Here, we must mention Yoon Suk-yeol, whose rise in the "nuclear possession" discourse is somewhat linked to him, especially during the later stages of his presidency.
On one hand, faced with North Korea's increasingly frequent missile tests and nuclear weapons development, South Korea lacks military counterbalances, leading to rising domestic "nuclear possession" sentiment. According to the "2023 Unification Awareness Survey Report," in 2021, support for possessing nuclear weapons reached its peak (71.3%), but began to decline in 2022, mainly influenced by domestic political factors and discussions on developing nuclear weapons independently.
On the other hand, many scholars believe that South Korea's "nuclear possession" is an important means to maintain balance on the Korean Peninsula. Even during Yoon Suk-yeol's administration, many internal figures of the People Power Party privately or openly expressed support for South Korea's "nuclear possession." This situation led to a general belief among both the public and officials that South Korea should "possess nuclear weapons."
Public opinion changes regarding South Korea's possession of nuclear weapons, September 2014 to April 2023 Data source: "2023 Unification Awareness Survey Report"
However, Koreans clearly did not learn from history and harbored unrealistic fantasies about the U.S.
Throughout, the U.S.-South Korean alliance has been viewed by South Korea as the foundation of their relationship. In reality, the U.S.' trust in South Korea has always been questionable. Whether it was Trump's tariff pressure, listing South Korea as a "sensitive country," or coercing South Korea to increase defense spending, these all highlight the high asymmetry of the U.S.-South Korean alliance and reflect the inherited political inclinations of successive U.S. administrations. It is worth noting that South Korea was previously listed as a sensitive country precisely because Park Chung-hee touched on the U.S.' red line—attempting to develop nuclear weapons independently.
Even during the Biden administration, although there appeared to be a friendly relationship with the Yoon Suk-yeol government, assisting in building the "global hub state" diplomatic label, in matters concerning national security, the U.S. still showed strong distrust of South Korea, forcing South Korea to adopt policies aligning with U.S. interests through alternative policies.
During the Biden administration, suppressing public discourse favoring South Korea's "possession of nuclear weapons" was a significant event affecting bilateral relations. In essence, the Biden administration explicitly refused this proposal, demanding that South Korea not "possess nuclear weapons." However, as an alternative option, former National Security Council Deputy Chief Kim Tae-hyo discussed establishing a "Nuclear Asset Consultation Group" to replace South Korea's independent nuclear weapon development with regular U.S. deployment of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, indirectly calming South Korean discourse on "nuclear possession." In response, Kim Tae-hyo stated at the NCG (Nuclear Asset Consultation Group) meeting at the Yoon Suk-yeol Presidential Office in 2023: "Today, I believe that extended deterrence by the U.S. is sufficient and certain, so South Korea does not need to consider independent nuclear weapons."
After Trump took office, although he nominated Elbridge Colby, who supported "South Korea's independent possession of nuclear weapons," to serve as Deputy Secretary of Defense and Republican Senator Roger Wicker publicly called for advancing "nuclear sharing agreements" with countries including South Korea, overall, Trump's vigilance against South Korea only increased.
Compared to the Biden administration's policy toward South Korea, Trump's approach was more direct. The U.S. originally intended to negotiate with South Korea through the "sensitive country list," but inadvertently increased its own leverage in tariff negotiations.
Last month 8th, Trump spoke with Han De-soo, bundling issues such as defense, energy, industry, military, and trade into one negotiation. From this, we can see that Trump's current policy mix toward South Korea can roughly be divided into four parts: first, the issue of defense cost contributions for U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. Trump claimed that South Korea's defense cost-sharing payments would be linked to tariffs. It is worth noting that during last year's election campaign, Trump referred to South Korea as a "cash machine" and strongly demanded that South Korea pay $10 billion as defense cost-sharing for U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, which is about nine times the amount of the existing agreement;
Defense cost contributions for U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, 2020-2026 (in 2026, it will be 16 trillion won, approximately 7.9 billion RMB) Chosun Ilbo
Second, Trump proposed purchasing large quantities of liquefied natural gas from Alaska and strengthening cooperation between the two countries' shipbuilding industries; Third, Trump suggested transforming the role of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, shifting from North Korean defense to containing China; Finally, imposing a 25% "tariff knock" to respond to the trade deficit with South Korea.
Clearly, this is a naked, servile test directed at allies, and South Korea appears powerless against it.
Long before Trump's successful re-election in 2024, South Korea had already predicted and prepared for various tariff treaties. Even Yoon Suk-yeol practiced "golf" to enhance his personal charm. However, the "December 3rd Martial Law Incident" caused a vacuum in diplomatic power, leading to the current awkward situation.
For the U.S., categorizing its ally and major trading partner as a "sensitive country" and formally implementing policies left by the previous president during the current administration is not only a typical example of Trump's "taking advantage of others in distress" merchant style but also a deliberate warning to South Korea's future international alignment.
The beacon's light fades
South Korea's domestic political situation continues to be chaotic, with the president impeached and removed from office. The conservative party used the "sensitive country" incident to imply cracks in the U.S.-South Korean alliance, guiding public opinion to strengthen the alliance and reverse its electoral decline; the progressive party seized the presidential election opportunity to create public opinion momentum, with Democratic Common Party member Lee Jung-hee stating in multiple media outlets that the "sensitive country" incident is the current government's biggest diplomatic failure.
As the only U.S. ally on the sensitive countries list, the public's feelings of betrayal, shock, and subsequent psychological resistance are understandable. Currently, the U.S.' global influence is visibly declining, and future multidimensional suppression of allies, for its own benefit, is foreseeable. Such suppression targets not only allies but the entire globe.
South Korea needs to recognize that relying solely on an alliance treaty to stand on equal footing with the U.S. is a fantasy. Whether in frontier fields such as nuclear energy, semiconductors, AI, and biotechnology, or in economic areas such as import-export trade and industrial cooperation, the U.S. is no longer seen as the sole beacon.
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Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7494527026230002226/
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